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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
[…]Georgia's defense policy directs that the nation's armed forces be sufficient to deter a 
military attack against its territory, its infrastructure, or its institutions. In the event that 
deterrence fails, the Georgian Armed Forces should be able to counter threats until assisted by 
the Intel-national[sic] community.1 
 
The Republic of Georgia has since its independence from the Soviet Union struggled through 
civil wars, economic crises and ethnopolitical turmoil. In addition, Georgia’s location in the 
South Caucasus,2 between NATO and Russia, is its geopolitical blessing and curse. It is a key 
state for regional cooperation, but also for regional conflict. Russia’s unwillingness to let go 
of the South Caucasus as a sphere of influence has not decreased. Georgia’s short experience 
of statehood is insufficient for handling domestic and foreign pressure and it is, thus, 
vulnerable to both national and international powers. The foundation for Georgia’s security is 
thus in its making – even after more than a decade of sovereignty. This search for security 
takes many forms. First and foremost Georgia has taken on a process of reforming its national 
security institutions, as the Armed Forces and ‘power ministries’, but the search also has an 
international dimension. In 1999, the Parliament declared that Georgia’s prioritised goal was 
membership in NATO and the European Union. Until this goal is reached, regional security 
cooperation is also on the Georgian agenda. However, the weak statehood of Georgia and 
embedded problems that lags from the Soviet era has slowed down processes of reformation. 
This has forced Georgia to rely on foreign aid. Aid and support, civil and military, is given by 
many states - most notably by the United States of America, which has undertaken a mission 
to train and equip the Georgian Armed Forces. This cooperation is, undeniably, the most 
rewarding way for Georgia to improve and develop both its military establishment and civil 
institutions while still fulfilling what is indicated in the quote above. Nevertheless, the road to 
security is long and scattered with potholes - maybe too many for a safe journey. If Georgian 
security is to be understood, these issues deserve attention and must be analysed. This is what 
this study will do. 
 
1.1 Objective of the Study 
Analyses of Caucasian and Georgian security are frequently made, but most often only by 
assessing the regional conflicts or the pipeline diplomacy of Caspian oil. In contrast to this, 
the objective of this study is: to analyse and critically assess Georgia’s security as of the year 
2003, by seeking to answer three separate questions, relating to the issues outlined above, 
namely: 
 
                                                 
1
”Georgia's Defense and Security Strategy”, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/defense.html, 
2003-05-01  
2
 N.B. Forms of spelling and usage of geographical names have no political meaning and should not be 
interpreted as a solidarity with one or another side in the various conflicts. Also, the ‘South Caucasus’ consists of 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (also know as The Southern Caucasus, Transcaucasus or Transcaucasia). 
North Caucasus refers to the southern part of the Russian Federation, i.e. the republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, 
Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkassia and Adygheia. When referring to the 
‘Caucasus’ or the ‘region’, neighbouring states of Turkey, Russia and Iran are also included. Finally, the 
institutions of Georgia are often written and abbreviated differently depending on translations and origin of the 
author, e.g. the same institution can be called: State Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry, Foreign Office, Department for Foreign Affairs et cetera. This study attempts 
to stick to the ones that are most frequently used. Naturally, one distinction is made between Ministry and 
Department, of which the latter is subordinated to the former. 
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1) What is the current status of Georgian’s national security structures? 
2) What are the current options and implications for Georgia concerning international 
security structures? 
3) What long-term issues and risks are connected to the US-Georgian security cooperation? 
 
1.2 Scope of Inquiry and Point of Departure 
As a detailed examination of all security-related issues in Georgia, and the South Caucasus, 
would pose too wide a scoop, much will be left aside. Therefore, lengthy historic descriptions 
will be avoided and instead suggestions for further reading will be given.3 As indicated, issues 
well covered in other works, as the struggle to various pipeline routes; the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and the impact on security by neighbouring states, will be 
awarded subsidiary roles in this analysis. What the study will do, however, is to approach 
Georgia’s security in three different ways and attempt to answer the questions posed above. 
Approaching an issue in three different ways, ignoring the important aspects of oil and posing 
different kinds of questions produce incoherent results, one could argue. However, this study 
does not attempt to elucidate in full for Georgia’s security, but rather to contribute to a wider 
understanding of the current situation in Georgia and the South Caucasus. The rationale for 
such an approach is found in the fact that all issues covered can be seen as tools that Georgia 
has for handling security. For security actors and analysts in Georgia, most things are no 
news, but other readers might be interested. This is done in three separate case studies that 
seek to answer the questions posed above by relying on different sources.  
 
While eschewing a theoretical discussion, a classic definition of security is that it is protection 
from something negative that might happen in the future. Given the fact that the Caucasus is a 
region of great political tension, Georgian security must be met on several levels. Firstly by 
having a strong and stable civil state that is able to handle domestic and foreign threats and 
risks; secondly by having a potent national security structure, such as a police force and 
Army; thirdly as part of a regional or multinational security structure. A security structure is, 
in this case, the formal institutions that play an important role in issues of security. At the 
national level this relates to both the governmental apparatus, but also such forces as single 
paramilitary units, while at the international level, organisations such as NATO and GUUAM.  
 
At all levels, a basic assumption of this study is that although ‘hard’ security as military 
capacity is a substantial part of the analysis, ‘soft’ cognitive security issues also have an 
impact on the security environment, which is something that has been neglected in other 
analyses. Most notably, this will be the case of the third study that will have a long-term 
perspective. Moreover, civil-military relations are something that will draw much attention in 
this study. The reason is that separation of civil and military powers is a key feature of a 
democratic state. As will be shown, Georgia adheres to this idea and thus it is worth to 
explore the current situation. It is, also, worth mentioning that this study solely approaches 
issues from Georgia’s horizon and therefore concerns of other actors, domestic or 
international, will be treated somewhat unfairly. This is especially the case throughout the 
study concerning the Georgian-Russian relation. Occasionally, and related to this, normative 
conclusions and comments will be made. It is important to underscore that this will be done 
from Georgia’s point of view and will only be made on the basis of what relates to the 
political intentions of the state. Concerning the method of utilising case studies, it can be 
                                                 
3
 For a comprehensive overview of the history and present situation of the Caucasus, see: Cornell, Svante E. 
(2001), Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of the Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Surrey: Curzon 
Press 
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stated that there is no intention to explain or generalise issues that will be discussed in this 
paper. The result is that the meaning of a case study differs somewhat from its ordinary 
academic practice. The rationale for this is to facilitate reading for someone who is only 
interested in certain parts of this paper. Therefore, the intention is to separate the part to the 
greatest extent possible. Finally, the study takes into consideration material and data until 
mid-July, 2003. Having said this, the essence of the three studies is outlined below. 
 
Case Study One – Georgia’s National Security  
Aim of the Case Study 
The aim of the first case study is to assess Georgia’s domestic institution for handling security 
issues. Therefore the first study seeks to answer the question: what is the current status of 
Georgian’s national security structures?  
 
Content of the Case Study 
Addressing three broad fields will answer this question. The first field, ‘Civil Security 
Structure’, includes such institutions as fall outside of the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Defence - as the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of the Interior. The second field is, 
hence, the formal military force under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, as the 
Army, Air Force and Navy. Finally, the withdrawal of Russian military troops from Georgia 
will be awarded special attention as this dimension underlies the general security reform in 
Georgia and takes a central role in the debate on Georgian security. Within all fields, the 
issues of current status, reform agenda and problems of reform will be addressed.  
 
Scope of the Case Study 
Although rich in detail, this study makes no claim to provide a comprehensive numeric 
overview of all units and equipment of the Georgian security establishment. The ‘frozen’ 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in addition to tension in other regions will not be a 
focus neither will the historical account of Georgia’s military be.4 For greater detail on 
military numbers and equipment, see the works by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute - SIPRI and the International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS. What the 
study does, however, is to provide a few examples of the military and civil security situation 
in Georgia by highlighting its status within important areas. The reform will be assessed in 
several ways and over-arching and embedded problems that are common form all security 
institutions will be devoted more attention than peculiarities of single entities and actors. The 
reason is first and foremost to underscore deeper problems and give an illustration of the 
current status of Georgia’s security actors and their capacity.  
 
Sources to be Utilised in the Case Study 
To a great extent, primary sources, as news and interviews, is the core of this case study, most 
notably from the resourceful publication by CIPDD, such as Army and Society in Georgia, 
which contains analyses and press digest from Georgian press until 2001. This press digest 
covers shortcomings derived from insufficient usage of sources in Georgian, at least to a 
minor extent. In addition, national newspapers such as Svobodnaya Gruzia, Georgia Today 
and The Georgian Messenger are utilised along with various reports and secondary analyses. 
Interviews will be conducted as a source of information and analysis, but mostly in order to 
highlight opinions of some central actors. The US Centre for Defence Information (CDI) has 
made a similar study as this one.5 However, it was made in 1998-1999 and therefore does not 
                                                 
4
 For an examination of issues that require attention in terms of assistance and aid, see: Cornell, Svante E. (ed) 
(2002B), The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment, Stockholm: SIDA/CCC 
5
 Feinberg, Jared (1999), The Armed Forces in Georgia, Washington: CDI 
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take the current reform into consideration, as this study will do. Moreover, the CDI study paid 
great attention to historical accounts and the composition of the various actors. Therefore, this 
study devotes more attention to reform, main problems and current status by analysing also 
the civil parts of security. 
 
Case Study Two – Georgia’s International Security 
Aim of the Case Study 
The aim of case study two is to analyse Georgia’s various alternatives for handling security at 
regional and international levels. Therefore, this study seeks to answer the question: what are 
the current options and implications for Georgia concerning international security 
structures? 
 
Content of the Case Study 
In turn, this case study will cover a majority of both the official organisations, such as the 
CIS, NATO and GUUAM as well as various proposed constellations of handling security and 
discuss their pros and cons from Georgia’s horizon. 
 
Scope of the Case Study 
As previously stated, as opposed to the majority of academic articles in international journals, 
this case study will analyse the issue from Georgia’s point of view, rather than from the 
institution at a focus. This means that judicial aspects of international treaties, opinions of 
every actor or a historical account will be left aside. Looking at main trends is most important 
in this aspect. 
 
Sources to be Utilised in the Case Study 
Naturally, the main sources to be utilised are those that deal with the various security 
organisations, alliances and quasi-alliances of the region, as Insight Turkey, Survival or the 
work by the RAND Corporation. In addition, prominent officials will be interviewed. Recent 
events and news will also be at a focus.  
 
Case Study Three – Georgia’s ‘American’ Security 
Aim of the Case Study 
The aim of the third case study is to assess one important way for enhancing Georgia’s 
security, namely the cooperation with the United States. Thus, this study seeks to answer the 
question: what long-term issues and risks are connected to the US-Georgian security 
cooperation? 
 
Content of the Case Study 
Consequently, this study consists of three main parts. The first part discusses the American 
and Georgian approaches towards cooperation and outlines the strategic context. The second 
part penetrates the political problems and issues related to the cooperation of democracy and 
economic growth. The third part assesses military and strategic key-points and analyses the 
impact of cooperation. 
 
Scope of the Case Study 
As indicated above, the cooperation on hydrocarbons is not a core concern of this study, as 
these questions are already well assessed in other works. The numerous bilateral agreements 
and consultations will not be detailed, nor will economic information on cooperation. Instead, 
the impact, or presumed impact, of the cooperation itself will be analysed in-depth.  
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Sources to be Utilised in the Case Study 
As this study is not meant to detail a situation, but instead to analyse the impact of 
cooperation, the sources to be utilised must differ somewhat. By this, the last case study aims 
to rely, to a major extent, on secondary sources, where US foreign assistance and policy are 
analysed against various backgrounds. Examples of this are the journal Survival and academic 
anthologies related to Caucasian security.  
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2 GEORGIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
Georgia has set onto a course of action that includes a restructuring of is security institutions. 
The Soviet legacy of parallel security institutions has left Georgia in a costly and politically 
unstable situation where intra-departmental fighting is common. Reform of the complex 
institutional security system, with links to paramilitary forces and organised crime, has been 
initiated, primarily with foreign assistance, but the road ahead is heavily protected. As stated, 
the aim of this study is to critically assess Georgia’s domestic institution for handling security 
issues. Therefore this first study seeks to answer the question: what is the current status of 
Georgian’s national security structures?  
 
Naturally, security structures encompass many dimensions worth taking into consideration, 
although this study only incorporates a handful. An important difference between this study 
and many others is that this does exclude the general security environment and instead focus 
on the actors and structures for managing security within this environment. As stated earlier, a 
key-theme in this study is civil-military relations. Here, this primarily includes the aspect of 
civil control over military and security forces, which must be said is a pivotal issue in states 
that strive towards greater democracy. This is most often measured by a way labelled 
concordance theory,6 which basically assess the level of military subjugation to civil 
structures. This study lacks the methodological tools for such a quantitative undertaking, but 
it will nevertheless be an important aspect when assessing security reform. In general, when 
canvassing such issues, the concepts of transparency, accountability and legitimacy also come 
at a focus. Finally, the process of replacing military structures by civil ones is just in the 
making, which makes any assessment somewhat bizarre, as the indications of reform is of a 
size that is almost impossible to measure and draw any conclusions from. 
 
2.1 Lack of Security Concept and Doctrine 
All activities involving civil security structures, defence forces, foreign policy and politics in 
general, require that the political establishment knows at least three things. Firstly what the 
issues and tasks are; secondly what that the short-term and long-term goals are and; thirdly, 
how to reach these goals. In most states, this is handled by having some kind of national 
security concept for general security policy and in addition, a defence concept and military 
doctrine. A concept is the ideology and compass for security. In combination with some kind 
of action-plan that specifies means to be used, they form a doctrine, which serves as roadmap 
for military and politicians. In addition, concepts and doctrines have the advantage of 
providing some predictability of policy, which is of gain for all actors as it builds stability. 
However, a fundamental problem is if politicians do not know what kind of security the state 
is opting for, a codification of a concept is difficult.  
 
As Georgia has never had a codified security concept, but only a vague and incoherent idea of 
security that incorporate all and nothing at the same time, it can be stated that real such 
concepts and doctrines mentioned above are missing. Indeed, the process of forming has 
started but as the meaning and content related to these issues are unknown to a great extent.7 
It is true; a security concept is not a required for every state if it has a long history of coherent 
                                                 
6
 See, for example: Schiff, Rebecca (1995), “Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: a Theory of Concordance”, 
Armed Forces and Society, vol 1, no 22, pp 7-24 
7
 Yet, these ideas have been in the developing phase for several years, for example see: - ”National Security 
Concept of Georgia”, The Strategic Research Centre, Tbilisi: November, 1998 
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and predictable security policy has clearly illustrated the intentions and priorities of the state. 
However, this is not the case in Georgia and thus the need of a concept is pivotal.  
 
In January 2003, a conference was held on the topic, which is one real step towards a coherent 
policy.8 It was shown that at least there is an understanding of the needs, but the development 
is still at the drafting stage. An International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) is currently 
assisting Georgia in drafting a new concept.9 The result will likely be presented before the 
General election on 2 November 2003, but there are many disparate views involved and 
expectations should not be too high. This is of great importance and if the Parliament adopts 
the concept it will enjoy the status of a law, which would require a qualified majority for 
future changes. The result is thus greater stability, legitimacy and predictability.10 This would 
be the first real concept of this kind in Georgia. During the last decade there has only been a 
broad and vague notion about what the unwritten concept encompasses. Currently, there are 
but a few things that give an indication of future priorities, for instance the state budget. 
Presidential decrees and laws naturally give an indication of intention, but as the 
implementation often is poor, it is of little interest. Finally, by looking at past and recent event 
it is also possible to draw some conclusions of the status of the current security structures. 
Some of these issues outlined above will be awarded attention in this study. 
 
Speaking about a military doctrine, it can be said that Georgia does have a codified military 
doctrine, dating from 2 October 1997. In sum it had clauses on:11 
 
1. Banning of transportation, deployment and productions of nuclear armament. 
2. Prohibition of usage of armed forces for domestic political purposes. 
3. Definitions of the functions of military bodies and separations of responsibilities. 
4. Declaration of Georgia’s intentions to cooperate with the UN and other organisations. 
 
In addition, it pointed out two potential causes of war, namely “[…] separatist forces aiming 
to destabilize the state and the aspirations of some states to dominate the region with the use 
of force”.12 Obviously, this is a political product that is of little use as a security ideology or 
an agenda for handling defence and security issues. This is partly why it is neither used nor 
frequently analysed. It is a dead document. What the doctrine does, however, is to illustrate 
two objects that the security apparatus must handle. In reality, this points towards the conflicts 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with other paramilitary forces on Georgian ground, and, 
secondly, Russian interference in Georgian internal affairs. It can thus be stated that these two 
potential causes of war are what Georgia believes must be priorities objectives for the security 
establishment. Hence, the coming analysis will assess issues against this background. 
 
2.2 ‘Civil’ Security Structures  
It must be remembered that protection of the territorial integrity of Georgia is not solely a task 
for the military troops. Territorial defence is based on three lines of defence. The first line 
consists of Border Troops, followed by a second line of regular Army units. Finally, a third 
                                                 
8
 Miller, Eric A. (2003), “Georgia Struggles to Develop National Security Framework”, Eurasianet, 28 March, 
2003 
9
 Smith, David (2003B), presentation on US Engagements in Georgia at the GFSIS, 23 June, 2003 
10
 Interview with Dr Archil Gegeshidze, former National Security Advisor and currently Senior Fellow of the 
GFSIS, 26 June, 2003 
11
 Feinberg, Jared (1999), The Armed Forces in Georgia, Washington: CDI, p 18f 
12
 Feinberg (1999), p 18 
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line of Interior Troops and officers from the Ministry for State Security exist. The first and 
second echelons are assessed in part 2.3 and the third one below. 
 
Civil Security Actors 
The number of organisations and institutions that can be said to be a part of a larger security 
structure is difficult to assess, as many groups are informal, nameless gangs of bandits. In 
addition these merges are sometimes between illegal paramilitary groups and the national 
defence establishment, at least during the most turbulent years of the last decade. Overlapping 
and parallel structures of official institutions do not only make analytical evaluations 
impossible, it if also a key problem to reform and decision implementation. However, it is 
possible to distinguish between three different kinds of actors, namely: governmental, official 
international, and paramilitary. Although the first group is at focus here, knowledge about the 
other groups serves at least two purposes. First, it highlights the groups that existing security 
forces must handle, especially the civil forces, as paramilitary groups mainly operate in a 
mixed sphere of criminality and military. Secondly, it indicated the background of the 
existing structure and thus some of its contemporary problems. However, to avoid a lengthy 
description, information on the paramilitary forces is found in appendix three of this study as 
they are not to be seen as tools for Georgian security policy.  
 
Governmental Forces 
Ministry of the Interior (MOI aka MVD): The MOI is the largest and most influential of 
the governmental institutions. Its total strength includes 23.400 personnel and has several 
departments and units. The majority of the staff are ex-Soviet police officers and its links to 
the old Soviet structure has made is less popular than the Ministry of Defence. After some 
problems in the early 90s, however, it has consolidated its position. Areas of responsibility 
include assisting local police, maintaining law and order, fighting terrorism and organised 
crime, guarding prisons and special cargo transportations.13 Much complains have been heard 
about its position on human rights. Some of its responsibilities include property protection, 
which has been a major source of bribes as it gives opportunity for extortion. In addition to 
this, the level of corruption has been extremely high and related to the contraband smuggling 
of tobacco and petrol. Officials have also often been excessively interested in fining drivers 
for non-existing traffic violations. In sum, it is a stronghold of political élite groups that by 
intrinsic rules of extra-budgetary spending enjoys a strong economic position.14 
 
Interior Troops (of the MOI): The Interior Troops is a civil, but armed, branch of the MOI, 
based in Kutaisi and Tbilisi among other places. It includes 6400 servicemen in addition to 
the ordinary staff of the MOI - on paper that is. During 200 it only got 59% of the conscripts 
needed to fill its units.15 Its function has been a mixture of police and military responsibilities. 
The bulk of its weapons are Kalashnikov assault rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, sub-
machine guns, Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). In 
addition, one airborne brigade serves under the MOI (located east of Tbilisi). 
 
State Department of Border Guards (of the MOI)(aka SBDD): Until 2003, the SBDD was 
a part of the Ministry of Defence during times of war, but is now being transferred to the MOI 
                                                 
13
 Feinberg (1999), p 25  
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 Darchiashvili, David (2003), ”Georgia: A Hostage to Arms”, The Caucasus - Armed and Divided: Small Arms 
and Light Weapons Proliferation and Humanitarian Consequences in the Caucasus, Matveeva, Anna & 
Hiscoock, Duncan (eds), London: Saferworld, p 76f 
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 Press Digest, Army and Society in Georgia, Center for Civil-Military Relations and Security Studies; 
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, January-February, 2001  
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as its police functions will increase. As an example, it will enjoy investigate responsibility. In 
includes some 8700 persons and is armed with APSs, vessels and possesses a Motorised 
Rapid Reaction Force.16 In addition, the US has contributed with three helicopters and two 
patrol planes. 17 Yet, it has been chronically underfunded (by $2,7 million in 2001) and has 
not been able to carry out its duties, not even along the northern borders. However, its head, 
General Valleri Chkheidze, has a good reputation of only spending money on relevant issues, 
as things necessary for his soldiers.18  
 
Gen Gulua Special Forces (of the MOI): This is a special unit that directly reports to the 
Minister of the Interior. Its two operative brigades are deployed near Pankisi and Abkhazia.19  
 
Coast Guards (of the MOI): The current reform of the armed forces will subordinate the 
Georgian Coast Guards to the Border Protection Department of the MOI, starting in 2003. 
 
Ministry of State Security (MSS): The MSS, a civil institution, has about 4000 servicemen, 
of which a minor part constitutes of a special force detachment and some combat guard 
units.20 Five years ago it also consisted of some 40 at the State Intelligence Department21 that 
now is an independent body. The most important responsibilities of the MSS include 
monitoring of anti-governmental plots and terrorism as well as investigation of economic 
crimes. The foundation of the MSS is the old Soviet State Security Service - KGB. As KGB 
had little popular support and was too integrated with Russian structures, it dissolved in the 
early 90s after having been split up in Intelligence, Information and Special Forces 
Departments. Ex-KGB officer Igor Giorgadze then created a new organisation - the MSS. He 
was later accused of having a role in the 1995 assassination attempt on Shevardnadze. The 
Airborne Brigade, which is now under the MOI, was first created as a part of the MSS. The 
MSS has had close links to the Russian Troops in Georgia – the GRVZ (see 2.4). Currently it 
is headed by Valerian Khaburdzania who denies that there are any informal links, whatsoever, 
between the MSS and the GRVZ.22 MSS’ present responsibilities of handling economic 
crimes have raised doubts about are undertakings. Allegedly, the responsibilities of 
supervising tax crimes have provided fertile soil for incomes of bribes by officials promoting 
payments of ‘fees’ instead of taxes.23  
 
Special State Guard Service: (SSGS) and the Presidential Guard (SGS): 3000 persons 
serves in the SSGS/SGS and initially it was set up by people from the MOI and the MSS. The 
SSGS is concerned with protection of pipelines, governmental agencies and embassies. 24 The 
SGS, which serves under the SSGS, is focused on protecting the President. Currently, Mr 
Papaskiri, who is said to be honest and professional, heads the SSGS.25 The budget of the 
SGS has been growing steadily the last couple of years. In 2001, the budget was around $3 
million, which is considered to be rather high if the staffs of 3000 men are considered.26  
                                                 
16
 Darchiashvili (2003), p 85 
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Ministry of Justice (MOJ): The Ministry of Justice is, naturally, not focused on combat 
activities, but it has some 3000 staff armed with light weapons. In 2001, the Minister of 
Justice, Mikhail Saakhashvili, created a Special Task Force consisting of 60 persons (with an 
aim of having 300). Its purpose is handling of riots and hostage crises in prisons and colonies. 
After Saakhashvili’s resignation, it ceased to exist rumours had it.27 In fact it still exist but has 
not taken part in any major operation since.  
 
Ministry of Finance (MOF): The Georgian Ministry of Finance of today includes the former 
Ministry of Taxes and Revenues, and has an armed Special Legion of 370 men. However, it 
has no role in state protection and no heavy weapons.28 
 
State Department of Intelligence (SDI): The SDI is the military intelligence agency of 
Georgia. Before 1998 it was subjugated to the MSS but is currently independent and reports 
direct to the president. According to the Head of the SDI, this reform improved the efficiency 
of the SDI as it could focus on pure intelligence issues and further reform is not planned. Its 
mandate only covers foreign operations.29 
 
National Security Council (NSC): Although the NSC is not an armed security actor, it has 
great importance in policy planning and implementation. It is headed by the President and 
consists of the State Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the 
Minister of State Security, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Secretary of the National 
Security Council. Its main function is to serve as a consultative body to the President.30 
 
Official International Forces 
Transcaucasian Group of Russian Troops (GRVZ, aka TGET): Today, Russia has around 
500 soldiers at the closed Gudauta base in Abkhazia and some 5-6000 soldiers at the two 
bases in Batumi and Akhalkhalaki. However, these are addressed further in chapter 2.4 of this 
study. 
 
CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF): As a part of a UN mandate, Russia has some 2500 
troops located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the umbrella of the CIS, which will also 
be address in 2.4. 
  
The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG): The UNOMIG, stationed 
in Sukhumi, has since 1993 served as observers of some parts of Abkhazia, notably near Gali 
and Kodori. Their military staffs counts 116 and the civilian 272.31 UN Military observers are 
unarmed and rely on protection of the CISPKF. However, as the UNOMIG is not a part of the 
Georgian security structure and does not constitute a threat to be handled by these structures, 
it will not be further addressed.  
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 Press Digest, Army and Society in Georgia, Center for Civil-Military Relations and Security Studies; 
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Civil Reform Agenda 
Judging from the descriptions given above, two points can be elaborated on. The first point is 
that security problems as border problems, secessionist regions, trafficking, smuggling and 
violations or territorial integrity will be handled by this structure (and the MOD which is 
analysed in chapter 2.3). Although these risks are not an object of this study, a priority of any 
security reform should be to form a structure potent of managing these risks. The second point 
is that the structure actually brings along security problems by its form and even content. The 
forms of overlapping responsibilities create a structure that is inefficient and lacks 
transparency. The content refers to corruption and conceptual problems. Consequently, a 
security reform must address both points outlined above. 
 
In general, the process of reformation is very slow and not at all prioritised according to 
General Lieutenant Valerii Chkheidze.32 When reform is discussed by NGOs, Western 
experts and even the Government, there are several areas that need to be dealt with. The MSS 
has understood that it is difficult to assess the problem of the own organisation. Therefore all 
power ministries and security bodies of the state form a working group to tackle the issue. It is 
financed by the general state budget and lies under the executive branch. No results have yet 
been seen, as it is just in the making.33  
 
Just to mention one example as an illustration how a traditional security problem has an 
obvious link to the security structures is the wide-open borders. The (Georgian) TV-program 
’60-minutes’ staged a fake smuggling during the summer of 2003 in order to show how easy 
it is. They labelling a box containing fake items ‘weapons and drugs’, and sent it from Turkey 
to Georgia without problems. The structures that are supposed to handle this are the border 
guards, the customs department, the sixth police department for economic crimes, the security 
service and the legion.34 This complicated Tbilisi’s control over the situation and illustrates 
how integrated the problems are. As another example that shows Tbilisi’s lack of control is 
that the Custom Service was expected to transfer some 300 million Lari to the government. 
Currently only 24 million has been transferred. The newly appointed head of the Customs 
Department, Tarkhan Mouravi, is not expected to be able to change the situation.35  
 
Structural Reform 
Firstly, the very core of the problem, at an institutional level, is the overlapping of functions 
and responsibilities. This leads to clashes and conflicts of interests that work in two ways. 
When a security problem emerges, two or more departments assume that another body will 
handle it and thus no one is responsible or accountable for it. The opposite can occur too - 
when there are some benefits from handling an issue, several bodies fight for it. Secondly, the 
mixture of civil and military duties and responsibilities is a phenomenon that needs to be 
abolished.  
 
For the MSS, there are a few issues that deserve attention. One of the most important ones is 
the attempt to reform the Ministry to a civil security service where counter-intelligence, 
investigations and analysis are the core issues. Preferably, the current MSS should be replaced 
completely, Valerian Khaburdzania argues. Demilitarising of the Ministry will, surely, take 
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time, as there is no plan to replace all military staff at once, but instead increase the amount of 
civilians over time. Furthermore he sees the separation of the MSS and the SDI as a waste of 
resources as more staff is needed now. It is also doubtful whether this will generate any 
visible results, he further argues. Nonetheless, it is of great value in a democratic aspect.36 It 
can thus be concluded that when the Minister for State Security emphasises democracy there 
are some good prospects for improvements. Yet, it must be remembered that although he is 
considered to be a reformist, with a somewhat clear and democratic agenda, he has been in 
office for two years and the results have been modest so far. 
 
Additionally, the MSS considers its internal problems to be two-fold. One aspect is the old 
mentality of the Soviet era that still colours everything, second, the mix of old-time staff and 
the new educated generation poses serious problems in communication at work. This has 
proven to be even more important than economic problems as sometimes when heads of 
various departments are allocated funds for reform, the spending have been dubious. The way 
out of this destructive and inefficient situation is, according to Gela Suladze, to reform the 
structure in such a way that it is made easy to dismiss people if they do not perform, and 
secondly to raise wages to that there are greater incentives to work. Under the current laws 
and regulations this is, apparently, impossible, but new laws are currently under way and are 
expected to be fully adopted in early 2004.37  
 
Seen in the light of concordance theory, a few things can be noted. Georgia’s attempts to 
subjugate military structures to political ones are indeed an indication of awareness. However, 
subjugation to political structures is not necessarily the same thing as subjugation to civil ones 
in the notion of Parliamentary and democratic control. Then the question arises whether the 
civil armed forces of the MSS and MOI are to be seen as equal to the MOD in this sense. If 
this is the case, all high-ranking officials of the Ministries and other relevant bodies should be 
civil and subjugated to control of the Parliament. Presently, most of the interviewees have 
been asked about this and it seems that the general Georgian standpoint on this is unclear. It is 
something to pay attention to when reforms are to be undertaken. 
 
Currently, there is a discussion going on whether or not military personnel should be allowed 
to serve as MPs. The opinion points toward not allowing but no decisions are made. This 
could have several effects. Firstly, it could be seen a step towards a clear and extensive 
separation of military and civil bodies. Today, Military or Police officers are not allowed to 
serve as MPS or as civil bureaucrats at the same time.38 Secondly, it could be a step towards a 
reform of loyalty. This means that MPs should not be allowed to have other businesses than 
their official duties. Thus one of the core problems is the existing double loyalty. As the 
wages are extremely low, it would be hard to discourage MPs (as other officials) to have other 
incomes, which would run the risk of increasing informal ways of making extra money. It is 
questionable, however, if makes a difference. Georgia has laws and structures, but its 
potential is not fully utilised. Also, even if the wages were doubled, the level would still be 
extremely low and would provide no incentives to refrain from taking bribes. The immunity 
to prosecution of MPs also naturally infringes on the ability to handling the problem. 
However, there are methods for expelling MPs from office by voting in Parliament. Although 
voting has occurred, MPs have never been dismissed in this way. Partly this can be explained 
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by the fact that the laws and regulations are blurry and partly due to the fact that most people 
in Parliament has been involved in some kind of criminal activity which complicates the 
situation and move questions of ethics into a grey zone.39  
 
About transparency, the MSS has reached the conclusion that a certain level of openness will 
improve the public opinion of the old KGB structure. The PR-campaign launched during 2003 
included intentions of greater openness and intentions to communicate with the citizens. The 
budget will also be more transparent than before.40 This PR-campaign is carried out on 
several levels. One is greater exposure of the Minister of State Security in media and the other 
is the recent launch of a new web site that contains some information about the activities of 
the MSS.41 Yet, there are no specific goals to be fulfilled and no polls are intended in order to 
measure if improvements are made or not.42 From an anticorruption point of view, 
institutional change relates to three things. The first is that there should be great transparency 
within the security structure as far as financial and budgetary issues are concerned. Secondly, 
there must be a clear civil-military separation. Thirdly, the power ministries must have a clear 
division of responsibilities that include a separation of police and civil units. 
 
The International Security Advisory Board has been cooperating with the Anticorruption 
Bureau of Georgia on issues of transparency and the outcome has been a set of 
recommendations to the President. The bottom line of the document is, not surprisingly, that 
all totalitarian lags must be abolished. Thus the focus of state activities should be the 
individuals, society and state, not the regime. This is especially important in the aspect of 
security. For instance, the old KGB structures had the responsibility of issues of social control 
related to ideology that today has no place in Georgia today.43  
 
Furthermore, the ISAB suggested in 1998 that the Interior Troops should be under the MOD 
and the Border Guards under the MOI. Georgian authorities agreed, but any signs of a will to 
implement the idea have not been seen. Strangely enough, the current situation is 
unconstitutional.44 Mustafa Aydin argues that it is the Soviet heritage that constitutes the 
problem, as Georgia does not have a tradition of handling its own problem by self-
governance.45 It is true that Georgia lacks experience and that its situation differs from other 
post-communist states as Estonia and Poland. This is also visible within the economic and 
democratic sphere. However, this fact is insufficient as explanation of lack or political will of 
implementations.  
 
It must be remembered that reform of the security structures are supposed to be undertaken 
simultaneously and the Georgian political system has some peculiarities that also have an 
impact on the reforms. As an example, the current constitution is tailor-made to suit 
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Shevardnadze and in 2005 he is to leave office. It is still unclear what will happen to him and 
the constitution.46 As another example, the conditions for presidential elections are under 
review and a new office of the Prime Minister is being created. In addition, there are ideas on 
a two-chamber Parliament and this idea goes hand-in-hand with issues of territorial 
integrity.47 This may enhance the existing inter-regional clashes, but it also provides a 
legitimate venue for doing so. That is better than the informal and illegal structures of today. 
The reform is not only a process that incorporates several domestic aspects, but is also largely 
connected to international trends. This is particularly the case as foreign intervention, due to 
geopolitical concerns, it affects Georgia’s security sphere.48 
 
Responsibility Reform 
Another important aspect of the reform that has been suggested is ‘areas of responsibility’, 
which connects to the structural reform. This both relate to the broad security responsibilities 
of protection Georgia from various threats, but also at a detailed level. It is believed that 
removing responsibilities of handling economic crimes from the MOI would reduce the 
opportunities for receiving bribes. As said, forbidding officials to have business interests on 
the side of public duties is another idea.49 There is a contradiction in this aspect. As an 
example, since 1995, the MOI has been able to stop and eradicate extortion by several 
paramilitary groups. However, after this, the MOI has taken over the role by replacing them.50  
 
What is most important, however, is to see whether there are any clear visions for the security 
structures. The new Minister of the MSS adheres to a reformist agenda and is by many seen as 
fairly depoliticised.51 He states that a German system of a Security Service with the mission to 
protect the constitution would be positive. What he refers to is the German Security Service, 
Verfassungschutz, which literally means ‘constitution protection’ that has a role of fighting 
crimes directed against Germany as a state, as terrorism. This includes both domestic 
investigate tasks and direct counter terrorism by utilising special squads at the ‘GSG 9’. When 
asked to elaborate on the issue, Khaburdzania also refers to the American model of FBI of a 
special police force for certain types of crimes with special powers that are well defined.52  
 
About the responsibilities, he states tax crimes and economic crimes by individuals should be 
handled by the investigative parts of the Police or the Ministry of Finance, however, as soon 
as the crimes are organised and of greater scale, it should fall under the responsibilities of the 
MSS, for example concerning contraband. Apparently, the various power ministries have no 
problem of cooperation amongst each other. Nevertheless, the NSC is currently working on 
making clear distinction on the problem of overlapping responsibilities and develops a long-
term strategy for handling potential problems.53 The problem of overlapping responsibilities is 
a Soviet legacy, but new laws that are expected in 2004 will clear the distinctions of areas of 
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responsibility. The risk of having too many security actors is acknowledged by Kaburdzania 
who points out that some of them, as the Legion of the MOF, are of little use as their level of 
professionalism is very low.54  
 
Staff Reform 
A third dimension that needs to be reformed is the unofficial system of appointment by 
nepotism or political/personal loyalty. As it is, several attempts, including the newly created 
Anticorruption Bureau, has had little impact of the MOI. The loyalties to Shevardnadze make 
officials immune to certain legal actions.55 The recently appointed Minister of the MOI, Koba 
Narchemashvili, is said to be a friend of reform. So far, the action of improving and reforming 
the important Property Protection Department or replacing old friends to the previous minister 
has not been done.56  
 
Forming a professional bureaucratic apparatus has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Professional officials, as opposed to politically appointed, have the advantage of good 
continuity, which reduces the number of staff needed. At the same time, it runs the risk of 
becoming a power by its nature. Every organisation has a basic wish to survive that is more 
important than serving the interests of the state and electorate. Thus the logic prescribes that 
reductions and reform will be met with scepticism. There is also an aspect of accountability. 
If the whole political apparatus is appointed on professional grounds, it is not accountable in 
the same way as parliamentarians. Georgia’s approach to this issue is appointments should be 
made on professional grounds rather than political. Traditionally, the way has been by having 
professional bureaucrats that have been appointed on other grounds than professionalism, as 
nepotism or parochialism. Most parties, where Zhurab Zvania’s and Mikhail Saakhahsvili’s 
parties are excluded, have elements of clans-based loyalties that reminds of the old 
nomenclature system. By this, any structural reform is doomed to fail. A change of power in 
favour of the opposition bring along two dangers. One is that the opposition is defeated and 
the other is that even if they are successful, they fall into the clan-system and nothing has 
changed.57 Khaburdzania also sees this as a key problem. His vision concerning staff reform 
is to increase the level of professionalism. First of all, the organisation should be a civil 
instead of a military one. What is more, more money is needed in order to raise wages so that 
the best people will be attracted to the MSS. Funds are also greatly needed for investigating 
internal problems within the Ministry.58 The Anticorruption Bureau that states that 
redundancies are one of the best ways to break the ‘principle of the locked circle’, which is 
something that supports this idea. The result would be that wages could be raised when 
surplus staffs are expelled. Presumably the expelled staff will become entrepreneurs and 
contribute to Georgia in a better way than they did within the governmental bodies.59 As most 
of the staff cannot be replaced overnight, measures must be taken concerning the mental 
approach to reform. Indeed this is a difficult task to undertake, and the Anticorruption Bureau 
acknowledges the problem and adheres to a long-term preventive agenda that encompasses 
three parts. The first part is about legal actions concerning crimes of corruption. The second 
point is education and awareness rising on the topic and finally general anticorruption 
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propaganda is made. This has proven to be successful in Lithuania and in Hong Kong and the 
bureau believes that those models can be applied on Georgia.60 
 
Key Issues and Problems of Reform 
From what has been said, it is clear that Georgia actually lacks an explicit reform agenda. 
Problems that the reform aims to handle are both at theoretical and practical levels, which to a 
great extent relate to fundamental principles of how to organise a society. Despite the fact that 
a real vision is missing, some of the cases in point of the actual reform in itself will be 
addressed below. They mainly relate to structural, conceptual, legislative problems. 
 
Structural Problems 
Comparatively, and relatively, speaking, Georgian legal and political institutions were rather 
efficient during Soviet times.61 However, institutional ‘lags’ from the USSR and Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia’s political manoeuvring, have come to set the stage for the reform problems of 
the present. As said, the Soviet-style organisation with several parallel structures with 
overlapping responsibilities complicates decision-making, implementation and above all, 
reform. If a democratic perspective is applied, it is clear that these questions of security in 
general, and those related to institutions in particular, have a democratic deficit. Anna 
Matveeva argues that all these democratic institutions, that Georgia actually have managed to 
create is just a façade, as they are no leverage on the security development.62 This contrasts 
recent European trends towards greater transparency even within the military field. There is 
no openness in Georgia’s concerning defence and security issues. Not even the Parliament has 
the right to review the internal budgets of the power ministries. This causes a distancing 
between civil and military-security institutions where trust and legitimacy are sacrificed on 
the altar of secrecy. Like most states of former Soviet Union, the secrecy related to security is 
substantial. In the US, for example, the level of openness is so much greater that it is possible 
to obtain public information on Georgian military issues that are closed information in 
Georgia. Considering Georgian NATO and EU aspiration, it is interesting to look at any 
Georgian strives towards increased openness. In is generally believed that the greater level of 
transparency is, the greater support for military structures by the public. It is difficult to 
improve the democratic features of the system if reform and problems cannot be assessed 
openly or even by the Parliament. Another thing that connects to democracy is that the 
President presently appoints the Minister of State Security (among others) and in order to 
increase the legitimacy it would prefer to have this done by the Parliament instead. If is 
obvious, but it is of greater importance for power ministers.63 
 
Considering corruption, several things can be said. The fact that the MOI is involved in 
dubious activities is a key factor. Narchemashvili, the very Minister of the MOI, has admitted 
in public that the MOI has been involved in criminal activities in Pankisi, as smuggling and 
upsurge. Naturally, this has an impact on both the actual activities of the MOI and how other 
actors view the Ministry and Georgia in general. A common argument is that as the MOI staff 
earns money by using the Property Protection Department, is must be removed from MOI’s 
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area of responsibility. This would not necessarily solve the problems, as the mission must be 
taken care of by some organisation. This would include greater opportunities for private 
security agencies. The result is also that a strong power base for the MOI disappears.64 It can 
therefore be assumed that the MOI would be unwilling to undertake such a reform, as some of 
its employees would loose form it. Yet, doing so, in combination with greater transparency, 
would improve perceptions of the MOI. The problem of corruption within the MSS, on the 
other hand, is allegedly extremely small. There exist, therefore, no action-plan for reducing 
corruption within the Ministry. However, there are two priorities of the MSS in this respect. 
One is to fight general criminal activity within the Ministry and the other is to investigate and 
analyse criminality in order to combat the problem more efficiently.65 Hence, the internal 
affairs department of the MSS handles most of the work concerning investigations of 
corruption and crimes within the MSS. The inspectors of the MOF have no authorisation to 
investigate problems of the MSS, although the Parliament and President have, but those 
powers are rarely used.66 
 
The notion of ‘statehood’ is a key factor in the reform process.67 Without a strong state and a 
common conception of statehood, the reform is pointless in many ways. Development of 
civil-society goes hand-in-hand with reform of the political bodies but there are reasons to 
believe that a thorough reform must be imposed from above. The impact by NGOs in Georgia 
is limited and is dependent on donors’ will. Analyses suggest that the role of the civil-society 
is increasing within the security sector, but the impact is still small. The reason is that within 
the most important areas, as concerning the situation in Abkhazia, actors are unwilling to 
compromise on their political objectives even if they are positive to cooperation.68 A similar 
idea can be suggested in relation to Georgia’s civil security structure. Even if many actors 
agree on the need of reform and work for improving Georgia, their personal situation makes 
them dependent on the structure in which they work.  
 
‘Conceptual Problems’ 
An underlying problem, which relates to what has been outlined above, is that lack of 
coherent system thinking. There are no common guidelines of what the notion of security or 
institution building is. This means that all executives can interpret and carry out issues while 
acting according to their own belief in what Niko Melikadze calls a “conceptual cacophony”. 
The result is that Georgia, under Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze, is carrying out a 
systematic reform, or tries to, without system thinking. Thereby, institution building becomes 
organisational building, which in reality is just an enlargement of the bureaucracy. Once these 
new, and sometimes strange, institutions are established, their costly position is entrenched 
and viz. - they become opponents to further reform.69  
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Many conceptual problems do not have a solution in any state. As an example, a ‘cyber 
attack’ directed at the Georgian security apparatus by a civilian, state or paramilitary unit, is it 
to be seen as a crime or an act of war? According to the MSS, it is an act of war, but it does 
not necessarily mean that it automatically falls under the responsibility of the MOD. The 
problems of definition must be handled carefully and diplomatic. Currently, the MOD, MSS 
and MOI handle such issues jointly. Most often, the MSS is in charge and gives 
recommendations to the President on what to do. The same thing goes for armed attacks. 
When asked if attacks by Russians in Georgia is seen as crimes, terrorism or acts of war, no 
clear answer is given. The reason is, allegedly, that the public relation with Russia is so 
important that definitions runs the risks of causing political tension.70 
 
Legislative Problems 
In Georgia, the President approves or creates the security structure and the Parliament only 
approves the number of staff. The Parliament does not have the authority to amend the state 
budget without the approval of the President. As the budgets from the various departments 
often only consist of one or two pages, there are few possibilities for the Parliament to control 
the activities of the security establishment.71 It is also interesting to note that the 
Parliamentarians have the right to bear arms and are immune to prosecution. Occasionally, 
MPs have shot people and, naturally, not been prosecuted due to immunity. This illustrates 
that any approach to reform may face problems within the political and bureaucratic 
establishment. Information given by the Parliament on its web site illustrates this. The quote 
is the full piece of information given.  
  
President of Georgia is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He defines the structure 
of the Armed Forces and chairs the National Security Council, which is an advisory body. The 
Main Military Inspection Service is under direct subordination of President. The Parliament of 
Georgia approves the number of Armed Forces and the defence budget, means defines the state 
policy in the military. In case of military situation the commandment and coordination of the 
Armed Forces is centralized and carried out by the President and the State Security Council.72 
 
The powers given to the President are thus extensive, especially on security issues (see 
appendix five for the President’s role in the NSC). It cannot be concluded that this is a 
problem in itself. It can make the decision-making efficient, but at the same time, reforms 
become dependent on one person. The predecessor to the NSC (the National Security and 
Defence Council – NSDC) reported to the Parliament, whereas the current NSC reports to the 
President.73 Moreover, the President is, according to the Law on State Defence from October 
1997, responsible for:74 
 
1. Signing defence treaties. 
2. Presenting military doctrine and project for approval by the Parliament. 
3. Approving mobilisation of the armed forces. 
4. Approving deployment of foreign troops on Georgian ground. 
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It can furthermore be argued that an organisation needs to evaluate its own functions and 
results in order to improve and become more efficient. As an example of how Georgia’s 
security forces do this, the MSS can be at a focus. The reform of the MSS encompasses a new 
model of auditing activities. The economic model is based on the American FBI auditing 
system and the legal parts of evaluation focus on controlling, monitoring and observing all 
activities of the MSS. The core concepts are legitimacy and constitutionalism. Andro 
Gotsiridze states that the best way of measuring the result is the passive way. When people do 
not complain, he knows that the Bureau has done a good job.75 It can hence be said that the 
evaluation model for results is currently underdeveloped at the Anticorruption Bureau 
 
Armed Problems 
A somewhat different problem of reform from a militarised to a civil security structure not 
solely relying on arms has another dimension. Analyses by Saferworld show that the numbers 
of small arms and light weapons have a role in the transitional problems of security. A strong 
gun culture, due to four reasons, has made the situation worse. These are the traditions of the 
‘macho-style’ of the Caucasus in general; the Soviet army legacy; the easy access to weapons 
and finally; the belief in violence as a solution to disputes.76 No one really knows how many 
illegal weapons there are in Georgia, but some estimations indicate that around 20.000 are 
missing.77 By this situation, emergence of new, or old, paramilitary forces are facilitated. 
Public discontent and upsurge can thus take a more violent form than had these weapons not 
existed. Judging form the present situation and past event, it can be said that it is not totally 
unlikely.  
 
2.3 Military Security Structure 
By turning to military security structures, many things can be said and several have been 
touched upon above. Military security and defence policy is the responsibility of the 
President, the MOD and the NSC. The starting point for such an analysis can be the budget of 
the MOD. The process of the Georgian Defence Budget has several steps, namely: 
 
1. Draft by the Defence Resource Management Department of the MOD. 
2. It is turned to the MOF after a preliminary reading by the MOD. 
3. On the basis of a yearly indicators plan, the MOF works out a draft budget. 
4. Draft state budget is under perusal of the government. 
5. The President and the NSC considers it and submit it to the Parliament 3 months 
before next fiscal year.  
 
The preferred budget allocations by the MOF is much less than by the MOD, and consensus is 
rarely reached. This leads to confrontation not only between the ministries, but also between 
the committees within the Parliament. Most often, when it reaches the parliament, the draft 
only reflects the opinion of the MOF. As there has been a huge deficit in the state budget, the 
expenditures of each fiscal year have had to cover the dept from previous years. According to 
the Parliament only about three quarters of the MOD budget has been executed during the last 
couple of years (see table on next page).  
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Table 1: MOD Budget Execution 
MOD Budget Execution 
1998 77% 
1999 69% 
2000 56% 
2001 66% 
2002 Approx 70% 
Source: Parliament of Georgia 
 
The problems of the armed forces have recently received attention because of arguments 
between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defence. A meeting held on the topic by 
the Security and Defence committee of the Parliament questioned Finance Minister Mirian 
Gogiashvili about the problem. “Such a negligence of the problems faced by the armed forces 
will touch off the threatening processes. We have taken a military oath, and if you need army, 
you are to finance it. If not, release us from oath and let us go home,” Defence Minister Davit 
Tevzadze later said to Georgian Times. A similar meeting at the National Security Council 
ended with the President ordering the Minister of Finance to allot $17 million to the Ministry 
of Defence. This is a problem, as the IMF demands that defence spending should be cut by 
some GEL 20 million. The latest figures of 2003 show that the budget execution for 2003 will 
be as low as 62,7%, which in real money is between $9-10 million only.78 The MOI and SDI 
are also underfunded, as are the Border Guards.79 
 
As far as democratic control over the security forces is concerned, the Parliament is, in theory, 
granted extensive powers according to the Law on State Defence. As an example, the 
Parliament is supposed to:80 
 
1. Approve military doctrine. 
2. Adopt laws regarding defence. 
3. Discuss and approve defence budget. 
4. Approves composition of the armed forces. 
5. Ratifies international treaties. 
6. Implement mobilization process.  
 
The thing is that the Parliament does not fully utilise its powers and authorities. As it seems, 
Georgia has most of the structures and organisations that it needs. The structural problems 
relates to issues of individuals and staff, lack of coherent concepts, blurred regulations on, for 
example, responsibility and legislative problems that are further addressed below.  
 
Currently, there are only two options for controlling the defence budget. One is the Military 
Inspectorate, which assesses the combat status of the Armed Forces. It reports to the President 
and to the NSC. The State Audit Chamber monitors the financial books and records of the 
MOD and has as a mission to determine whether expenses correspond to budgetary figures. 
The Parliament has a function for monitoring and controlling the Ministries, but when it 
comes to the MOD, it is not fully utilised. While turning to the missions of the armed forces, 
its missions can be pinpointed: 
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1. To protect ground, sea and air borders from aggression. 
2. To provide protection of integrity of State. 
3. To stop attempts to change the state institutions with use of force. 
4. Assessment of war threat. 
5. Participation in rescue operations after disasters. 
6. To maintain equipment and control arms of mass destruction. 
7. Participation in international peacekeeping operation. 
8. Military cooperation in accordance with international agreements. 
 
From a military viewpoint, this raises many questions. It is clear that the missions outlined 
above are a political construction that has little connection to military reality. It is merely a 
statement of political wishes. The missions are vaguely and ambitiously formulated, which is 
an indication of the discrepancy between military capacity and political will. Most often, a 
state, when developing a military structure, attempts to harmonize political intentions to the 
current structures and capacity and thereafter take the financial situation into consideration for 
formulating further policy.  
 
Judging from what has been said, this incoherence has the effect of making the tasks of the 
security structures more difficult as their mandate is unclear. The scarce resources must thus 
be dived among operations of disaster assistance, international operations and protection of 
territorial integrity. Considering the fact that the latest training via the GTEP includes very 
basic duties as techniques of throwing hand grenades, it is an overwhelming responsibility to 
handle efficiently. Nonetheless, Georgia is fully aware of this and a plan of improving is 
slowly taking shape. Gela Bezhuashvili, Deputy Minister of Defense in Georgia, underscore 
the main objectives for Georgia’s defense policy:81 
 
1. Accomplishment of the military reforms in order to acquire a credible, modern and 
efficient, but at the same time, affordable and sustainable defense capability. 
2. Enhancing Georgia’s status of security provider, through maintaining and improving 
our contribution to the regional stability. 
3. Strengthened civilian and democratic control over the armed forces and the 
subsequent mechanisms, according to the principles and values of constitutional 
democracy. 
4. Harmonization of national legislation to ensure compatibility with appropriate 
standards and regulations. 
5. Integration in the Euro-Atlantic and European security structures. 
 
The next part intends to illustrate how this will be done.  
 
Military Security Actors 
Ministry of Defence (MOD):82 The over-arching structure of the Georgian Ministry of 
Defence is divided into twelve main bodies:  
 
1. Apparatus of Defence Minister 
2. General Staff 
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3. National Guards department 
4. Rapid Reaction Force 
5. Personnel department 
6. Main military inspectorate 
7. Special mission group under Defence Minister 
8. Military Intelligence Department 
9. Foreign Military Relations department 
10. Law department 
11. Financial-economic division 
12. Public relations service 
 
In addition, there is a MOD Military Board, which is a planning and consultative body in 
wartime. This also includes the Ministry of Interior and the Border Guard.83  
 
The Army: As of 2003, the Georgian Army had 18.700 soldiers divided in seven (sometimes 
the figure four appears because not all units are considered full brigades) brigades and a 
number of single units. Conscription is carried out twice a year and service is for 18 months 
or 12 if the person has a higher education.84 In 2001, the units falling under the Ministry of 
Defence counted some 9730 new conscripts.85 However, during the last couple of years, 
conscription rates have been falling. In 2002, only between one third and half of what was 
needed, were drafted, even for the units stationed in Pankisi.86 A peculiar phenomenon is that 
the 25th Motorised Rifle Brigade in Adjara undertook ‘territorial conscription’ and filled the 
unit only with local citizens. The reason was said to be the cost for transportation must be 
kept low and arguments are heard that it is unconstitutional.87 The army units are located in:88 
 
1st Brigade (Artillery) – Tbilisi 
2nd Brigade – Senaki (West Georgia) 
3rd Brigade – Gombori (East Georgia) 
11th Brigade – Koda (South of Tbilisi) 
21st Brigade – Kutaisi (West Georgia) 
22nd Brigade – Akhalkhalaki (South Georgia) 
25th Brigade – Batumi (South West Georgia) 
 
The Navy: The Navy has 900 (2000) personnel and 17 vessels. These form a mixed Brigade 
in Poti. 
 
The Air Force – Air Defence Forces: The Georgian Air Force is of a modest size, as its 
personnel count 900 (1200), 22 aircrafts (mainly at Marneuli and Kutaisi) and 11 helicopters 
(Telavi).89 Its Rapid Deployment Force has some 500-900 servicemen. During Soviet times, 
the 34th Single Army Air Defence and 31st Airborne was stationed in Georgia. At that time, 
ten airfields were operational. As their mission was to attack Turkey or Iran, its quality at the 
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time was excellent. Today, most infrastructures have been destroyed by Russians and by local 
plundering.90 RAND estimates that only two are in good condition and six that are acceptable 
for military usage.91 
 
National Guards: As indicated in previous chapter, the National Guard was created before 
the MOD and its status has varied. It has incorporated many paramilitary forces (see appendix 
three). At one time it was renamed ‘Rapid Reaction Corps’, but was later renamed again. It 
failed to compete with the MOD and MOI for funding and is now a semi-autonomous group 
of the MOD. Its purpose is to be a reserve for the Armed Forces and support the State in 
emergencies. This overlaps the Department for Emergencies Situations of the MOI.92 The 
Guards are consists of some 1000 men,93 but its function in peacetime is not specified.94 
 
Arguably, Georgia’s forces in Abkhazia should be representative of the status of combat 
ready units. This gives an indication of the general status of Georgia’s military apparatus. If 
the numbers detailed in appendix four are considered, it is clear that the situation is poor. The 
Abkhazian part of the Georgian Ministry for Defence consisted of a 3000 servicemen strong 
organisation, structured in the regular bodes of the Air Force, Army and Navy. In addition, a 
guard company and a communication company is directly subordinated the Minister of 
Defence.95 Judging from this list in appendix three (from 2001), it can be hence be concluded 
that the personnel situation and equipment is far form acceptable in order to wage war. The air 
defence capacity in terms of anti-aircraft artillery is limited, intercepting capabilities are non-
existent. However, the ground forces have a substantial number of Armoured Personnel 
Carriers and Main Battle Tanks. Yet, these are of outdated kind and will not stand up to the 
heat of modern tanks or even the T-72s or T-80s, which are the backbone of Russian 
armoured forces. Against Abkhazian forces, it has some capacity, but against Russian troops 
that usually have an attack ratio of 1:10 it is of little protection. Naturally, an invasion from 
Russia is unlikely, but as Georgia as pointed out Russia as a potential source of conflict, it is 
what the Georgian troops are supposed to handle.  
 
Military Reform Agenda 
There are numerous areas of the Georgian defence forces that require additional funding. 
Below the areas of the social situation, the equipment situation and training and mission tasks 
are examined. In general, the reform during the last decade was not a complete failure. It is 
interesting to not that during the first two years of independence; there was no military force 
under the control of the Georgian government. The National Guards and the Meskhedrioni, 
both fighting on the Georgian side against Abkhazia, were loyal to their commanders. The 
latter was even involved in the assassination attempts on President Shevardnadze.96 For more 
on the various paramilitary groups of Georgia, see appendix three. It can thus be concluded 
that Georgia, after all, has managed to integrate several forces into a structure that today is 
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controlled by the Georgian Government. However, one reform of the MOD was completed by 
1994 after the turbulent years of civil war in the early 1990s. Six key areas were improved:97 
 
1. Abortion of illegal paramilitary groups. 
2. Purging of non-professionals and criminals. 
3. Restoration of a draft system. 
4. Clarification of the army’s structure. 
5. Restoration of funding via state budget. 
6. Strengthening of political control over the army and its withdrawal from politics. 
 
This meant that by loosing criminals, Georgia lost many combat-experienced soldiers. This is 
important concerning competence, but has little impact on the reform process and it is time to 
look at the issues connected to the reform.  
 
When asked to outline the political wills of what kind of army Georgia should have, Shota 
Sandukhadze only emphasised that it should be a light and mobile army that it capable of 
protecting the territorial integrity of Georgia.98 Luckily, the general reform approach is more 
sophisticated than this. A fundamental starting-point for reform out to be to cut the number of 
troops that Georgia has today. Considering both needs and budget allotments, it is clear that 
the current numbers are greater that what Georgia is capable of handling. Therefore, the initial 
plan is to cut the army from 18.700 to 12000 soldiers in the coming years.99 The ISAB and 
USECOM assessments have put forward recommendations of developing a rapid reaction 
force by merging land forces with Special Forces units and a helicopter squadron.100  
 
In June of 2003 it was announced that presence of the Border Guards would be extended 
along the northern borders of Georgia. In all ten new outposts, along the border to Chechnya, 
Ingushetia and Daghestan, will be created.101 In addition to this, the OSCE has recently 
contributed with over EUR100,000 worth of technical equipment. For instance, this included 
binoculars, ponchos, boots and communication equipment that facilities patrol duties.102  
 
Social Issues 
It is no secret that Georgian conscripts are willing to go great lengths for postponing military 
service. Currently, a postponement for 12 months can, officially, be bought for about $100.103 
There is an ongoing discussion on the topic of raising this fee, but as it would only increase 
the gap between rich and poor, it has so far been rejected. A great many young Georgians 
have, arguably, been moving north, to Russia, in order to avoid military service and started to 
work instead. This has, according to Lyudmila Rayeva, had two effects. First, it has been one 
                                                 
97
 Darchiashvili, David (1997), Georgia: the Search for State Security, Stanford: CISAC, p 10f For a general 
overview of the background of the Armed Forces in Georgia, from an official point of view, see: 
http://www.parliament.ge/ARMY/hisarm.html,   
98
 Interview with Shota Sandukhadze, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Parliamentary Control of Activities 
carried out by the Defence and Security Bodies under the Committee on Defence and Security at the Parliament 
of Georgia, Tbilisi, 27 June, 2003 
99
 Interview with Nodar Kharsheladze, Advisor at the NATO Division, Department of Political-Military 
Relations, Georgian Ministry of Defence, Tbilisi, 19 July, 2003 
100
 - “Speech of Ambassador G. Bezhuashvili, Deputy Defence Minister of Georgia at the Meeting with Lord G. 
Robertson, NATO Secretary General”, Brussels, 13-14 March, 2003 
101
 Bakashvili, Nana (2003), “Georgia Tightening its Border Security”, The Georgian Messenger, 20 June, 2003, 
p 4 
102
 - “OSCE Helps Georgian Border Guards to Better Protect the Border”, The Georgian Messenger, 30 June, 
2003 
103
 Chitaia & Zhvania (2003) 
Georgia’s Search for Security  by Robert L. Larsson 
 

of the reasons for the Georgian demographic gap and, second, it has outflanked many of the 
older Georgian traders in Russia.104 The reason for the desperate attempts to avoid service is 
the poor social conditions in the armed forces. 
 
Investigations of military units based in Karti and Kakheti reveal unsafe accommodation 
conditions (often in tents) where several units lacked bed sheets. There is a chronic shortage 
of uniforms and no medical supply. One of the aspects that draw most attention, both from 
media and from soldiers, is the endemic malnourishment. According to Georgia’s general 
nutrition standard, a soldier needs 4524 Kcal a day. This it well below international standards 
and, as a comparison, Turkish soldiers ‘need’ over 6000Kcal. To tackle this problem, the diet 
has been composed, increasingly, of food rich in energy, as pasta and bread. This remedy is 
only working in the short run, as lack of fat, protein, vitamins and carbohydrates lead to 
malnourishment in the longer term. Soldiers have taking to steal food, but since the stock is 
poor, it is of no gain. Reports state that the daily diet mainly consists of only “kasha” – 
oatmeal. If meat is served it is often rotten and from fish, only heads are served. Apparently, 
deliverances of food have been problematic, as the drivers have sold food to increase their 
own low wage.105  
 
In 2001, a report labelled “Analysis of Suicides and their Reasons in the Armed Forces” by 
the Chief of the General Staff, Johnny Pirtskhalishvili, indicated that the social situation of the 
Armed Forces was devastating. It revealed that between 1995 and 2001, 28 privates and four 
officers committed suicide, with an increasing trend. The reasons for this figure is, both 
according the government and independent NGOs, bad psychological and social background 
of the soldiers. However, NGO polls show that 30-40% of the respondents confirmed torture 
and brutal treatment - dedovshchina. Almost 50% of the officers mistreat their inferiors. In 
addition, between 1999 and 2001, 54 servicemen died for various non-combat reasons. 
Analyses suggest that “bold violations of military regulations”, most often reckless usage of 
weaponry, was the main reason.106 In addition, food poisoning had been frequent, even if the 
situation is better now than in the 1990s when several cases were seen. Allegedly, radiation 
was one of the causes.107   
 
Consequently, all of the social problems of military life in Georgia provide incentives for 
leaving. Sickness, due to malnourishment, is not even a reason for going to the hospital, 
conscripts confirm. Therefore, desertion has been increasing. The military prosecutors office 
investigated 1872 cases of desertion in 2000, 2498 cases in 2001 and over 1102 during the 
first quarter of 2002.108 If this was not enough, in May 2001, 400 servicemen of a Border 
Guard battalion committed mutiny, as they had not been paid for over 14 months. 
Shevardnadze managed to control the situation, and even apologised.109 The immediate 
problem was thus solved, but the underlying issues remain. Officers and soldiers today are 
paid, although extremely low wages.  
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EquipmentProblems 
Pinpointing all weapons and equipment that Georgia would need to wage a full scare war, 
would be an overwhelming task. Yet, providing an example of the Georgian capabilities to 
preserve its territorial integrity may serve a purpose of highlighting its capabilities. As 
Russian fighter planes are carrying out missions, let be unofficially and in unmarked 
airplanes, in Pankisi and Abkhazia,110 it interesting to note what Georgia can do about it.  
 
As far as monitoring of air space is concerned, the situation is far from positive. Georgia 
possesses no low-altitude radar.111 The old Soviet P-15 and P-18 radars in Poti, Kopitnari, 
Marneuli, Makhati and Kvishiani are of little use as they lack fuel and electricity and, 
therefore, do not operate permanently. This had led Georgia to rely on the civil radar stations 
of Senaki and Kvishiani. Even if this system makes monitoring of Armenian Air force Bases 
possible (which the place for Russian fighters with responsibility from protection of Russian 
bases in southern Georgia), this is rather useless for serious military purposes, as the onboard 
identification devices must be on for it to work. Even if Georgia manages to track an enemy 
aircraft, its counter measures may be insufficient. As mentioned above, Georgia’s Air Force 
consists of some 20 aircrafts. However, none of these are interceptors, and its capabilities in 
this respect thus come to a halt. The remaining option is ground based anti-aircraft systems. 
For this purpose, Georgia has a range of equipment. The rather aged artillery system, ZU-23, 
and S-60 automatic artillery are of secondary quality (23mm and 57mm systems from the 
‘60s), while the somewhat more modern self-propelled anti-aircraft system ‘Shilka’(ZSU-23-
4) along with S-125 SAMs (often mistranslated as C-125) and some shoulder launched anti-
aircraft ‘Strela 2M’ (aka SA-7b Grail) and ‘Igla’, are the backbone of the Georgian Air 
Defence units.112 This very problem is clearly acknowledges by Georgia. Therefore, it intends 
to develop the Air Space Surveillance System and later the Air Defence system by 
involvement in NATO’s Air Situation Data Exchange Program (ASDE).113 What is more 
important, however, is the political dimension. If Georgian manages to shoot down a Russian 
aircraft carrying out operations of Georgian soil, the political implications would be 
paramount and it is doubtful whether Georgia would benefit from such actions. This is a 
dilemma for Georgia as a weak state, as territorial integrity is the foundation for independent 
statehood.  
 
Although most of the military-industrial complex of Georgia has been falling apart, some of 
its capabilities remain intact. For example, the Tbilaviamsheni (Tbilisi aircraft plant) launched 
its newly developed SU-25 ‘Scorpion’ in 2001. The SU-25 was developed in collaboration 
with Israel as it uses the Elbit System. The aircraft is a new version of the SU-25T with new 
night fight capacity. In addition it can use both western weaponry and ex-Soviet Weapons. As 
it costs some $5 million, Georgia will unlikely buy any (new ones) themselves, but hope to 
export some.114 Apart from this, the amount of new purchases by the defence forces is rather 
modest. The latest gain was some ‘Delga 1’ terrain vehicles that were created in Georgia for 
tourist purposes. Operated by a three-member crew, it has a selection of machine guns, anti-
tank weapons or grenade launchers.115 In addition, 12 second-hand T-55 MBTs have been 
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bought from the Czech Republic, for use in Abkhazia.116 Drawing form this, it is clear that the 
situation concerning weaponry and equipment is problematic. NATO aspirations in 
combination with equipment from a range of countries and lags from Soviet times may 
infringe of efficiency of the armed forces and require substantial improvements to be made. 
As can be sees in the diagram of the MOD budget of 2001 and 2002, found in appendix seven 
and eight, procurements of materiel and weapons is not prioritised. The major cost is wages. It 
is in this context interesting to not the enormous share of the budget, which is not directly 
specified. Such spending give room for speculations about how spending is made. Maybe not 
in the same way as during the Cold War, but instead in a criminal perspective. 
  
Training, Missions and Responsibilities 
Georgia participates yearly in several hundred military exercises within the PfP and with 
regional states, for example Turkey. It should be noted that the Georgian share of these 
exercises is of a small scale. Its KFOR troops are less than a platoon and on some occasions, 
only one patrol boat represented Georgia in international exercises. However, increased 
training with international forces, including via the PfP, are under way. An infantry company 
within a German battalion will also extend the peacekeeping platoon in Kosovo. As another 
step in this direction, the Peacekeeping policy department of the MOD will be linked to the 
Defence Policy and International Relations Department.117  
 
Locally financed training exercises are rarely held due to financial problems. The ‘Katheti-
2003’ exercise that was to be held in the summer of 2003, with the objective of training for 
prioritised instability in Pankisi, was indefinitely postponed for the same reason.118 This was 
exercise was much needed. The Georgian military campaign in Pankisi in 2002 was said to be 
an easy task, but still the problems remain unsolved.119 What is more, all since 1985, 
Georgian officers did no attend Soviet military schools, which today result in a lack of 
competent platoon managers.120 A new training exercise, ‘Makhvili-2003’ is planned, but 
over $2,5million are needed for training every month.121 
 
One, let be marginal, aspect of a security reform has been initiated in early 2003, namely the 
reformation of the Border Guards. Previously, these had a mainly military character, but 
developments within the security sphere has called for widened responsibilities as operations 
in the borderlands is not always of a combat character, but instead resembles a mixture 
between police and military missions. From 2003 until 2007, the Border Guards are to 
transform and take on the role as a police force, as the have been granted police functions as 
investigative powers. By this transformation, the Border Guards of the Border Protection 
Department will be subordinated the Ministry of the Interior, instead of the Ministry for 
Defence. An interlinking process is that of the Coast Guard. The previous Coast Guard 
Service, created in 1997, will from now on fall under the responsibilities of the State Border 
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Department of the MOI.122 Further, Djemal Tchumburidze, commander of the National 
Guards, have the US National Guards as a form of role model for his organisation. Soldiers 
should serve some time every year and have a responsibility of assisting the state also with 
non-combat actions. However, its core must always be warfare, he argues.123 This, again, 
illustrates what has been mentioned above, the extensive responsibilities of the armed forces 
brings along problems that the resources may be insufficient to meet.  
 
A lot has to be made before Georgian military forces are up to international standards. Russia 
often claims that the reasons for the poor status of its military equipment is due to that most 
equipment fell into the hands of former republics upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
However, looking at the case of Georgia, it is clear that the bulk of equipment and resources 
fell into the hands of Russia. The equipment and infrastructure of the ZkVo – the old 
Transcaucasian military district of Soviet Union, was, according to the estimations of the 
Georgian MOD, worth $11842,12 million in 1992. Till the year 2001, Georgia has got 
equipment and infrastructure to a value of only $989,53 million only.124  
 
By and large, the improvements need to come within three key areas if Georgia is to come 
closer to international levels, especially if NATO membership is a goal. The first is concerns 
the organisational structure of all security branches. This paper highlights the fact that it is not 
without its problems. Secondly, major training of staff is needed. Finally, some kind of 
standardisation of procedures, training and equipment is necessary. To be able to do this, 
Georgia receives international assistance. Thanks to the US, some progress has been made. 
The creation of the Centre for Defence Resource Management has started and reform of the 
General Staff structure is underway.125 This will unlikely improve performance, but will be a 
small step towards NATO standards. A rapid deployment unit will also be created. So far the 
results have been small, but still it is much better than within the civil structures.  
 
External Support  
The training and support given by external forces to Georgia is divided, in order to avoid an 
overlap. For example, the 11th Brigade is the ‘American product’ and France, Italy and 
Switzerland support the mountain units while Ukraine and Israel take care of other units. The 
strategic planning of the MOD enjoys support from Greece, while implementation in taken 
care of by Turkey. Increased presence of external advisors is also planned. The top level of 
the MOD will have 2, the General staff and HQ will have 4-5 and 9 advisors will be assist 
platoon commanders.126 The UK and the US are further involved as advisors in budgeting 
issues and in early 2003 they assisted implementation of an integrated defence resources 
management system called PPBS.127 However, some of the training, as that given at the 
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Ukrainian Defence Academy, is not donated to Georgia and Georgia still owe the Ukraine 
$1,2 million for training.128 
 
It is not a surprise that the US funded ‘Train-and-Equip’-programme comes as a blessing for 
Georgia. Its initial stage budget of $64 million may be modest by American standards, but 
considering the Georgian defence budget of $17 million,129 it will have a paramount impact. 
In addition to 10-20 thousands of uniforms and caps,130 six UH1-H helicopters has been given 
to Georgia by the US.131 This security cooperation is of pivotal importance and deserves 
extensive assessments, which is made in the third case study. By and large, the GTEP has 
been going on since May 2002. Initially the Green Beret Special Forces trained Georgian 
Commandos, but now several American units are involved in the Task Force GTEP 
programme. First and foremost, the US Marine Corps is responsible for the actual training of 
Georgian troops. In addition, the US Army is in charge of communications, first aid training 
and provide surgical teams while the Air Force and Navy have minor roles. The training 
curriculum for the three companies of the battalion (from the 11th Brigade in Koda) is a 14-
week training cycle. To a great extent, the American instructors are non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs). NCOs are believed to have a positive impact as they are supposed to show 
how mature they can be and inspire Georgian troops to develop in a similar way. The core 
issues of the training is:132 
 
Week 1-4: Land navigation, movement, fire drills, first aid and infantry tactics. 
Week 5-7:  Squad tactics, marksmanship, illuminated night attacks and patrol exercises.  
Week 8-10: Supported platoon attacks and tactics, ambush training, patrol base operations 
and initial defence training. 
Week 11-13: Urban terrain combats tactics, defence and offensive, movement to contact and 
raids. 
Week 14: Final exercise by company level live daylight fire supported attack (AK47s, 
Machine Guns, RPGs etc). 
 
Another part of the training that has received special attention is usage of mines. The 
Georgian troops has been thought to use, detect, clear and mark mines and mine fields of both 
anti-tank mines and claymore mines (for usage against troops). In addition, proper technique 
of throwing hand grenades has been included in the curriculum.133 As patronising as it may 
sound, this underscores the poor level of combat proficiency of the Georgian forces.  
 
After the US, Turkey is the largest donor and sponsor of the Georgian military. This aid will 
greatly improve Georgia’s military capacity. Turkish help made renovating the Marneuli base 
possible. It become operational in 2001 but still lacks night-time navigation control systems. 
The plan is to replace the P-18 radar with new NATO-standard TACAN.134 Also, $4 million 
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was awarded for modernising the 11th Motorised Rifle Brigade in Koda. This does not only 
include equipment, but also a kindergarten for servicemen’s children.135 Also Turkey has 
given Georgia two UH-1H helicopters, 136 and 125 vehicles. 137  
 
Germany has since 1996 funded the Georgian Army and provided numerous bilateral 
consultations every year. As far as training is concerned, some 25 fellowships have been 
given to Georgian officers to German military institutions on topics of security policy, inner 
leadership, personnel and commander training. Since 1997 over 100 servicemen have been 
trained by Germans in Tbilisi, Bonn and Berlin. Equipment given includes PCs, ‘Iltis’ cars, 
mine sweeper boats, ration packs, medical packs and uniforms for one brigade.138 As the 
environmental problems related to of Georgian military are substantial, much help has been 
given within this fields, for instance by dismantling outdated ammunition and, poisonous or 
radioactive waste, mostly at the old Air Force bases of Most and Meria, but also at the air 
fields Dedoplistqaro and Vartsikhe.139 Moreover, France has supported Georgia by donating a 
military hospital in Telavi and Romania has given 10 000 uniforms. Even China has 
contributed by some logistical goods140 The UK has, since 2000, supported Georgian military 
with English language courses.141  
 
Although important, foreign aid cannot solve every problem of the Georgian armed forces. 
Equipment can be bough, money given and training undertaken, but as long as the 
institutional problems remain, improvement is difficult. By reiterating what has been said 
before, the problems are found in two dimensions, one are the actual problems themselves and 
one is the problems of the reform. The former was outlined above and the latter is the object 
of following chapter.  
 
Key Issues and Problems of Reform 
It goes without saying that the problems related to the armed forces resemble those of the civil 
structure. First and foremost, this is the case of corruption and complex structures, but other 
factors also play a role.  
 
Institutional  
Naturally, lags from Soviet structures have an impact, but as far as the MOD is concerned, it 
did not exist in Georgia, only the MOI and the KGB did. Therefore, the structure has been a 
truly Georgian creation, although with staff from older institutions.142 Georgian security 
actors of toady are mixture of old Soviet police officers, a mixture of voluntary defenders and 
regular bandits.143 It is true, a process of appointing civilians to the top level of the MOD, 
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including the Minister of Defence, has been initiated.144 Frankly speaking, the advent of this 
process is of such a modest intensity that it is impossible to analyse other things than 
statements of intentions. The impact is yet to be seen.  
 
Economic  
The economic problems of reform are two-faced. The first is, of course, lack of money for 
reform. Even the every day activities of the MOD are underfunded by some $50 000 so there 
are great economic constraints already.145 Second, there is so much illegal money to make 
from corruption that a reform would abolish. Both high-ranking officers and field officers 
have extra budgetary incomes. Sometimes these incomes are even related to the official MOD 
structure. As the transparency of budgetary issues is zero, other parliamentary institutions 
cannot monitor it. As an example, the MOD has spent a lot of money on computer software, 
business trips and insurances, that all are claimed to be of no other interest to the MOD than 
to support certain individuals.146  
 
Smuggling has, also, been linked to the MOD. The “Caucasian Route” has been the way to 
smuggle weapons from Asia to Europe, for example Grad missiles to Bosnia. The differences 
in Soviet and Western calibres have to some extent been a reducing factor.147 As far as 
corruption within the military sphere is concerned, the level far exceeds the amount of people 
prosecuted for it. Yet - prosecutions do occur. Within the Border Guards, for example, over 
200 low ranking officers and soldiers were dismissed from service during the last couple of 
years of the 1990s. The highest-ranking officer dismissed for corruption is the former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Georgian Navy, Rear Admiral Otar Chkhartishvili.148  
 
‘Mental Revolution’ 
Staff and servicemen of the MOD are a mixture of ex-Soviet soldiers, KGB-officers, 
policemen, Western educated officers, civilians and volunteers. This, naturally, makes the 
intellectual foundation of the MOD varied, but incoherent. This has a disadvantage of 
including too many various wills and ways of thinking, both militarily and politically. There 
is no unit identity, ethics or spirit. This would be an asset in some cases as it has the 
advantage of being easier to change. When US troops educate Georgian units, they get an 
opportunity to streamline the military training. As long as everyone within the organisation 
agrees on the new agenda, the level of impact is high. An interlinking process is that of 
confidence building.149 Shota Sandukhadze agrees on the fact that mental lags from Soviet 
time are one of the most important things that must change.150 It can be argued that the 
military and all governmental institutions naturally, should have a function and a way of 
working which builds confidence for its citizens. It is not until this has an impact that it is 
possible to talk about a real improvement in civil-military relations. Two political problems of 
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reform that has briefly been touched upon, is the lack of stability and cohesion within the 
military sphere. Currently, the people of Georgia see the army as something evil. This must 
change, and secondly, the state needs to protect the rule of law inside the country.151  
 
2.4 Russian Military Withdrawals 
Georgia’s military history reveals some of the puzzles of contemporary issues. In the early 
1990s, Shevardnadze was in great need of foreign support for maintaining the territorial 
integrity of Georgia. Paradoxically, Russian President Boris Yeltsin came to the rescue on 
three ‘conditions’ that, in turn, were fulfilled. First, Georgia entered the CIS; second, Russia 
took on a role as a mediator and peacekeeper in Abkhazia and; third, Russia got four military 
bases in Georgia.152 By then, Russia was just in the developing phase of its doctrine 
concerning foreign bases. In 1992, Yeltsin and his advisers formulated two strategies. Either 
withdraw everything outside Russian borders, or transform them into Russian bases. The 
second strategy was adopted on 2 November 1993.153 During this time, Yeltsin wanted over 
30 bases on foreign territory as a way to get ‘strategic depth’.154 Although Georgia’s 
conception of Russia’s interference is negative, it is doubtful whether Shevardnadze would 
still be in office, had it not been for Russian support.  
 
On February 3, 1996, Georgia and Russia signed a “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourly 
Relations, and Cooperation”, which was ratified by the Georgian Parliament on 17 January 
1997. In addition, on 15 September 1995, Russia and Georgia signed the “Treaty on Russian 
Military Bases on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia”. This treaty granted Russia access 
to bases on Georgian ground for at least 25 years. Russia was also to guarantee Georgia’s 
border security and assist Georgia in reconstructing its military forces. What is most 
important, however, is that the treaty never has been ratified.155 Since 1995, the policy has 
been extremely incoherent and rumour has it that local commanders are acting on their own 
initiatives. However, even if there, as it seems, are two policies, one by the President 
(especially during the reign of Yeltsin) and one by the Generals, Mikhai Gribincea concludes 
that the Kremlin sanctions everything. Therefore, there is only one policy - Kremlin’s.156 In 
Georgia’s view, this military presence, which carried out by the “old-style sentiments of the 
Russian political élite”, in combination with Russia’s Abkhazia policy, is the “most irritating” 
aspect of Russia’s Caucasian policy.157 According to the Minister for State Security, the best 
way of reducing the Russian influence is by international pressure on Russia and having a 
great power as counter-balance.158 
 
The pro-Russian stand in Georgia was rather comprehensive a few years ago. Western 
military guidelines were even not allowed in training. Given the fact that the Russian 
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divisions, despite its previous combat experience, were second-rate units,159 it is not a mystery 
that the standard of training today is poor, even by old Soviet standards. The result is that 
Russia has utilised peacekeeping and its regular units in Georgia as a policy instrument short 
of war. Georgia’s concessions consequently led to short-term gains but major strategic losses 
that by and large were due to Shevardnadze’s policies.160 After a speech by Vladimir Putin on 
11 September 2002, Georgia officially pointed out Russia as an enemy of Georgia by stating:  
 
The statement of the President of the Russian Federation of the 11-th of September 2002 
demonstrated that Georgia is facing the next threat of aggression from the side of Russia.  
 
The President of Russia gave assignments to the Staff Headquarters, the Ministry of Defense, 
Federal Security and Border Guard Services for the preparation of military operation on the 
territory of Georgia.161 
 
This quotation serves as an illustration for the following chapter that assesses the Russian 
military presence in Georgia. The problem with Georgian, and partly also Russian policy, is 
that it is reactive instead of proactive. The effect is that predictability is decreased.  
 
Russian Security Actors 
As indicated, the Russian military presence in Georgia is two-fold. The first is the 
peacekeepers of the CIS that today only consists of Russians. The second is ordinary units of 
the Russian army. 
 
CISPKF 
The UN subcontracts the CIS Peacekeeping Forces, which consists of some 1500 Russian 
soldiers in Abkhazia and 500 in South Ossetia. This mean that the UNOMIG has to rely on 
the CISPKF for protection which is somewhat bizarre as Russia has taken active part on the 
Abkhazian side in the conflict it is supposed to monitor. The result is, consequently, the 
international community legitimised that Russian presence. It is also worth mentioning that 
the Russian word and concept of peacekeeping - ‘mirotvorets’ - rather resembles a translation 
of ‘peacemakers’. This caused not only linguistic concerns, but also real problems as Russian 
peacekeeping differs from international practice. One key fact that is argued to prove Russia’s 
dubious approach to peacekeeping is that its units in Abkhazia mainly were the 27th and 45th 
Motorised Rifle Divisions that previously had served in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Afghanistan.162 Although much criticism has been heard about the Russian CISPKF, the 
situation has improved somewhat. Its mandate was renewed in June 2003 for an indefinite 
time, which in reality means until either side calls for withdrawal.163 A related issue is that if 
the CISPKF were to be withdrawn, the UNOMIG would also withdraw, as it needs some kind 
of protection.164 This is why it was renewed despite its negative connotation. The real issue 
today is that, although its mandate was recently renewed, that the CISPKF has little support 
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and no capacity to do anything.165 This makes its presence in Georgia questionable also on 
other grounds than Georgian aversions towards Russia. 
 
GRVZ 
Russian presence in Georgia consisted during the mid-90s of 4000 troops on the Georgian-
Turkish border and 11000 on the four bases in Gudauta, Vaziani, Akhalkhalaki and Batumi, 
collectively know as the Transcaucasian Group of Russian Troops – GRVZ. As indicated in 
the previous parts, the formal status of the troops is of a temporary nature and they have no 
right to carry out military operations.166 Today the base at Gudauta is formally closed as an 
operative base but still hosts some 500 soldiers, although without heavy armaments. 
Furthermore, military base number 12, situated in Batumi on the Black Sea Coast, enjoyed 
great respect from the local people. Much of this is said to be due to the ruler of Adjara, Aslan 
Abashidze, who is a former Major General in the Soviet Army and who greatly supported the 
Russian forces in the region. The base is still in operation. Military base number 137 was 
Vaziani, located near Tbilisi. It was object of many cases of aggression towards the Russian 
presence due to its easily accessible location near Tbilisi. It is closed today and all Russian 
troops. The infrastructure was destroyed or withdrawn. Military base number 62 in 
Akhalkhalaki in Samtshke-Javakheti is often referred to as either the ‘Armenian division’ due 
to the Armenian population of the region. Another nickname is ‘the garrison at the gates of 
heaven’, which is due to its location of 1700m above sea level.167 It is in operation and takes a 
central role in Georgian security. The impact of these bases is discussed in greater lengths 
below. 
 
Withdrawal Agenda 
A principal problem with Russia’s policy in Georgia is, according to Temuri Yakobashvili, 
that Kremlin’s ideas of it are unclear. The Eurasian dilemma of Russia has an impact as well 
as Soviet and tsarist legacies and Russian theories of managing conflicts as proven wrong. 
“Setting the fences on fire” has been Russia’s policy along its borders, which has proven to be 
very destructive for Georgia, he argues.168 There is a common belief in Georgia that the 
Russian military presence one of the most urgent problems in the Russian-Georgian relations. 
This goes both for the CISPKF and the GRVZ. It can be argued that Russia has a huge 
positive potential for solving the problems in Abkhazia, but it is not utilised. As stability 
would benefit Russia too, this is a contradiction to its eagerness to keep its presence.169  
 
The formal agreement on withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia was reached at the 
Istanbul Summit in 1999. By 1 July 2001, Russia was to withdraw from Vaziani and from 
Gudauta. The remaining withdrawal was not to take longer than necessary. In the meantime, 
Russia would get access to airfields and fly 48 missions a year for free. This proved to be a 
rather blunt part of the agreement since Russia claims that it needs some 15 years for 
withdrawal, while Georgia believes that three is enough.170  
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It is evident that the process of withdrawal will take time. By and large, the process of 
withdrawal has had three phases. The agreement of withdrawal was reached on the Istanbul 
summit of the OSCE, and the first phase was initiated as of 19 November 1999 and lasted 
until 31 December 2001. During this phase personnel and equipment was withdrawn to 
Russia in accordance with the CFE Treaty. The second phase, from 1 January 2001 to July 
2001, included the closing of Vaziani and Gudauta. Vaziani was totally closed and 
infrastructure destroyed or removed. Again, the Gudauta base still exists, as it was only closed 
as an operative base.171  
 
The 11th Georgian Brigade took over Vaziani in 29 June 2001, since then no new negotiations 
between Russia and Georgia have taken place for over a year. This is the hallmark of the third 
phase. Georgia has, at three occasions, delivered notes to Russia on the topic, without any 
response. However, renewed negotiations was finally held in late May of 2003, where the 
future status of Gudauta was on the agenda.172 During May of 2003, also, the idea of 
withdrawing Russian troops from Akhalkhalaki to South Ossetia or Armenia was made 
public. Both Armenia and Ossetia has welcome Russian troops and state that they are 
prepared to host Russian bases.173 The Speaker of the South Ossetian Parliament Stanislav 
Kochiev later confirmed this.174 The first echelon of Russian withdrawal left Georgia for 
Armenia in June 2003 with military equipment, weapons and ammunition.175 Whether any 
troops will be positioned in Ossetia is yet to be seen but it is seen as very unlikely. Suggested 
moves of Russian troops to South Ossetia would naturally only move the problem and not 
solve the situation.176 Yet, there is not much Georgia can do about it and Georgia’s standpoint 
is clear on the point that Russia should leave Georgian soil completely, including places that 
are not under total control from Tbilisi.177  
 
Key Issues and Problems of Withdrawal 
When assessing the Russian military withdrawal from Georgia, it becomes clear that the 
underlying reason for its existence is an explanative variable worth studying. The raison 
d’être for the Russian bases are, as strange as it may seem, disputed, at least explicitly. By 
and large, there are three key obstacles to Russian withdrawal, namely strategic, ethnic and 
economic. To a great extent, the problems are similar for the CISPKF and the GRVZ, as both 
have served Russian purposes of being leverage on Georgian politics.  
 
Strategic Problems of Withdrawal 
When seeking the answer to the reason for Russian refusals to leave the bases in Georgia, four 
related perspectives can be identified. Firstly, the former Minister of Defence in Russia, Pavel 
Grachev, claims that securing the stability of the Caucasus is the key issue. Secondly, Andrei 
Kozyrev, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, highlights the protection of Georgia and Russia 
against the enemy powers that might arise in the power vacuum of the Soviet Union. 
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Vyacheslav Elagin, section Chief at the Russian Press and Information Department of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, suggests a third approach that points to the protection of the 
Russian-speaking population of Georgia. In addition he points to the protection of borders and 
Russia’s economic interests in Georgia.178 Yet, the Russian General Staff has had many 
concerns about the bases. They argue that they are costly, of poor quality and too far away 
from the Russian lines of defence, which makes them exposed. Therefore, the ‘strategic 
reach’ sough after is limited.179 This fact is made worse by the Russian financial crisis, 
subregional cooperation that excludes Russia and the growing number of external powers as 
the US and Turkey. As argued previously in this paper, the Russian policy has not been 
coherent. Dov Lynch assessed the Russian policy, in relation to peacekeeping in the CIS, and 
came up with six reasons for Russian policy incoherence. He concludes that the Russian 
policy depends on:180 
 
1. The development in Moscow, bureaucratic fighting and shifts in civil-military 
relations. 
2. Differences between departments in Moscow over peacekeeping and foreign policy. 
3. Resource capacity beyond Russia’s borders. 
4. Development in target state. 
5. Development if conflicts on the ground. 
6. Development of international relations, e.g. in the CIS. 
 
This sheds some light on the issue, but it can be said that there are more reasons for the 
Russian presence. Hence, Grinincea who examined the views expressed in Zakavkaskie 
Voennie Vedomosti, which is the paper of the Russian troops in South Caucasus, discovers 
the fourth view. He found eight positive (from a Russian point of view) key-points with the 
troops, namely: 181 
 
1. It can be a force against other states that wish to dominate. 
2. They can stop an aggressor. 
3. A new and expensive border in Russia does not have to be built. 
4. It can serve as a buffer against Islam. 
5. It is good for Armenia to with Russian bases in Georgia. 
6. It has a stabilising function. 
7. It may help Georgia to build a national army. 
8. It helps to provide a work for at least 8000 locals in Georgia. 
 
The four latter points are discussed further below. Concerning the four former ones, it is clear 
that Russia sees gains in this. States that “wish to dominate” refers both to regional great 
powers, as Iran and Turkey, but also to the American engagement. One could argue that four, 
or now two, Russian military bases would serve as inertia to other powers wishing to gain 
influence. There is nothing that supports this, at least not in the American or Turkish cases. 
Moreover, Iran has kept away due to Russian concerns, but it has less to do with Russian 
bases. As for the third point, their capacity, with or without Georgian assistance, can do little 
to stop an aggressor. If Turkey was to invade Georgia, Russian troops could put on a fierce 
but short fight, but further elucidation of such a scenario would here be too speculative. This 
connects to the fourth point, a buffer against Islam, which is a rather exaggerated reason. In 
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Central Asia it may have some substance, but as Iran and Russia are cooperating on several 
levels, it is of minor importance. Azerbaijan is indeed a Shi’a Muslim State, but its religious 
stand is far from expansionistic or fundamentalist, and the argument also goes for secular 
Turkey. Finally, building a new border in North Caucasus would be costly, but given its 
geographical location, natural borders already exist. This study has not incorporated any 
calculations on this matter, but an indefinite presence in the ‘near abroad’ is also costly. 
Given the fact that most radar and monitoring equipment must be updated and that there are 
only three major roads between North and South Caucasus working all year around, the task 
does not seem overwhelming. However, that is out of the scope of this study to analyse 
further.  
 
It is no secret that Russia opposes Georgian NATO aspirations and would go great lengths to 
prevent it from happening. One requirement for Georgia’s accession is that its statehood is 
strengthened and that its territorial integrity is secured, which means that Tbilisi must control 
Abkhazia. Hence, if Russia aims to obstruct Georgia’s strive to join NATO, the best thing to 
do is to make sure that the conflict in Abkhazia remains unsettled.  
 
Ethnic and Regional Problems of Withdrawal 
One of the most important, and frequently mentioned, issues related to Russian withdrawal is 
the ‘Armenian-issue’ at the 62nd base in Akhalkhalaki. Ethnic Armenians to a large extent, 
populate the region of Samtshke-Javakheti on the Georgian-Turkish border where 
Akhalkhalaki is situated. Even if Georgia and Turkey are on a friendly basis, Armenia has had 
some historical problems with Turkey, which underlies the attitude of Armenians in Georgia. 
Since Armenia and Russia are close allies, the Armenians in Samtshke-Javakheti are positive 
about the Russian presence. As Tbilisi does not devote much attention to the situation in the 
region, it is no surprise that Russia’s influence is strong.  
 
Armenian feelings of insecurity in Akhalkhalaki are due to two things. First the Georgian 
military capability and resources for protection are limited, which is indicated by this paper. 
Secondly, Tbilisi’s policy on the topic has been incoherent and a lack of political wills to 
handle the issue has been evident. The Government in Tbilisi does not control the situation 
and many local officials and servicemen are involved in criminal activities, as smuggling. 
This has created a paramount distrust and in 1998, local Armenian paramilitary even 
confronted Georgian troops in the region. As long as Tbilisi’s security guarantees are 
insufficient, Armenians see the 62nd base as a stabilising factor. However, as the Russian 
force is weak, also its deterrent capability is low.182 One example of the magnitude of this 
issue is highlighted by an episode on 14 June 2001. A Russian convoy, consisting of ten 
trucks, with military equipment was to go to Russia as a step of withdrawal. However, 300 
local Armenians blocked the road in an attempt to stop it.183  
 
Tbilisi has tried in many ways to regain control over the area and in late May 2003, the last 
Armenian Judges in the regions (Georgian) court were dismissed by Georgia’s Constitutional 
Court. The reason was that they failed a Georgian language test. However, people in the 
region hardly speak Georgian, but everyone speaks Armenian and Russian.184 RAND 
underscore the seriousness of ethnic tension in the region while saying: 
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In terms of ethnic strife with origins from beyond the region, further Russian attempts (beyond 
Abkhazia) aimed at fragmenting Georgia along ethnic lines are the most plausible source of 
potential severe ethnic conflict in South Caucasus.185 
 
In this context it may be appropriate to mention that Armenia unlikely will have any part in 
destabilising the Samtshke-Javakheti region. Armenia’s landlocked position ensures that 
positive ties with Georgia are retained. 
 
As far as the Batumi base is concerned, the situation is different. The Russian base there does 
not possess the same kind of leverage on politic as in Abkhazia. There is no conflict in the 
region and the Russians enjoy great support from Aslan Abashidze. Although this friendship, 
between the local ruler and Moscow, has contributes to the marginalized role of the Georgian 
25th Brigade in the region. However, the ‘territorial conscription’ of the 25th Brigade has 
reduced Tbilisi’s control of the region, and strengthened Abashidze’s power, but the problems 
of withdrawal are not as embedded as at the 62nd base.  
 
Economic Issues and Problems of Withdrawal 
The economic issues of withdrawal are two-fold. The first relates to the ‘Armenian issue’ 
mentioned above in point five and six, and the second to the costs of withdrawal. Firstly, the 
reasons for Armenian distrust of he Georgian government are not only related to incoherent 
policy. Social problems are endemic in Akhalkhalaki. The level of integration is very low and 
the quality of the ‘democratic self-governing’ is very poor. In addition, there is an information 
vacuum, as information on Tbilisi’s actions not always reaches the region. As an example, 
national TV broadcasts are limited due to the geographic location of the city.186 
 
The region totally lacks major enterprises and most people work on small farms. Naturally 
this affects the economic situation for the residents of Akhalkhalaki. In combination with 
social problems, the situation is serious. Around 926 local civilians are employed at the 
Russian base and considering their families and relatives they support on the wage from the 
base, it has great economic impact. Estimations suggest that the base sustains 6-8000 
residents, which is around 10% of the population of Akhalkhalaki. In addition, the base 
facilitates broadcasting of Russian TV, and as most Armenians do not speak Georgian, it 
becomes a main source of information. Finally, the only major hospital in the city is the 
military one.187 Avtandil Ioseliani, the Head of Georgia’s State Department of Intelligence, 
states that the economic issues related to the region are paramount. If the financial situation 
improves for the citizens, the need of Russia would decrease and Tbilisi would regains some 
of its influence.188  
 
While turning to the last two points mentioned by Gribincea, two things can be said. First, the 
Russian claims that the base is a remedy for economic problems is too optimistic. Russia’s 
financial situation is in this respect terribly poor. It cannot even pay for the usage of the base. 
What is more, the financial situation of the base itself is in such condition that it has taken on 
cattle breeding and agriculture to sustain its soldiers with food.189 The second thing is that the 
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soldiers and civilians at the base are paid in Russian Roubles, not Georgian Lari. This has had 
the effect of undermining the Lari in the region.190 
 
The cost of withdrawal is a key issue that has not to this date seen any solution. Georgian 
demands of a withdrawal within three years are met with little understanding in Moscow. 
Russia estimates that the costs for withdrawal would be around $140 million. As said, without 
any additional means for the Russian military reform budget, 14-15 year is a feasible 
timeframe for withdrawal.191 Georgian estimations, which are based on Russian logistics 
handbooks, suggest that it would only take two years and eight months and cost less that $30 
million.192 Although, the UK and France has created a fund after the OSCE Summit in 
Istanbul with the objective to facilitate Russian withdrawal.193 The US has donated $10 
million to this fund.194 As David Smith does, it is also interesting to note that Russia has the 
funds for creating a new Rapid Reaction Force, within the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation of the CIS, located in Central Asia.195 Zviad Mukbaniani argues that Georgia is 
a ‘bone’ for the Russian military to play with and therefore political declarations are on no 
interests at all. The only way to regain the territorial integrity of Georgia is by utilising the 
international community as leverage on Russia.196 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The disparate issues discussed hitherto are found at many levels and many kinds of 
conclusions may be drawn. Reiterating details serves no purpose here and hence the broader 
situation will be addressed instead. Consequently, This part intends to summarise some key 
findings and pinpoint some conclusions in order to give an answer to the question posed in the 
introduction, namely: what is the current status of Georgia’s national security structures? 
 
Firstly, there are some fundamental problems of the current situation. The current lack of 
security, defence and foreign policy concepts in addition to the lack of doctrines poses one of 
the most serious challenges for Georgia when forming future policy. As indicated, change is 
under way, but the results are yet to be seen. As far as reform is concerned, it can be stated 
that system reform has been initiated without system thinking, which is due to the lack of a 
clear reform plan and contradictory assumptions of the actors involved. In addition, many of 
the problems that must be taken care of are of such a nature that the actors involved would 
loose, politically or financially, from reform and thereby the needed momentum for reform is 
missing.  
 
Secondly, there are many ideas on the agenda but little ability and will for implementation. 
For the MSS, ideas include restructuring of to a Security Service; reform of areas of 
responsibilities such as economic crimes; new laws on redundancies; separation of military 
and civil intelligence parts; tackling internal criminal activities and extending of the process 
of replacing military staff by civil. For the MOI, removing of responsibilities of property 
protection and fighting corruption are on the agenda. In addition, the Border Guards and the 
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Coast Guards will fall under the responsibility of the MOI. In general, improving the public 
image and enhance elements of democracy also within the security structures are mentioned. 
New laws are also suggested and even a reform of the constitution. While turning to military 
aspects, it can be said that reform is a part of NATO standardisation and several things are 
proposed (see also the next case study). Procurement is not prioritised and a reform of the 
drafting system is planned. There is no correlation between stated intentions and capabilities 
as far as responsibilities and task of the armed forces are concerned. In short, there exist an 
awareness of the needs and some vague ideas and political intentions on how to reform 
Georgia’s security structures. 
 
Thirdly, only a few points of reform and have seen daylight. It can, above all, be concluded 
that reform is in the initial stage. No clear trends can be seen yet. The process of replacing 
military staff by civil has reached the top level, but nothing more. Reforms of the actual 
structures are modest in intensity and slowly implemented, if at all. Changes in performance; 
civil-military relations, democracy or concerning laws and regulations are at this point so 
small that any evaluation is impossible. Results from new laws and concepts are yet to be 
seen. Most notable, however, are the improvements of the armed forced due to the GTEP and 
the change in MOD spending. The social situation of the army is not awarded attentions that 
correspond with the needs. Seemingly, the situation of the MOD structure is better than within 
other branches. This can be explained by the fact that it receives more attention and is less 
integrated with other power ministries. The mentality within the MOD is allegedly also more 
pragmatic and progressive than within other ministries. The limited military fighting 
capabilities is of lesser importance than the social and political situation is, as no open conflict 
or immanent risk of it exists today. In short, except for the GTEP, all aspects and levels of 
reform are just in its initial phase and no results are visible at this point.  
 
Fourthly, Russian withdrawal is slow. Its is no news that Russia has left the Vaziani base 
completely and closed Gudauta as an operative base, even if it still has some 500 troops at the 
latter. The 12th base in Batumi and the 62nd in Akhalkhalaki are in full operation. Negotiations 
on the issue of Russia’s troops in Georgia show that the CISPKF’s mandate is prolonged but 
the GRVZ should leave Georgia completely. Russia estimates that it will take some 15 years, 
while Georgian calculations points towards three. Some parts of withdrawal have been 
initiated and equipment moved to Armenia. Presently, there are no signs of positioning troops 
in South Ossetia. The problems of withdrawal are of economic, ethnic, strategic, political and 
regional nature. Unclear and incoherent policy both from Moscow and Tbilisi pose further 
problems. In short, almost half of the intended withdrawal has been undertaken but currently 
status quo is ruling and Russia seems unwilling to take necessary measures.  
 
Finally, the problems of the national security reform are many and embedded. To a great 
extent the problems of the reform and the problems that the reform is supposed to improve are 
similar or the very same. Lags for the Soviet era do no not explain everything but is a 
substantial part of the problems. Economic and political issues often coincide and dependence 
both at individual and state level has proven to be other aspects of inertia. Low wages is a 
core problem, but mentality issues are more important. In short, almost all problems remain 
unsolved and the prospects for the future are dark if no momentum is gained. 
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3 GEORGIA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
Georgia’s geopolitical location has over the centuries proved to be an exciting place that often 
has been subjugated to imperialist powers from one direction or the other. The golden age of 
Great Georgia only manifests itself trough national identity and history these days and as a 
small state in an unstable environment, Georgia has had to finds its own way in the post-
Soviet period. The aim of this case study is thus to explore and analyse Georgia’s various 
alternatives for handling security at regional and international levels. Therefore, this study 
seeks to answer the question: what are the current options and implications for Georgia 
concerning international security structures? In turn, this study will cover a majority of both 
the official organisations, as the CIS, NATO and GUUAM as well as various proposed 
informal. This is no attempt to elucidate the judicial aspects of various treaties or to assess the 
stands of every state involved. Instead, the study intends to raise a set of key point and discuss 
them from Georgia’s point of view in relation to its options. It also deserves to be mentioned 
that this constitutes a balance between what would be ideal from a general point of view, from 
a Georgian or Russian point of view et cetera. 
 
3.1 Foundation for Cooperation 
Thus, when assessing Georgia’s search for a regional or international security structure, there 
are many factors that must be taken into consideration. Every state or political entity has its 
own demands and requisites. A table of the intra-Caucasian relations is found in appendix 
two. The strongest forces in the process of forming security structures naturally have most 
impact. Georgia is far from strong and can therefore not dictate the course of action of its 
neighbours, but it is interesting to note what is preferred from Georgia’s horizon.  
 
What are Georgia’s Prerequisites? 
Firstly, at the top of Georgia’s agenda is a membership in NATO and the EU. As will be 
discussed further on, there are indications that ambitions are stronger that the will to take 
necessary actions. In any case, as this is explicitly stated by the regime, other security 
constellations are by definition of secondary priority for Georgia. Secondly, Georgia has 
positive relations with all states in the region, except with Russia. Therefore, Georgia could, 
in theory, cooperate with any of the regional states but to as little extent as possible with 
Russia. In relation to other regional problems, such as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over 
Karabakh, Georgia does not actively take side, but do support the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan.197 Thirdly, Georgia’s weak situation makes it dependent on foreign support. 
According to Alexander Rondeli, three things – the weak statehood, the ethnopolitical 
conflicts and unconstructive foreign intervention, affect Georgia’s security situation.198 The 
US is strong and willing to assist. Irakli Menagharishvili even calls the cooperation with the 
US and EU as “the only way”.199 That, in combination to NATO aspirations shows that 
Georgia’s relations with the United States are of highest priority. Fourthly, even if Iran and 
Georgia are on a friendly basis, the strained relation between the US and Iran make Georgia 
reluctant to initiate cooperation on security, as the relations towards the US is most important. 
While waiting for NATO membership, other less ideal structures are offered to Georgia and 
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regional states. As said, Georgia cannot create the structure only according to the premises 
above, but also need to consider other relation. Before examining some of the structures on 
offer, other considerations deserve attention.  
 
Regional Considerations 
Starting by looking at the Turkish approach. Turkey’s policy in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus has shifted during the last decade. Initially, Central Asia was at a focus, but now 
Georgia and Azerbaijan gets most attention. This is much due to the fact that Turkish policy 
in Central Asia greatly failed. This failure had several reasons, for example:200 
 
1. Costs of engagement were greater than gains. 
2. The ‘Turkish Model’ of a secularised state with market economy gained little 
admiration. 
3. Turkey’s ‘big brother-approach’ was not appreciated and Central Asian officials did 
not understand their political situation. 
4. Internal problems of Turkey took much attention.  
5. Russian influences in Central Asia were stronger than expected as Russian elite 
controlled the economy, politics and energy etc. 
 
It can be argued whether states learn from old mistakes or not, but a few conclusions might be 
drawn from those five point. First, concerning the new focus of the Caucasus, Turkey will 
make sure that its engagements pay off. This is partly shown in Turkey’s aid to Georgia, 
which was addressed in the first case study. Secondly, Georgia is no real disciple of the 
Turkish State-model and will not consider being subjugated to other external ways 
cooperation except its first choices. At this point it is not a major risk, as the cooperation 
somewhat is at an equal level. Thirdly, Georgia should be prepared that, although the 
cooperation and relations at this point is extensive and rewarding, the situation may change if 
the domestic situation in Turkey changes. As the ‘Kurdish issue’ is highly affected by the 
situation in Iraq, Georgia should not rely and depend on Turkish support. Finally it can be 
said that even if Russian influence in Georgia is rather strong, the pro-Western approach of 
the regime might be stronger.  
 
Currently, Turkey is the largest sponsor of the Georgian Army, apart from the US,201 even if 
its ties with Azerbaijan are strongest. Turkey is providing Georgia with, for example, 
helicopters, training, money, equipment and education. The good relations are to a great 
extent dependent on the pro-Western stand of Eduard Shevardnadze.202 Although security 
cooperation increases, there is a limit of the role Turkey can play. Turkey’s former President, 
Süleyman Demirel, states that Turkey cannot take on any active role in Abkhazia or 
Chechnya, but only to passively provide humanitarian assistance.203 It is doubtful, however, 
whether this is an explicit policy of the Turkish state today. The key issue here is the Russian 
dimension. At this point, Turkey and Russia are more of economic partners, than geopolitical 
enemies, but a pro-Russian shift in Georgian foreign policy would change the situation, 
RAND argues.204 Indeed it would expose Azerbaijan and reduce the Turkish influence over 
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the BTC-pipeline, but such a shift is unlikely given the strong Russian antipathies in Georgia. 
In addition, if pipeline routes of natural gas were diversified, Turkey would not be dependent 
on Russia. Today, cooperation between Russia and Turkey on the Blue Stream project of 
energy transportation in the Black Sea shows that there is no major hostility involved.205 
Nevertheless, the other side of the coin is that Turkey is not only a member of NATO, but 
also a traditional enemy to Russia, which may have an impact. After all, the Russian troops in 
Georgia serves the purpose of protecting the border from Turkey. Pavel Felgenhauer 
emphasises the weakness of Georgian and Russian troops in Georgia and they can serve the 
purpose of being a trip-wire at best. If Russia wants to stop and armed invasion from Turkey, 
it has to be prepared to use nuclear weapons, he argues.206 The border is still heavily mined 
since the cold war even if the Georgian attitude towards Turkey is relaxed today. Turkey has 
allegedly been negotiating with Azerbaijan and Georgia on using their military bases.207 This 
is something that would affect the regional security dynamics and decrease Russia’s influence 
and quite likely also further alienate Armenia from the regional states. 
 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in addition, claims that the US also has initiated negotiations with 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, as a step of preparation for a campaign in Iran.208 Georgia’s deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kakha Sikharulidze, quickly and strongly denied this.209 In fact, 
there is no evidence of any substance in that article. However, the impact of the article has 
been serious. Iran has even left formal protest notes to Baku210 and it has been frequently 
cited in the regional press.211 David Smith, states that any such plans are completely wrong, as 
the situation in Iran cannot be solved in the same way as in Iraq, in the American view.212 It is 
debatable whether the article in itself was an attempt, intentionally or not, to affect regional 
politics but that was indeed the outcome of it, which highlights the fact that perceptions often 
is more important than reality. 
 
As far as Russia is concerned, its position is pivotal. As the former ruler of the region, it has 
had a difficult time to let go of the South Caucasus as a sphere of influence. The reasons are 
partly accounted for in the previous study. In addition, there are some loud claims that 
Russia’s true intents are to regain full control of the road and routes along the Black Sea, 
which is something that must be stopped.213 Other express a slightly more diplomatic view by 
stating that the long-term goal of Georgia’s relations with Russia is, according to Georgia’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Irakli Menagharishvili, to develop a strategic partnership, 
become good neighbours and to undertake intensive trade relations. This must be made by 
increased mutual negotiations. The most crucial issue, however, is for Russia to develop 
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domestically along its southern tier and regain the control over its territory.214 When asked 
what is to be done for improving Russian-Georgian relations, Vladimir Putin said that the 
solution is simple. It is about preventing armed attacks on Russia from Georgian territory.215 
If this is the real issue, it would be hard to see why Russia objects when US forces are present 
in the region with the purpose of training Georgian troops for stopping this. 
 
Iran’s influence in the Caucasus, however, is limited. This relates both to capacity and will, in 
sum:216 
 
1. The states of South Caucasus dislike radical Islam. 
2. Iran is focused on the Middle East. 
3. Iran needs to consider the Russian view, party because of their nuclear cooperation. 
4. Iran (like Turkey) lacks the capabilities to dominate. 
5. The US is containing Iran 
 
The last point is a key issue. As all three states of the South Caucasus especially Georgia and 
Azerbaijan have close cooperation with the US, any form of regional cooperation must 
preferably be made under the consent of the US. Including Iran would have negative effects 
on the relation to the US. Unfortunately forecasts of a rapprochement between Iran and the 
US have been wrong. The negative relation is partly a result of the Iraqi war, but mostly a 
result of Iran’s nuclear cooperation with Russia217 and the claimed support for al-Qa’ida.218  
 
The Ukraine is also worth taking into the equation as it can be seen as risk indicator. If 
Ukraine would find itself in a situation where its independence is threatened, South Caucasus 
would start to worry. The Ukrainian relation with Georgia is positive at the moment.219  
 
It can, in addition, be mentioned that a RAND report from May 2003 searches for a scenario 
where the US Army would end up in a military conflict in South Caucasus or in Central Asia 
within a 10-15 year framework. The rationale of the report is to facilitate Pentagon’s 
planning. According to RAND, a plausible scenario includes intensified conflict in Chechnya 
where Georgia gets involved after Russian military actions in Georgia. This is said to lead to 
US, Azerbaijani and Turkish support for Georgia’s side and Armenian support for Russia’s 
side.220 Georgian politicians do not agree that the scenario would lead to open conflict, but 
point out that this kind of activity is already going on.221 Exploring this scenario further serves 
no purpose in this context, but it can be concluded that the regional situation is serious enough 
for Washington to pay military attention to it. Given this brief overview, it can be concluded 
that the prospect for finding a structure that every state agrees on is a difficult task where 
compromise is a key word.  
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3.2 Economic-Political Structures 
Occasionally claims are heard that structures, as the EU, should take on an active role in 
security management and cooperation. Therefore it serves a purpose to explore also 
economic-political options available for Georgia. 
 
The EU - European Union  
Naturally, Georgia’s security is not a core concern for the European Union, but the EU is a 
partner and donor of many activities in the South Caucasus. EU’s approach is yet vague and 
unclear. This can been explained by the fact that it is a result of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), which is greatly marked by national interests and EU’s limited 
capabilities.222 The EU strategy is a regional one, which means that all states of the South 
Caucasus are jointly at a focus, especially in a conflict resolution perspective.223 By and large, 
the financial support goes via the TACIS programme that contains two parts.224 The first is 
the east-west transport corridor TRACECA and second part is the energy project 
INOGATE.225 In addition to this, the EU is an observer in the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC), the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT). Most actors consider EU’s involvement as constructive and rewarding, 
not only due to its subsidiaries, but also because it threatens none.226 Regretfully, the 
Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 failed to mention the South Caucasus, which was a 
great disappointment for Georgia.227 One reason for EU’s passive involvement in conflict 
resolution is that all regional conflicts are already discussed in various forums, such as the 
Minsk group. It therefore poses a risk of having too many foreign organisation that are might 
compete with each other. Currently, the EU has a role mainly as a financial donor. Yet, there 
are reasons to believe that that Georgia listens to the EU to a much lesser degree than to the 
US.228 
  
It is true; EU involvement in regional activities has a positive connotation, but the prospect 
for Georgian membership is still in the future and membership does not make Georgia secure 
automatically. Nonetheless, if Georgia’s aspirations of membership are serious, the efforts for 
meeting the necessary criteria will strengthen Georgia substantially. Thus the core of 
Georgia’s security problems is reduced.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the EU on the one hand sees a clear connection between the 
politics of energy and level of conflict in general. In addition, it acknowledges the risks of 
foreign interventions.229 On the other hand, EU supports and facilitates development within 
this sphere at the same time as it supports conflict resolution, but this may not be as strange as 
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it might seem. The reason is that in the Caucasus, the roots of the conflicts are not related to 
energy.  
 
In June 2003, a new small landmark was reached in the Georgia-EU relations when it was 
announced that a special EU appointee for South Caucasus would assess the future process.230 
However, the process is in its making and the third session of the Georgian-EU Cooperation 
Committee in June 2003 had not much news on the topic. It was made public that due to 
Georgia’s geographic location, it will not be included in the current round of discussions, 
even if the EU greatly support Georgia’s strives.231 On the 7-10 July 2003, a EU ministerial 
troika headed by Margherita Boniver, paid a visit to Tbilisi and reaffirmed its position on 
commitments to Georgia. Emphasis was also put on the importance of free and fair 
elections.232 Boniver stated that Georgia has a long way to go but that there are some future 
prospects for EU-Georgian relations to move from friendship to family.233 Basically, there is 
not much news on the topic. 
 
In a broader perspective, at least four things can be mentioned. Firstly, one argument, 
proposed by Zviad Mukbaniani, is that as long as the states of the South Caucasus cannot 
cooperate efficiently amongst each other, the EU will not dedicate much energy to it. 
Therefore, the conflict over Karabakh affects Georgia to a great extent and a solution must 
come if further integration into European structures is to be made. Secondly, a EU-
membership for Turkey would be excellent in the Georgian view. By all means this would 
provide another leverage for EU strives and as the Georgian-Turkish border would be the 
outer EU border, the EU would be forced to pay attention to its problems and opportunities, 
some argue.234 Thirdly, assume that Georgia develops in every aspect necessary to such an 
extent that its situation and status would ‘grant’ a membership to the Union. If that happens – 
membership might not be as sought after any more because then; dependence and weak 
statehood would be history, the territorial integrity secured and foreign pressure under control. 
Thus - a negative correlation between need and possibility seemingly exist. Finally, one of 
Georgia’s strongest assets in terms of exports are agricultural products. If there is one thing 
that EU does not need more of, it is agricultural products. In such a perspective, it would 
make more sense to increase trade with Russia.  
 
The BSEC - Black Sea Economic Cooperation  
After an idea in 1992, the BSEC was created in 1999 with the mission to facilitate 
transportation, visa regulations and to fight organised crime in the wider Black Sea region.235 
In fact, the BSEC already has a military dimension. A Black Sea Naval Task Force 
(BLACKSEAFOR) has been set up by Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia and Romania and 
Bulgaria and can be deployed under a UN mandate. So far, this has never happened. Most 
actors have a positive view of the BSEC, which also can be explained by the fact that its 
involvement in military and security issues is limited. However, some Georgians believe that 
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the BSEC is unserious and that any serious attempt to cooperate on security issues will be 
destroyed by Russia.236 However, there are suggestions for a wider function of the council. 
Michael Emerson, for example, suggests that the BSEC should expand its South Caucasus 
cooperation so that have the following elements:237 
 
1. Conflict resolution and prevention. 
2. South Caucasus community building. 
3. An OSCE regional security system. 
4. Including all of Russia, EU, US and South Caucasus. 
5. Broader Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian Cooperation. 
6. Infrastructure investments. 
 
There are few indications that this would be realised in the near future and no methods are 
specified. After all, security and conflict resolution cannot be a key issue for every 
organisation in the region. From Georgia’s point of view, the BSEC could well serve as an 
alternative structure for economic cooperation in the time before EU membership. It has many 
benefits, low costs, both politically and economically and does not threat any state. Thus, it is 
a way for Georgia to facilitate economic development in the westward direction. Yet, there 
are several weaknesses of the organisation. RAND points out a few:238 
 
1. Weak leadership and poor policy coordination. 
2. Heterogeneous members with ethnic tension. 
3. Huge geographical distances, between Albania and Azerbaijan for example. 
4. Most states are poor and in a developing stage of statehood. 
 
To a great extent, this is true. However, the prospects fore continuous development are 
positive and there are room for improvement and if the economic gains from cooperation 
increases, there are reasons to believe that at least Georgia’s strives to further integration is 
plausible.  
 
3.3 Military-Political Structures 
The structures for security cooperation where Georgia can take part are several and of two 
types, one are the formal organisations, as NATO and GUUAM, the other are hypothetical 
suggestions proposed by various politicians.  
 
The CIS – Russia’s Suggestion 
The CIS takes a central role in Georgia’s search for a security structure - despite the fact that 
Georgia does not take part in the security cooperation of the CIS. By and large it is week; has 
not archived much in ten years and is far from Georgia’s first choice. Kemal Balar poses an 
initial question by asking, “what is the CIS”? No one knows, as it does not resemble any other 
major organisation. Even if the CIS has peacekeepers the meaning is not the same as 
peacekeeping or peace enforcing in the notion of the UN. The UNOMIG is actually observing 
and monitoring the peacekeeping activities of the CIS (CISPKF). This underscores the 
discrepancy of peacekeeping as a concept. It is no surprise that Georgia does not consider the 
                                                 
236
 Interview with Zviad Mukbaniani, Head of Committee of Foreign Relations at the Parliament of Georgia, 
Tbilisi, 1 July, 2003 
237
 Emerson, Michael (2000), “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, Insight Turkey, vol 2, no 3, 2000, p 29 
238
 Larrabbe & Lesser (2003), p 122 
Georgia’s Search for Security  by Robert L. Larsson 
 

CISPKF as peacekeeper.239 Moreover, the CIS is no confederation or no commonwealth as 
the UK or the Francophone. It is no OSCE, NATO or Council or Europe.240 Thus it is 
something of its own and it has no ‘role-model’ to follow.  
 
The member states include all former states of the USSR except the Baltic States and its 
members do not want a strong and potent organisation reminding them of the USSR. 
Therefore its very structure and authority has been created weak on purpose as the members 
have a right to veto or not to participate at all. During the last decade, it has reached over 200 
agreements on military, political, economic and ecological issues, but still it lacks substance. 
Bilateral agreements have been more important than the larger structure. The reason is that the 
member states wishes to keep their manoeuvring space and emphasis their national 
sovereignty. Except Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine have been most reluctant to 
participate while Armenia and Kazakhstan are strong supporters of the organisation.241 
Azerbaijan and Georgia have not even ratified the Tashkent treaty.242  
 
It is possible to distinguish a split between positive and negative attitudes within the CIS. The 
faction with negative attitudes towards the CIS consist of the ‘GUUAM group’ that tries to 
distance themselves from Russia and the CIS, and there is the Russian led faction of Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that are more eager to cooperate.243 Drawing 
from this, there are reasons to believe that further development would take place only within 
the Russian led core group, whereas the GUUAM-faction would seek other ways to 
cooperate. It is old news that many states and analysts see the CIS as a Russian attempt to 
regain control of its former territory, which partly explains Georgia’s aversion towards the 
CIS. In fact, Georgia had not planned to be a member at all, but during the Boris Yeltsin-era, 
Shevardnadze was in great need of foreign support and was forced to join under Russia’s 
pressure. Pavel Baev claims that the Russia policy in the CIS has not been about cooperation, 
a few attempts in Central Asia in 1993 excluded. Instead, its main features in the Caucasus 
include:244 
 
1. To force Azerbaijan and Georgia into the CIS. 
2. Inconsistent engagement by Russia. 
3. Blocking Turkey from influence. 
4. Breaking the seemingly strong Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus (KNK). 
 
If these actions are to be evaluated, it can be said about the first point, that the intentions were 
realised in theory, but not in reality. This means that although they are participating members, 
there is a high level of reluctance. The second point is still valid, but there are tendencies of 
greater coherence. The CIS of today has little influence in blocking Turkey and the KNK is 
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not a major factor of power today. Additionally, as security issues are well guarded 
cooperation is often difficult. Except the obvious aversion towards cooperation with Russia, 
the reasons for the marginalized role of the CIS have been concluded in five points.245 
 
1. Unclear structure and legal basis of the CIS. 
2. Great level of freedom for its members concerning commitment and participation 
(Georgia is most reluctant to take part). 
3. Problematic ways of decision-making and implementation. 
4. Weak organs, as the Inter State Bank and Economic Court. 
5. It is difficult to bring together weak and underdeveloped states. 
 
Georgia has done little to extend to improve this and, as said, many of the vague features are 
created on purpose. The Russian-faction, however, has recently deepened the security 
cooperation substantially. The Georgian standpoint is that the CIS, at best, can be a forum 
where Presidents can express opinions and intentions. 246 
 
CSTO – Russia’s New Suggestion 
All since 1992, the CIS has had an aspect of collective security, but while considering it 
useless, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan pulled out in 1999. The re-launch of a collective 
security treaty in may 2003, during a summit in Tbilisi, include five states - Russia, Belarus, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The official name is ‘Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation’ – CSTO. A part form collective defence and security, the treaty include 
opportunities for obtaining Russian equipment and weaponry to special prices as well as the 
opportunity to send officers on training in Russia. The collective defence is rather extensive. 
The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, even compared the agreement with 
article five of the NATO charter on mutual defence. It is intended to be a counter-balance to 
NATO and analysts believe that joining means taking an anti-American stand on Russia’s 
side. The Georgian Messenger also points out that it undoubtedly lead to Azerbaijan being 
able to claim that Russia is a biased mediator in relation to Karabakh. Naturally, Georgia has 
a negative view of this creation and has, naturally, no intentions of joining.247 
 
GUUAM – the un-Russian Suggestion 
GUUAM consists of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (before 
Uzbekistan joined in 1999 - ‘GUAM’). It is a pro-western formal organisation dating form 
1996 that has been created as opposed to the CIS. In 1996, it was stated that a core issue of 
the organisation was to:  
 
The essential part of cooperation will be the security of the Eurasian corridor where the GUAM 
Group and Central Asian Group have great possibilities for interaction. 
--- 
[…]to work together on four goals: (1) to minimize the effect of the Russian financial crisis on 
their countries; (2) to support each other against “growing challenges to regional security and 
stability;” (3) to cooperate with each other and international partners in the Europe-South 
Caucasus-Central Asia transit corridor project; and (4) to jointly lobby for accelerated 
development of Caspian oil deposits and the construction of multiple pipelines directly to 
international markets. 248 
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All of the points outlined by GUAM are of core concerns for Georgian security and general 
development even today. In 1999, when GUAM had developed into GUUAM, the member 
states agreed on intensified security and military cooperation while stating the progress made 
at a summit: 
 
They agreed to continue consultation on establishing a joint peace keeping unit, to exchange 
information on military and regional security issues, and adopted a calendar of upcoming events 
within the GUUAM Ministries of Defense cooperation framework. 249 
 
By looking at the member states, it can be said that GUUAM is not defined by geography or 
by socio-economic factors, but by international politics at large. Security is at the top of the 
agenda. GUUAM’s treaty has therefore been interpreted as a flank document by Russia - 
especially as all members except Uzbekistan favour the US and NATO. It was created during 
the height of the Kosovo-conflict and NATO enlargement summit in 1999, which made 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to speak about a cordon sanitaire around Russia. Even 
if it is so, the members try to state the opposite. For example, Tedo Japaridze said: “[t]his, for 
example, is the only group in which Georgia is a member and Russia is not. I do not mean 
that GUUAM is an anti-Russian alliance.”250 This nevertheless serves as an example of 
Georgian perceptions of GUUAM’s position vis-à-vis Russia. Still, the main goal as stated 
above is to support each other. From Georgia’s horizon, the GUUAM is an excellent 
substitute to the CIS. In excludes Russia, includes all friendly states and has the blessing from 
Washington. In addition to this, the important issues of security and hydrocarbons are on the 
agenda at the same time as they have an opportunity to gain from economic cooperation.  
 
In fact, the US once looked upon GUUAM with some annoyance as it brings about some 
problems concerning the CFE treaty and NATO expansion Today, it promotes deeper 
cooperation, for example concerning Armenian participation, which relates to its conflict 
resolution efforts in Karabakh.251 Despite of former grievance, which is of minor importance, 
the US is a strategic partner of GUUAM and in 2000 it was stated that it had: 
 
[…]four immediate objectives: (1) to promote East-West trade and transportation corridor; (2) 
to develop interaction within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program; (3) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in the region; and (4) to combat the trafficking in narcotics in their countries. 252 
 
WMD proliferation is not a main issue in Georgia, but the agenda on trafficking goes hand in 
hand with other issues related to weak borders. This means that strengthening state borders 
for protecting Georgia’s territorial integrity also have the positive effect of increased security 
in the aspect of trafficking and smuggling. The financial support by the US have been 
extensive too GUUAM. In 2002, for example, it consisted of $20 million in foreign military 
financing grants, $10 million in non-proliferation assistance and $2 million for antiterrorism 
activities. 253 Nonetheless, it is hard to know where GUUAM is going.  
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There are many intentions of settling disputes and to co-operate, but little substance on how to 
do it. The UN and the OSCE do not want to share responsibilities for peacekeeping, but on 
the other hand they have potential for technical cooperation, the argument goes.254 Georgia’s 
Foreign Minister, Irakli Menagharishvili calls for growth of GUUAM by using 
telecommunication and east-west transportation.255 Other views promote integration with the 
BSEC, as states as Uzbekistan are reluctant to deepened cooperation within GUUAM.256 
Indeed, it is a problem if not all members agree on the agenda, but merging GUUAM with 
BSEC would not solve any of the problems that have emerged hitherto. Besides, such 
integration would make prioritisation even more difficult, as the geographical obstacles would 
infringe on the capabilities of the BSEC. For Georgia, the effects would not be as great as for 
Uzbekistan. Georgia’s location is advantageous in this aspect, as it has the opportunity to take 
part in cooperation both eastwards and westwards. Yet, Menagharishvili’s statement on 
growing with help of telecommunications only serves as an illustration of intentions. In reality 
it would be difficult to realise, and how it should be made is not declared. When asked how 
this is to be done, he argues that the regional stability must initially increase. After that further 
economic integration and cooperation on transportation can be made. Stability is the key 
before investments can be attracted and one option is to enhance border protection 
cooperation. In the end a free-trade zone is sought after.257 Thus, economic and security issues 
goes hand-in-hand. Even if 25% of Georgians have mobile phones, growth does not come by 
increased consumption, but from industrial development. Currently such a prospect is distant. 
In addition, how this would help GUUAM to develop and consolidate its position is not 
mentioned in public statements. 
 
The latest developments in the summer of 2003 actually show that the US-GUUAM 
cooperation is intensifying. The ‘GUUAM-US Framework Program’ gives support for border 
protection. Also, the new decision to create a Virtual Centre and Interstate Information 
Processing System, which is meant to channelling laws between the states, shows the 
increasing proximity of GUUAM and US cooperation. In addition, there are some suggestions 
that Bulgaria and Romania would join, but nothing has been confirmed.258 On July 3, the 
members of GUUAM held a summit in Yalta, but only Georgia was represented by its 
President. Two objectives of the summit were to discuss the potential of a free-trade zone and 
the replacement of Russian CISPKF in Abkhazia by Ukrainians.259 
 
By turning to military issues it can be mentioned that the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, 
Vilayat Guliev, does not promote a military development of GUUAM with peacekeepers, but 
does believe that security cooperation will increase when the CIS deepen its security 
dimension.260 It is here interesting to note that some statements, like this one is diametrically 
opposed to what GUUAM member states have agreed on and that is visible in the joint 
declarations cited above. It is nevertheless true that GUUAM development can be seen as a 
mirror of the CIS. It is no wonder that the CIS has problems with implementation of 
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agreements when half of its members take ‘counter-measures’ within the framework of 
GUUAM as soon as the CIS has achieved something.  
 
Another important aspect is that Georgia and Azerbaijan have NATO aspirations. This can 
result in that they do not fit in GUUAM anymore.261 There is some substance in that in idea, 
but since it will not be realised in a long time, it is of no constrain for GUUAM’s immediate 
development. Besides, NATO is not an identical organisation and issues related to trade is not 
on its agenda. It can therefore be concluded that for Georgia, NATO aspirations should not 
infringe on its participation in GUUAM. 
 
Furthermore, Turkey and Poland have been interested in gaining status as observers. There 
are also prospects for GUUAM to enter the UN as an observer and the US-GUUAM summit 
in Tbilisi has been interpreted as a re-launch of the organisation where intensified cooperation 
can be realised.262 A few new states joining as observers would have little impact on 
GUUAM’s development other than in symbolic terms. Yet, if Romania and Bulgaria would 
join, the constellation would change somewhat. For example, Uzbekistan, which is already 
the most sceptical of the members, would run the risk of being marginalized due to its isolated 
location in Central Asia. From Georgia’s point of view, Romania and Bulgaria would be an 
asset to GUUAM as they are strong states and have no conflicting interests with Georgia. 
 
16+1 – GUUAM’s Suggestion 
One failed suggestion for a security constellation was in 1998, when GUUAM was still 
GUAM. At that time, GUAM had the intention to merge with NATO and create a 16+1 
system for security. However, NATO’s response was not more than lukewarm and NATO 
preferred bilateral agreements with the four states in a 16+4 system instead.263 This has 
continued after both NATO and GUUAM expansion and there are no immediate prospects for 
any closer cooperation. Naturally, the organisations would not merge to one, but instead to 
have a formalised and somewhat more horizontal relation. This would be positive for Georgia 
indeed, as it would increase NATO proximity and act as a catalyst for meeting the NATO 
criteria. Since conflict resolution within the CIS has been a major failure,264 other forums 
have gained importance. GUUAM has proved to be too underdeveloped in this aspect,265 and 
a strengthened CIS brings about a risk of Russian influence. Much faith is thus held in NATO 
along with EAPC, in addition to the OSCE.266 
  
NATO – Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s Suggestion 
In 2002, the Georgian Parliament declared the joining the EU and NATO was the prioritised 
goal of the state.267 Since then a ‘white paper’ has been created as a guiding star in the 
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political strives but the real political will is still missing.268 NATO is thus a top priority for 
Georgia. It is against this background strives for international cooperation must be seen and it 
requires a deeper look at the process of meeting NATO standards.269 
 
The Georgian conception of NATO is in general positive within the whole political spectrum. 
However, there exist a discrepancy between optimists and pessimists on the speed of 
development. The optimistic faction, headed by Shevardnadze himself, believes that a 
membership is only a few years away. As this optimism is to be characterised as rather naïve, 
it has been interpreted as a way of scoring some additional points before the upcoming 
election,270 and as a way of gaining western support.271 Zviad Mukbaniani, the Head of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations, is pleased that the support for NATO is so 
strong, but boldly states that he does believe that neither the public nor the majority of the 
politicians are aware of what NATO membership actually means, especially not in terms of 
responsibility.272 In fact, the Georgian road to NATO is long and scattered with potholes.  
 
In 2002, Georgia spent 0,5% of its GDP on the military forces, while NATO has a 
requirement of at least 2%. As a comparison, the neighbouring states spend more: Azerbaijan 
3,5%, Russia 4% and Turkey 4,5%. In 2003, Georgia increased the spending to 0,79%, partly 
due to this very reason.273 The plan is to increase the spending to 1,2% in 2005, 1,5% in 2007 
and 2% between 2008-2010.274 In addition, Turkey pays for Georgia’s representation in 
NATO and the salaries for its peacekeepers in KFOR.275 It is, therefore, not strange that the 
process of developing a stable military force takes time, but actually, financial constraints are 
not the only obstacle. The previous case study outlines some of the problems related to the 
reform of the military in general. Naturally, these are the key problems also in this aspect. In 
addition, domestic politics also has an impact. In general, the improvements are meant to be 
made in three ways, according to Deputy Defence Minister Gela Bezhuashvili; namely by 
improving the organisational structure, by training of staff and finally, by standardisation.276 
Georgia has a 29-point list of things to improve as a part of reform towards NATO standard. 
None has been completely fulfilled.277 At the time, Menagharishvili said to ‘Rustavi-2’ that 
“[n]o one from outside can assess to what extent we will be able to do it. It is task for us to 
accomplish, our homework, so to speak.”278 This statement can serve as an illustration of 
Georgia’s unwillingness to be patronized by other actors, but facts remain. 
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During a visit to Tbilisi on 15 May by NATO’s Secretary General, George Robertson, it 
became clear that NATO’s approach is positive but indeed more realistic than the Georgian 
approach. Robertson emphasised that Georgian participation as peacekeepers in Kosovo has 
been successful and that the door to NATO is open, yet with a stress on the fact that the 
process is long and hard, even if Georgia’s ace in this game of cards, is its favoured 
geopolitical location.279 The standardised and vague parts of the speech set a side, Robertson 
actually underscored that Russia must be included in regional cooperation by stating: “It is 
important, first and foremost, that all the different parties of the region show political will and 
good faith. And Russia must be involved in a constructive way as well.”280 This can be 
interpreted in at least two ways. Either it means that the situation must be solved by involving 
Russia, or that the Russia already is involved but currently only in an unconstructive way. 
 
Hard evidence that Georgia actually is of interest for NATO is that it will create a ‘South 
Caucasus Coordination Unit’ in Tbilisi, as Robertson announced during his visit.281 During 6-
8 May 2003, a military NATO delegation undertook the yearly assessment of the Georgian 
military forces. The Train-and-Equip programme of the Georgian military reform was 
considered to be the major improvement since last year.282 If the efforts related to the military 
reform in Georgia are to be seen as an indication on the commitment for NATO membership 
– how is security cooperation within GUUAM supposed to be interpreted? In might run the 
risk of creating a Janus-position for Georgia where it cooperates with all and none at the same 
time. Security cooperation will then be extremely broad and wide, but never deep.  
 
It is nevertheless clear that even if political concerns are set aside Georgian armed forces will 
not be up to NATO standards for a long time. However, there are in this respect three key 
issues that deserve some attention. First, even if it will take a long time, the efforts are not 
wasted. Every aspect of improvement bears importance and as long as the usage of it is of a 
defensive nature, it will serve the purpose of stabilisation. Second, there is nothing that 
indicates that the level of training and equipment must reach the levels of the US. Other 
Eastern European states that have joined NATO are still in the process of developing, Poland 
is one example. Third, as the improvement of the Georgian armed forces is dependent on US 
support, there is a natural limit of how much improvement there can be. 
 
What is more, Georgia is weak and without support from America, Moscow could see a 
window of opportunity for increasing its control over Georgia. In relation to this, NATO 
expansion is a debatable topic that has great influence in the region.283 Russia may be lacking 
means for qualifying as a super power, but nevertheless has the ability to act against the US 
and NATO, in Roland Dannreuther’s words, ‘in an obstructionist manner’.284 According to 
Stephen Blank, this obstructionism and attempts to block NATO expansion is the key-
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obstacle to good US-Russian relations.285 For Georgia, this is one of the strongest arguments 
for increased cooperation with America. The US play a vital role as in tackling Georgia’s 
many domestic socio-political problems, which has had a financial situation, shattered by 
hyperinflation and financial crises.286 Rajan Menon even argues that as soon as Russia’s 
economic situation improves, it will take on a more active role within its former territory.287 
This is especially important since stability of the South Caucasus is a key to stability in the 
North Caucasus, in the Russian view.288 It must be remembered that Georgia is weak and 
“vulnerable to Russian power”, many analysts argue.289  
 
Indeed, the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council exists and seemingly works.290 
However, serious issues, that really need to be solved peacefully, are too much to handle 
when the elements of realpolitik come at hand. As an example, in the Russian-US/NATO 
cooperation seemed to be making progress over security issues but during the Kosovo-crisis, 
it situation really changed for the worse.291 Additionally, Western military engagements are 
not only limited by the will of NATO, but also of its actual capabilities. Even if Georgia and 
the Caucasus are important, it is still out of the core concerns for NATO and Western security 
- even if rhetoric points to the opposite. NATO and the US cannot, therefore, take on more 
than they can deliver.292 Finally, it is worth remembering that even if, in the post-nine-eleven 
era, the enemy of the USSR is replaced by the spectre of terrorism, “American foreign policy 
today operates in the realm of choice, not necessity”.293  
 
Several Georgian MPs, involved in NATO issues, underscore that security does not arrive 
automatically by joining NATO, but by strengthening the state from within. In addition, there 
is a concern that if the process of reform is to slow, NATO’s door might close.294 According 
to David Smith, former Ambassador, NATO and US support will not be withdrawn overnight, 
by a continuously failure to develop democratic features will undoubtedly change the relation 
for the worse. But - somewhat free and fair elections are a prerequisite for NATO accession. 
In addition he states that putting forward the ‘Romanian argument’ to NATO (which means 
that membership is the last resort for preventing a societal collapse) does not invoke any 
extensive commitments from NATO. It is a loser’s argument.295  
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PfP – America’s Suggestion 
Besides the ordinary and bilateral cooperation between NATO and Georgia, NATO is also 
engaged via the CFE programme Flank Zone Agreement, and through the PfP.296 The PfP is 
widely used as a tool for national assistance from the US, with the silent consent of NATO – 
“in the spirit of PfP”.297 While this has been the case for the last decade, the tide is turning 
now. The US support had characteristics of that some years ago, but after the launch of 
GTEP, most support is on bilateral basis. However, to Georgia’s regret, there is little evidence 
that the US is prepared to take on any responsibility in Georgia when it comes to commitment 
for security. There, multilateralism has a niche of its own. As the PfP foremost can be seen as 
a link between the NIS and NATO together with a form of training, rather than a structure of 
its own, it will be left aside. 
 
South Caucasus Stability Pact – Turkey’s Suggestion 
In June 2000, the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel suggested a stability pact, which until 
2003 has not been realised. Russian involvement and tension in Karabakh is said to the 
reasons for slow implementation.298 Yet, it has three distinguished features:299 
 
1. Multilateral diplomacy in the borderlands of EU enlargement and the FSU. 
2. Normative values codified. 
3. Its foundation is mutual interests of regional actors with foreign aid. 
 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan support it, which is a prerequisite for further development. 
Apart for these states, Turkey, Russian, the US, EU and OSCE and even Iran would have a 
role even if it were unspecified how. The meaning of normative values codified is vague and 
from Georgia’s horizon, common normative values with Russia might prove to be a 
challenge.  
 
3+3+2 – Armenia’s Suggestion 
Robert Kocharian, President of Armenia, suggested a somewhat feasible system a few years 
ago. The core of the system would be Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would have 
Iran, Turkey and Russia as guarantors. The EU and the US would be sponsors. This 
suggestion gained support in Georgia by Irakli Menagharishvili who at the same time pointed 
out the foundation of the system must be sovereignty and fixed national borders. A key 
problem is how the disputed areas can be a part of the system without an assumption of their 
future political status or by giving them de facto state status.300 Although similar to the 
structure above, it has a refined approach by underscoring the different roles of the 
neighbouring states. It therefore incorporates several of the features preferred by Georgia. 
Idealistic ideas of cooperation to promote peace aside, the idea of having Turkey and Iran, as 
balances to Russia would suit the Georgian model. If the EU and US contribute by 
supervising the system and provide financial support, it may be a sustainable creation, bit it is 
doubtful if the will for cooperating with Iran and Russia is strong enough.  
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3+3 – Iran’s Suggestion 
Hassan Rowhani, Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran presented the 
idea of a 3+3 system in 2001. This would include the South Caucasus with Iran, Turkey and 
Russia as guarantors. In April 2003, the idea was re-launched by Kemal Karrazi, Iran’s 
Foreign Minister.301 Georgia and Armenia are positive to the system302 while Azerbaijan, as it 
has NATO ambitions, is negative.303 It is interesting to note that Georgia is positive, as the 
Azeri argument would go for it too. The main difference between the Iranian proposal and the 
Turkish is thus the exclusion of the United States. Indeed it would have advantages, especially 
for Russia and Iran, as they have a different view of America’s engagement in the region, than 
what Georgia has. Even if Georgia has a positive attitude towards the system, it is not on the 
top of the agenda.  
 
Stability Pact for South East Europe – Romania’s Suggestion 
Whether or not the suggestion for adopting NATO’s Stability Pact for South East Europe is 
supported by Romania’s government can be debated, but it was presented by its Ambassador 
at Large, Sergiu Celac. He stated that the similarities with the Caucasus and with the Balkans 
are many and several of the features can be transferred to the South Caucasus.304 During an 
interview, Emerson stated that the stability pact used in the Balkans is of little interests for the 
South Caucasus due to the geographical location.305 However, adopting the agenda of the 
stability pact in the Balkans does not mean that it will be extended eastwards, but that some of 
its principles can be applied on the situation in the Caucasus. Since this idea has not gained 
much attention, it can be assumed that it will not be realised.  
 
Further Aspects on Georgia’s Search for Security 
Naturally, there are other organisations in the wider region. One example is the Shanghai 
Five’, which is a group of states that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. It has security issues on the agenda, but is no framework for mutual defence. Some 
tasks seeks to:306 
 
1. Solve border disputes. 
2. Reduce troops along the borders. 
3. Work as a force against Islam. 
4. Promote the ‘eternal friendship’ between Russia and China. 
 
Hence it is not a plausible option for Georgia today. In general there are some point that must 
be taken into consideration when forming a security structure. First of all, there is an issue of 
concept and terminology. Labels such as confederation, commonwealth or alliance and the 
strange horizontal and asymmetric relations within these constellations have proven to be of 
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importance.307 It can thus be concluded that problems of cooperation are found at several 
levels. Second, there are problems with seeing the South Caucasus as backyard; that truly 
prevents cooperation, the argument goes. Thirdly, there is a question of whether a stability 
pact should be formed before or after the regional frozen conflicts have been solved. Turkey’s 
Foreign Minister claims that before is preferred, or otherwise the situation will resemble the 
Middle East.308 Fourthly, Motika argues that one problem is that all systems are too exclusive. 
Some are pro-West, some are anti-Russian, others are vague and in Central Asia some are 
based on Islam. They all are international but most problems they address are national or sub-
national. Truly, this is something that is rarely accounted for and may well prove to pose a 
problem. Finally, the states forming a security system should not expect the US and EU to 
finance the structure if they do not get to have any influence.309  
 
Concerning the Russian dimension, there is a discrepancy between the business élite and the 
politicians on the attitude towards South Caucasus, Alexander Rondeli argues. The élite have 
started to see the region as potential for investments, which may lead to a constructive 
development of the Georgian-Russian relations and active participation of conflict 
resolution.310 It can in this context also be said that the Russian military establishment holds a 
positive view of Georgia at large, it is the Shevardnadze regime that is the problem, at least 
according to information given to Pavel Felgenhauer.311  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
As indicated in the introduction of this paper, this case study is intended to provide a brief 
descriptive outline of international security structures that Georgia considers for cooperation 
and thereby answer the question: what are the current options and implications for Georgia 
concerning international security structures? Underscoring options and key features of the 
options in combination have hopefully done this, although in a somewhat fragmented way. In 
addition, opinions held by some prominent security actors have been canvassed. Naturally, 
this form of research partly prevents any sustainable conclusions from being drawn. 
Nonetheless, pinpointing some aspects and summing up the findings can be made. 
 
Firstly, Georgia’s prerequisites are the profound delimitations of cooperation. As said, 
Georgia’s weak statehood and dependence infringes on its ability to act and choose a course 
of action. Elements of pragmatism in Georgia’s foreign policy are largely of a short-term 
nature. Additionally, the Russian-Georgian relation, above all, works as a catalyst for pro-
western standpoints in Georgia. This is also related to NATO and EU aspirations in contrast 
to other regional constellations. The fundamental problem is hence that suggestions are made 
for security cooperation with the states that other organisations are meant to be against. As the 
bottom line of EU is exactly about cooperation between former enemies, similar ideas in the 
Caucasus should not be as far-fetched.  
 
Secondly, concepts, doctrines and political will for cooperation are missing. As political 
priorities, except in the case of EU and NATO, are blurry, it can be said that Georgia 
participates in all and none organisation at the same time. The lack of a security concept and 
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coherent foreign policy in Georgia are other indications of the fact that the political will in the 
state is at best lukewarm. This is also a fundamental problem for Georgia. The statement of 
NATO and EU aspirations is one of the few clearly presented long-term explicit foreign 
policy objectives for Georgia. Georgia lacks both a compass and a map.  
 
Thirdly, there is a multiplicity of theoretical options with a tendency to overlap. As every 
state and actor has put forward at least one suggestion for a model of cooperation, it is clear 
that although a variety exist, agreements and implementations are difficult and this variety is 
partly to blame. It can be assumed that the informal constellations will not develop to any 
strong structures. Political will is missing. Additionally, Georgia takes a somewhat Janus-like 
position when cooperation are initiated, discussed and approved of within several structures at 
once at the same time as a clear agenda is missing. This will likely affect legitimacy, 
predictability and credibility for Georgia. The cooperation is thus very broad and wide, but in 
not one single case deep. By this - focus is lost.  
 
Fourthly, there are conceptual problems. Conceptual problems relate to two things, the first 
to organisations as such, for example it is not clear what kind of organisation the CIS should 
be. The second relates to the numerous regions with ethnic and political tension. In relation to 
these regions, definitions and concepts have a paramount impact. For instance all regions with 
tension must be included in forums of cooperation without the implications that definitions of 
their future status can bring about. 
 
Fifthly, regional conflicts obviously pose a problem too. It is no news that the conflicts over 
Karabakh and Abkhazia among others prevent the regional states from cooperation efficiently 
between each other and within international security structures. This is no less true when it 
comes to aspirations for EU and NATO membership. 
 
Sixthly, there are some naïve ideas about EU and NATO. There is nothing that indicates that a 
membership in EU and NATO will solve Georgia’s problems automatically. Instead, there is 
a risk of laying the responsibility of security in the hands of an external actor. Georgia’s main 
security problems are derived from weak statehood. But – strives for meeting NATO and EU 
membership criteria may enforce a process of development that will strengthen Georgia. 
Basically, strives for membership may be more rewarding the actual membership once 
received. 
 
Finally, EU and NATO membership are far away. Declared political will and the political will 
of actually reforming the system in Georgia suffer from a huge discrepancy. In no aspect the 
reform has reached a stage where actual negotiations can be initiated. Yet, both organisations 
show interest in Georgia and greatly participate and facilitate Georgia’s endeavours. The 
military situation is extremely low and so is the situation within the political and economic 
spheres too. 
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4 GEORGIA’S ‘AMERICAN’ SECURITY 
The United States has during the latest decade extended its presence and influence in Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, within every sector of society. Among other things, America is 
conducting “Train-and-Equip” (GTEP) programme for Georgian police forces, border troops 
and military units. Cooperation on issues connected to the hydrocarbon business and 
promotion of democracy is also increasing. In general, it is cooperation where both parts 
benefit and that contributes to a peaceful and stable development in the region. However, 
even if Georgia wants the US presence, it stands to reason that risks emanate from the 
strained relations between the US and the regional powers of Iran and Russia. If progressive 
development is to take place, such risks must be avoided. The aim of the third case study is 
thus to assess the consequences of one important way for enhancing Georgia’s security, 
namely the cooperation with the United States. Thus, this study seeks to answer the question: 
what long-term issues and risks are connected to the US-Georgian security cooperation?  
 
4.1 Approaches to Cooperation 
This chapter outlines the views held by Georgia and the US and, in addition, the strategic 
context of the Caucasus is highlighted. 
 
The View from Washington  
Washington’s policies towards Georgia have been characterised as a process in three phases. 
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until 1994, the ‘Russia first’ 
strategy was prioritised and the South Caucasus in generally neglected. Defence and oil came 
onto the agenda in 1994. They stayed as the main concerns until the third phase in 1996 when 
the US took on a general strategic role in the region.312 According to Svante Cornell, the 
reason for the policy shift is first and foremost that the US came to understand the Russian 
capacity and condition, not in the least its military status.313 In 1999, USAID defined the US 
interest in Georgia by stating that: 
 
Two primary themes establish the underlying basis for U.S. foreign policy objectives in Georgia: 
(1) the requirement for a politically and economically stable Caucasus region at a geographic 
crossroads that borders states with potential volatility, such as Russia and Iran; and (2) the vital 
position of Georgia as a Caucasus transit country of oil and gas for the U.S. and the West.314 
 
Thus, throughout this study, these two points will return when the US commitments are 
addressed. It is not too parsimonious to say that the US wishes to control the situation in such 
a way that these two points can be handled. Archil Gegeshidze, former National Security 
Adviser to Georgia’s President, Eduard Shevardnadze, states that Georgia is important for the 
US, due to five things:315 
 
1. International prestige of the political leaders leads to pro western foreign policy. 
2. Containment of Russia. 
3. Promotion of peace in a region where Georgia is a key player. 
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4. Georgia is the gateway for east-west transport, and a door against north-south. 
5. Introducing western values in Eurasia. 
  
Similar standpoints have been underscored by the RAND Corporation that states in a report 
from 1999 that Western/US objectives in the region are confined to:316 
 
1. Prevent regional hegemony. 
2. Get access to energy resources. 
3. Reduce risks of civil war or intrastate conflicts. 
4. Discourage spread of militant and anti-Western Islamic movements. 
5. Prevent spill-over effects to important regions, as the Persian Gulf. 
 
As it seems, the two latter points are of minor importance for Georgia, which will be 
discussed further on. These issues can be understood as threats against the US in three ways: 
against the US society, against American corporations and financial institutions, and against 
the global security and stability - in short, against the American values. Additionally, it can be 
said that all of the points mentioned above ‘qualifies’ as issues of ‘security’. This raises a 
general issue on the American Security approach. From the policy-makers’ point of view, 
such a comprehensive security approach is difficult to grasp - and even harder to control. This 
makes prioritisation of urgent security needs difficult.317 If focus is turned to what 
independent analysts say about Washington’s side of cooperation, three things can be said. 
 
Firstly, Rajan Menon argues that there are no vital interests for the US in the Caspian region 
(and therefore not in Georgia). Instead, it is the relation towards Russia that is worth 
considering.318 Surely, the Russian dimension is pivotal, whatever the reasons of engagement 
may be. The US strongly opposes the Russian standpoint of the ‘Russian sphere of influence’. 
In fact, in 1998, Steven Sestanovich testified in congress that the US “absolutely reject the 
idea of a Russian sphere of influence”.319 It is interesting to note that four years after this 
speech, Nicholas Burns, US Permanent Representative to NATO, officially declared the 
Caucasus as NATO’s zone of interest.320 Hence it can be concluded that two major states have 
aspirations as a key player in the region. Nonetheless, if regional aspirations by either state 
are reduced to terms of power, the US is the capable actor, albeit with modest intensity in its 
undertakings. Russia has greater ambitions than the US, but lacks the means.  
 
Also, during the summer of 2003, James Baker paid a visit to Georgia in that has been 
interpreted as another illustration of US’ positive view of Georgia. Yet, there is an ongoing 
discussion on the true reasons of his visit. Foreign Minister Menagharishvili allegedly lied on 
the reason for the visit when he stated that it was because he wanted to meet with 
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Shevardnadze. The reason is said to be to show how great Shevardnadze is seen in the West. 
The real purpose of the visit was to discuss the upcoming election the argument goes.321 
 
Secondly, the declaration of a new US National Security Strategy in September 2002 stated 
that all means are to be used when handling security issues in the post nine-eleven era.322 This 
includes so-called ‘foot printing’, which is a strategy of having light, mobile and adaptable 
foreign bases at the frontier where new threats emerge. Georgia is an ideal place for that as its 
geopolitical location is close to many pivots of Eurasia and in addition the outer flank of 
NATO.323  
 
However, from the American point of view, there are problems of convincing the US public 
and commercial lobbies of the greatness of a vague and long-term national strategy of 
promoting liberal values in the South Caucasus. This is, according to John McCarthy at Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, the reason for the frequent mentioning of the Caspian oil in public 
statements.324 It is true, most analysts, both journalistic and academic, reduce the core of 
cooperation to an American strive for oil. The fact that a stable and friendly Georgia may 
have other advantages, as being a geopolitical asset, is rarely mentioned. In this respect, there 
is nothing that indicates that the US part of the cooperation would not exist, had it not been 
for the Caspian oil.  
 
Thirdly, cooperation can take many forms. It can be conditional or unconditional, for example 
if can depend on if some political prerequisites are fulfilled or not, Haass and O’Sullivan 
argue.325 The US, like the IMF and the World Bank,326 often demand economic reforms prior 
to giving financial subsidiaries to the region. The result is that the cooperation takes an 
asymmetrical form and reduces the Georgian side as a receiver, while the US is a donor and a 
conductor. As will be shown, this might be of minor importance for Georgia. 
  
The View from Tbilisi 
The Georgian approach to cooperation is, naturally, guided by its weak political, economic 
and military situation. Georgia is by and large dependent on foreign assistance, either from 
the US, from the EU or from Russia. If the American goals, outlined above, are to be reached, 
the US must take on Georgia itself.  
 
Georgia’s blessing and curse is its geopolitical location. If the directions of the compass are 
considered, Georgia is the key state for east-west transportation and cooperation and, at the 
same time, the buffer between north and south. However, this is not much to offer if there are 
many security problems. Therefore, a substantial part of the cooperation between Georgia and 
the US is related to this field. The Georgian approach to security is, by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, formulated as:327 
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Georgia aspires to play a leading role in strengthening stability and security In the Caucasus 
region. "The Government of Georgia also understands the importance of protecting such vital 
assets as the oil pipelines running across its territory. For these reasons Georgia must possess 
capable military and internal security' forces. 
 
--- 
 
Georgia's armed forces will promote peace, stability, and democratization within the country, 
and will ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
As late as in May 2003, Shevardnadze clearly presented his Westernised views in TV by 
confirming Georgia’s course towards membership in NATO and the EU.328 In March he even 
stated that: “[i]n the past 10-11 years not a single country has rendered as much valuable 
assistance to Georgia as has the United States[…] I sometimes say that we would not have 
survived without it [US assistance].”329 Naturally, even if most politicians hold a positive 
view of the US, there are also negative conceptions. As an example, in late June 2003, a 
member of Revival political faction - Hamlet Chipashvili, requested that Georgia should 
reduce its defence cooperation with the US. This means that the Parliament must further 
discuss the issue.330  
 
As is acknowledged in the first study of this paper, Georgia includes not only conflictual 
aspects in its, often inconsistent, national security, but also environmental issues, educational 
aspects, societal development, rule of law and creation of democratic institutions. These 
issues are not codified in a national security concept, but will be in the fall of 2003. There is, 
also, a lack of consensus in Georgia on national security between people in general and the 
élite. The strategic thinking within the élite echelons harmonises with Western ways of 
thinking. The public, in contrast, is mostly concerned with territorial integrity; ethnic 
violence; lack of rule of law and the financial crises.331 A disharmony between the élite and 
the public concerning the conceptions of the US is a dilemma. If the US’ strives for 
promoting democracy work, the ruling élite and the regime will consider public opinion. 
Thereby the US has realised its own departure from the region. That risk has to be reduced by 
creating a situation where there is improvement for the public, and not only as abstract ideas 
of security for the regime. There are many factors to take into consideration, especially the 
views of neighbouring states. 
 
The Strategic Context of the Caucasus 
The US has, presently, positive relations with all states of the South Caucasus, and rather 
negative relations with Iran and sometimes the Russian Federation. By and large, the inter-
Caucasian relations differ. Georgia’s relations with its neighbours are positive in all cases but 
the Russian.332 Categorical division, exclusively of the states, is naturally a simplification, but 
as the US official relations with other entities than states are limited, it illustrates which 
relations the US, in first hand, must consider. In can be mentioned, however, that the 
Georgian autonomous region of Adjara has close links to Russia. This is also the case for the 
de facto independent region of Abkhazia. In addition, the region of South Ossetia also has a 
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pro-Russian stand. The region of Samthske and Javakheti is populated with many ethnic 
Armenians that both fear Turkey and favour Russia. Taking the perceptions of several states 
and regions into consideration when initiating ideas on cooperation is difficult. The numerous 
alliances and quasi-alliances in the Caucasus pose difficulties for the US to be neutral at the 
same time as promoting Western democracy. By no means the course of action is settled in 
advance, but if the perceptions held by regional actors concerning the US intentions are 
negative, counter-measures might be taken. Zbgniew Brzezinski recently said, on the topic of 
US in Iraq, that:”[t]he United States has for the first time found itself at the height of its 
military might and at the bottom of its political popularity.”333 If things are going in this 
direction for the US, at a global level, it entrench a view that constitutes the foundation of 
future policies. 
 
As far as Georgia is concerned, Russian ‘neo-imperialism’, and allegedly attempts to 
undermine peace and stability in the South Caucasus is far from the main reason of the 
insecure situation, even if it is often considered so in Georgia.334 In all aspects, Georgia is a 
weak state as well as a weak power, Alexander Rondeli, argues.335 The RAND report also 
concludes that the major security threats come from internal instability, rather than from 
external powers.336 One can therefore conclude that the focus of US-Georgian cooperation 
should include both civil institutional building and military training. Yet, a common view 
among prominent Georgians is that the West must start to put an end to Russia’s ‘aggressive 
policies’ against Georgia. It is, apparently, so aggressive in the post-Soviet space that 
Kazakhstan even moved its capital from Alma-Ata to Astana to prevent further Russian 
attempts to control the northern tier, at least according to the Head of Georgian Military 
Intelligence.337 Although, there might be other reasons for this, but it shows the conceptions 
that some actors have and act upon. 
 
The risk of anti-Western Islamic movements, which has gained renewed support after 
September 11 and the recent war in Iraq, does not pose an immediate threat in the South 
Caucasus. Samuel Huntington, the often-cited prophet of the ‘clash of civilisations’, points 
out the Caucasus as a main ‘fault line’ where the clashes between Christianity and the Islamic 
world take place.338 Huntington’s findings and arguments are not left unopposed. As an 
example, Cornell’s account of the ethnopolitical conflicts show, there is no ‘clash’, but the 
conflicts in South Caucasus have other roots, as territorial, ethnic and most of all political.339 
Yet, ethnopolitical and confessional problems exist in several regions, in both North and 
South Caucasus. The regions of Abkhazia, Adjara, South Ossetia, Meskheti, Samtskhe and 
Javakheti in Georgia experience a period of increased tension and need to be taken into 
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consideration.340 Ethnicity or religion can also be tied closer to states (or state-like entities) by 
external circumstances. This is the case in the ongoing ‘second’ Chechnyan war. During the 
first war, confessional aspects had only a minor role, but due to assistance from states in the 
Middle East and due to the intensity of the war, its importance increased.341 Additionally, 
Vakhtang Maisaia has explored the Islamic patterns in the region and argues that there are 
indications of increased links between elements of religion and geopolitics. He estimates that 
although the risks at the present situation are small, an increased element of Wahabbism 
would increase the risk of Huntington being right.342 It can therefore be said that institutional 
building and development of economic structures will not per se solve all problems, as other 
forces may be stronger.  
 
4.3 Institutional Security Cooperation 
This chapter lays emphasis on the political and economic side of cooperation. In addition, a 
comment of the politics of oil is made. 
 
Democratic Security 
It is no surprise that the democratic and liberty status of the Caucasian states is poor, 
according to Freedomhouse.343 By promoting Western values of democracy and liberty, the 
US tries to tie Georgia to the Western value community, without allowing Georgia to gain too 
much influence in Western institutions. At the same time the US withstands Russian and 
Iranian attempts to gain influence. Naturally, many of the threats and risks mentioned so far 
are reduced through promotion of democracy, but it is not without its problems. 
 
The aid given by USAID consists of five main parts. Private sector and market reform – 35%; 
health, humanitarian assistance and community development – 22%; democracy and 
governance – 16%; energy and environment – 14% and, finally, cross-sectoral activities - 
13%. The total sum reached $50,650,000 as of the FY2001.344 In monetary terms, Georgia 
and Armenia are the states that receive most aid per capita by the US, apart from Israel and 
Egypt.345 This has huge impact, as Georgia’s financial situation is extremely poor. It has 
largely failed to meet the recommendation by the IMF, which brings about a risk of failing to 
acquire new loans. Georgia’s dept is $1,684,528,816 plus some $90 millions undertaken by 
the state.346 However, an agreement has been reached with the IMF, so the risk is currently 
under control.347  
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Yet it is clear that external economic support for reform can be a misguided form of aid as it 
does give the expected impact if corruption exists.348 Since 90% of the Georgians believe that 
bribing an official is the only way of solving their problems,349 and that up to 92% of all 
officials are involved,350 the situation is serious. The Minister for State Security argue that the 
US is too focused on improving the situation within the civil society, when the governmental 
structures that needs attention. According to him, this is due to the fact that the US sees the 
benefits as greater in doing this than improving the official structures. The most important 
assistance by the US has been the anti-terrorist training centre.351  
 
The Shevardnadze regime is, indeed, pro-US, which is something that greatly has facilitated 
the US-Georgian security cooperation. However, the emergence of the George Soros-
sponsored ‘it’s enough’ campaign recently rocked the boat. It is argued that due to the general 
election, to be held during the fall of 2003, American attempts are made to undermine the 
Shevardnadze government by this campaign. This argument is said to be supported by the fact 
that the mastermind of the ‘it’s enough’-campaign in former Yugoslavia was Richard Miles, 
currently US Ambassador to Georgia.352 A replacement by Shevardnadze by anti-American 
forces would, naturally, decrease the possibilities for future cooperation, if the new President 
and Government were to be against the US. Nonetheless, as it is today, the whole political 
spectrum agrees on the benefits of EU and NATO membership. As opposed to last decade, 
Shevardnadze is often considered to be a part of the obstacles to reform - not a part of the 
solution. If that is the case, a new reform-eager and pro-US establishment might increase the 
possibilities for the US to reach its two goals discussed above.  
 
There is, also, a deeper aspect concerning how the support for democracy is perceived. Often 
criticism of US support to undemocratic or authoritarian states can be heard, but as long as the 
support consists of improving the democratic, economic and societal situation, it is 
misdirected. François Heisbourg argues, on the topic of US policy, that from Bosporus to 
Indus, there seems to be a zone whereas the ‘need’ for democracy and attention to human 
rights, is “less urgent than in places like China”.353 The money flow to the region is 
accordingly unaffected by criticism.354 Does this mean that democracy must prevail over 
foreign aid? From the US point of view, this criticism is a double-edged sword. It can 
therefore be said, that although rhetoric and reality does not harmonise, it is sometimes a 
necessity and reality in the Russian view. On the other hand, perceptions are sometimes more 
important than reality. It must be remembered that the US support to Georgia is, in monetary 
terms, not purely focused on military security as $50 millions are given by USAID and $64 
million via the GTEP, which was later added to by another $12 millions. At this point, one 
cannot draw the conclusion that the US has a short-term tactical gain as a point of the 
cooperation agenda - even if Georgia opened up its air space for American air campaign in 
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Afghanistan in 2001.355 David Darchiashvili points out that the US has two options in this 
respect, either to pursue strict conditionality or to ignore the “hollowness of Georgian 
democracy”. As the US has only labelled one political force in Georgia as progressive, the 
situation is locked.356  
 
Although the Iraqi war shows the opposite: if the US is about to gain support for its actions 
abroad, let it be domestic or international, this dimension might have an impact on the 
outcome. Additionally, the logic of criticism is not coherent. To demand from a newly 
independent state that it has to be democratic before any cheques are signed could be seen as 
ideological blackmail. There is a common belief that spending money on democratic reform 
requires the urgent security needs to be met already. With several ‘frozen conflicts’ in the 
region, such categorical criticism may serve no purpose but to provide an argument for 
withdrawal of external actors. Who would benefit from that? Russia would indeed, at least in 
the short run, but that does neither produce a sustainable argument for the US, nor for 
Georgia. However, Gegeshidze underscores that as long as American interests in cooperation 
with Georgia is of a geopolitical nature, democratic aspects will be neglected. This means that 
corrupt forces may lay their hands of financial aid, but does not worry on implementation of 
the designated policies of democratisation.357 
 
This study does not seek to detail all forms of economic or political cooperation between 
Georgia and the US.358 Yet, it must be remembered that what has started to happen this last 
decade, took almost a century in the West.359 Some argue that the likelihood of authoritarian 
policies in Georgia is strong and history shows that authoritarianism and economic recession 
in combination does not promote peace and prosperity.360 Although, a common view in 
Georgia is that the individualistic mentality will prevent any totalitarian tendencies from 
getting fortified. Democracy indeed lays the foundation for stability, but there is a risk of 
military issues overshadowing the situation and undermining the process of democracy.361 If 
the liberal view on trade, often proposed by the US, is to be the carrier of growth and peace, 
too firm political control and prioritisation of security are counter-productive. 
 
Albert Menteshashvili’s standpoint is that the Georgian entry into the European Council and 
as potential prospective members of NATO will be part of creating security and stability for 
the Caucasus.362 Such a statement might be too optimistic in several ways. First, as a 
comparison, even if the US Senate sees NATO as an organisation guaranteeing peace in 
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Europe - the Turkish and Greek entry into NATO increased the tension between the two 
states, not decreased it.363 Second, Georgia joining of NATO or the EU will not be realised in 
a long time. An enforced democratisation from above, or from the outside, may generate 
ethnic tension and economic polarisation, it can be argued.364 Indeed, entrenching democracy 
is a slow process. Occasionally or often it is deprioritised when a weak state is to distribute its 
scarce resources. It must also be remembered that there is not a stable relationship between 
democracy and peace.365 However, incorporating the search for democracy into the sphere of 
national security could lift democracy to a prioritised level. Yet, focusing on that is difficult if 
the regime is more interested in its own survival than in the long-term survival of Georgia as 
an independent and strong state.  
 
Naturally, there is a difference between ‘traditional threats’ to states, and threats towards 
regimes. As a state is not a single unit, even if it is often presented as such, the government or 
ruling establishment can ‘securitise’ threats toward the regime and make them a prioritised 
goal of the state. This may enhance authoritarian elements. Tough, there is nothing in the US 
undertakings that show an awareness of this in Washington. If the US fails to recognise this 
discrepancy, it might aim most of its aid and resources to regime-related problems. Thereby, 
the support for democratic development is wasted.  
 
What has been discussed thus far illustrates that another problem emerges if there is a 
discrepancy in the security logic in Washington and Tbilisi. Working in different ways can 
prove to be difficult if there is an assumption of priorities and agenda. Therefore, the US and 
Georgia should opt for a form of cooperation where this problem is reduced. 
 
Security of Energy 
As the policies of hydrocarbons are of importance, albeit not the main focus of this study, 
some of its broader aspects deserve to be mentioned. Firstly, secure transport routes, political 
stability and positive financial climate for investors are three key aspects of energy security, 
no matter if it is for the US or for Georgia. Numerous accounts and estimations on the 
existing amount of the resources of oil and gas in the Caspian region exist, but it is clear that 
potential and not reality, catches headlines. The case point is that Caspian oil can prove 
valuable on the margin. Although RAND overestimates the impact of oil, they do pinpoint 
two important issues. First, it underscores, unlike many journalists, that the US will not be a 
customer of Caspian oil. Secondly, it pinpoints a key thing by saying:  
 
The extent to which this matters given a global oil market is debatable, but the 
argument for diversification is made frequently enough to create a political reason to diversify, 
whether or not an economic one exists.366 
 
In this aspect, Georgia has a role as a transit country. Indeed, this bears importance when 
geopolitical considerations are given. Existing and prospected pipelines,367 for oil and gas, are 
widely spread across the region and many are the pros and cons for different options – 
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economic versus politic ones.368 Pipelines are drawn within, or bypassed, conflicts and 
regions of tension, such as Abkhazia, Chechnya, Karabakh, Kurdestan, Central Asia and 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, a frequently stated argument of oil falling in the wrong hands, as 
in the hands of Russia or Iran, lacks substance. Most of the oil has been or is already in the 
‘wrong hands’ of Saddam Hussein’s or Moammar Qaddaffi’s, from the US viewpoint. In fact, 
none of them have refused to sell oil to America.369 
 
Secondly, a military engagement by the US, for the reason of protection of oil and gas, is by 
many analysts seen as highly unlikely.370 However, the deeper the US commitments are into 
the hydrocarbon sector, the more unlikely it is for the US to be neutral in a regional conflict. 
This problem is currently reduced implicitly by the US. The US military training of Georgian 
troops, which are discussed in greater length in subsequent chapters of this study, are useful 
when Georgia conducts training for pipeline security under the aegis of GUUAM. Thereby, 
America reaches its goals with only a minor level of risk. 
 
Thirdly, oil and gas as political leverages have been utilised by Russia against Georgia. As a 
result, the US, by the USAID, has supported Georgia with financial means in order to 
decrease the Georgian dependence of Russia.371 The BTC-pipeline currently under 
construction will naturally decrease Georgia’s dependence on energy from Russia and by that 
Russia looses an important leverage for its security policy in the South Caucasus. It can 
therefore be concluded that US-Georgian cooperation on developing infrastructure also is a 
contributing factor of security.  
 
4.4 Strategic Security Cooperation 
As the very nature of military security is serious, it deserves attention. This chapter will 
discuss and analyse the US-Georgian cooperation by outlining the strategic issues followed by 
a note on the GTEP. Subsequently the effects and risks are analysed. Finally a comment on 
exit strategies is made.  
 
The Strategy of Geopolitics and Geoeconomics  
It is clear that seeing the Caucasus as a buffer zone, as many analysts do,372 follows the realist 
lines of geopolitics. This underscores the logic of north-south and east-west. By assisting 
Georgia, the US prevents Russian (and Iranian) influence in the region. While Russian 
capabilities are limited at this point, it will make Russia, according to Jaffe, only attempt to 
reassert itself in a way unfavourable for the US when it gets stronger.373 This indicates that 
the utility of the geopolitical buffer zone is only rewarding for the US in the short-run. It 
highlights what regional actors see as a zero-sum game. Even if this view is wrong and 
counter-productive,374 as long as regional actors hold this belief, even if they pretend not too, 
it has an impact. This distinction is often passed by in security analyses and deserves to be 
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noted. It must, also, be said that, the US does not try to win any ‘game’ (great or not) by 
knocking out Russia or Iran, but instead to infringe their ability to act in the Caucasus. The 
US thereby increases the space for its political action. Paradoxically, this strive will, as 
argued, increase the risk level and the magnitude of threats substantially. It will, therefore, 
reduce the space for political action. 
 
The east-west axis, symbolised by the transport corridor TRACECA, on the other hand, 
creates a geoeconomic advantage that makes the US’ engagements logical, peaceful and 
legitimate. Nevertheless, if economic engagements increase in the future, it may reach a point 
whereas economic issues are awarded a security label, by any (or every) involved actor. It 
will, in that case, take on the role as a strategic goal, and the political and military strategic 
engagements will be tools for protection of economic interests. In a region where the internal 
security dynamics are conflictual, it will undoubtedly be dangerous.  
 
Train-and-Equip and Beyond  
The status of the Georgian military forces is extremely poor, not only in terms of training and 
equipment, but also in a general social aspect. Malnourishment is endemic in the army and 
between 2000-3500 conscripts desert every year. Lack of funds and food have enforces many 
military units to take on farming instead of training.375 American support is, therefore, of 
great interest for Georgia.  
 
In wartime, Georgia falls under the responsibilities of the USEUCOM,376 but the current 
peacetime cooperation is conducted under special flag. During the summer of 2002, the US 
Special Forces ‘Green Berets’, among other units, launched a comprehensive foreign military 
training programme, covering all levels of the Georgian military forces from battalions and 
below. The initial cost of $64 millions and duration of twenty month has been extended and 
another $12 millions have been added. The units trained are first and foremost the grounds 
troops, but also units from the Border Guards.377 The training, which includes supply of arms 
and equipment, is conducted in public, in order not to impose an increased threat of covert 
operations against Russia.378 It is somewhat ironic that at the same time, unidentified Russian 
fighter planes carry out ‘anti-terrorism’ operations in the Georgian Pankisi Gorge, according 
to Georgian officials. As a consequence of this programme, some argue, Russia deliberately 
postpones the withdrawal of its ‘peacekeeping’ force in Abkhazia.379 At this point, 
nevertheless, there is nothing than supports the idea that Russia would not have postponed the 
withdrawal anyway. And, what is more important is that in May 2003, both Georgia and 
Russia signed a declaration on renewing the CIS mandate as peacekeepers.  
 
As strange as it may seem, removing bureaucratic obstacles to cooperation is not always 
without implications. In late March of 2003, an agreement between Georgia and the US was 
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made on the American military presence. The agreement grants US soldiers the right to enter 
Georgia without a visa and allows them to carry weapons and military equipment without the 
ordinary custom procedure. A few of the clauses of the agreement contains information on:380  
 
1. Using buildings and territories 
2. Logistical support 
3. Observing the law 
4. Entry and leaving 
5. Status of US military and civilian staff 
6. Carrying weapons and military uniform 
7. Taxing 
8. Movement of aircraft and transport vehicles 
  
In addition, Americans are granted immunity, which has upset many Georgians. They claim 
that Americans accidentally might injure Georgians without being held responsible for it. 
When Irakli Batiashvili, Head of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security for 
commented on this issue, he said:  
 
As regards the question of why we granted such extensive privileges to the US military, I'd 
remind you that the US is a strategic partner for Georgia, helping us in building our military 
forces up to modern standards. It was just our moral obligation to appreciate this.381 
 
Gia Baramidze, MP, and former Head of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and 
Security also held this view and said. 
 
The Georgian Parliament took a very important and vital step by ratifying the agreement on 
military cooperation between the US and Georgia. The US is a strategic partner and their long-
term program in the Caucasus region fully coincides with Georgia’s long-term plans, based on 
which the two countries are close partners. Their relations rely on common interests, and 
Georgia took this step bearing these interests in mind.382  
 
Georgia is, thus, willing to go great lengths in order to meet the American demands on 
cooperation. This emphasis two things. First, it underscores the asymmetric relationship and, 
second, it shows that mutual interests have a price in terms of regulatory concessions. 
Nevertheless, these are the kinds of demands that America have in most states where they act 
and it is, therefore, not anything special in the case of Georgia. 
 
What is more, none of the states in the Caucasus are considered to be official sponsors of 
terrorism,383 and contrary to media reporting, the US does not connect al-Qa’ida to 
Chechnyan rebels, or see the Chechnyan politicians as terrorists.384 Other groups, as the Hizb-
ut-Tharir, do not exist to a noticeable extent either. It is interesting to note that a few month 
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after this statement, Vladimir Putin proposed a opposing view by claiming that al-Qa’ida 
actually have connections in Chechnya.385 The following months, proof of this was 
undeniable presented as several members where arrested and, apparently, transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay.386 Although, it is worth noting that the counter-terror agenda of the US, in 
the region, has been present for several years. As early as in 1992, Georgian servicemen 
undertook training in the US.387 Even if this is a main goal of the American endeavours, it 
must be underscored that the education by the Green Berets and the US Marine Corp is not 
primarily about counter-terrorism; it is about standardised infantry tactics.388  
 
In June 2003, Shevardnadze once again called for US support in relation to the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He stated that all conflicts in Georgia must be discussed in the 
context of anti-terrorism.389 This is clearly a political, rather than a military, statement. By 
defining the problem as one of terrorism, it gives legitimacy for handling it with extraordinary 
means. By definition any forms of negotiations with terrorists are politically impossible to 
carry out. Arguably, such statements would corner Shevardnadze in this issue and it might 
infringe on the possibilities to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.  
 
Nevertheless, American commitments, with or without Georgian assistance, concerning ‘anti-
terrorist’ activities or regaining Georgian territorial integrity, are not on the agenda. It does 
not matter is, occasionally, requests for such undertakings in Pankisi or Abkhazia are heard 
from Georgian officials.390 This is a case-point as it highlights three intertwined things. 
Firstly, it shows that the Georgian government wishes to increase the cooperation with the US 
far beyond what is agreed on. The government’s considerations of Kremlin’s opinions are 
thus low, to say the least. Secondly, it draws a clear line for American commitments. Finally, 
it highlights the fact that in the cooperation, America is the part that dictates the scope of the 
cooperation, not only financially.  
 
The Kremlin Dimension 
Georgian flirtations with NATO do not have a deterrent effect on Russian interest in Georgia, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov said in late September of 2002.391 Even if Russia is 
weak, it is stronger than Georgia and still plays a major role in the region. In August of 2002, 
Russia held its largest post-Soviet military exercises in the Caspian region. The intention was 
allegedly to focus on the battle against terrorism and was not meant to be against any 
particular state, Russian officials declared.392 Often, these kinds of exercises are interpreted in 
terms of power projection and a least it show that some of Russia’s intentions. Yet, as late as 
spring of 2003, at the height of the Iraqi war, Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia saw the 
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GTEP as a net gain for Russia.393 It is nevertheless true; the risks of upsetting Russia, is of no 
concern for Georgia, at least not in the light of the cooperation with the United States. The 
reason for that is, in the view of Temuri Yakobashvili, that it does not matter what is done 
along the borders of Russia. If Russia does not control the area, it will not approve of 
anything of such kind and therefore Georgia can pursue whatever policy it prefers.394  
 
In a long-term perspective, if one assumes that the US is ‘rewarded’ permanent access to air 
force bases in Georgia as a result of its military and financial assistance. This would have a 
great impact on the relations in the region. First, it would not be appreciated by Russia to have 
even more American soldiers positioned along its southern tier. Second, by this, the US could 
reach not only Russia but also the Middle Eastern countries from the north. If further wars 
were taking place in the Middle East, such access would be an asset for the US, especially 
since Saudi Arabia is reluctant to support such actions. This assumption may not be as far-
fetched as it might seem and at least the idea is worth some consideration, no matter if the 
article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, quoted in previous case study, has any substance or not.  
 
Yet another episode that supports the argument of the importance of perceptions, is the 
statements by Irina Sarishvili from the Governments Bloc political Party in mid-June 2003. 
She states that Russian Special Service (unspecified which of them, presumably SVR) is 
conducting covert operation with the intention to destabilise Georgia. Sarishvili, in relation to 
the Kmara-campaign, launched this idea in spring of 2003 and she stated that Moscow’s 
intention was to replace the Shevardnadze regime. Furthermore, she argues that Russia had 
planned the operations for August but it was carried out earlier than planned due to the 
tension in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. It was said to be followed by increased criminal 
activity and discrediting of Georgia in world affairs along with increased domestic tension. 
The Russian General HQ’s plan is, according to Sarishvili, to support Chechnyan General 
Ruslan Gelaev and the invasion by his 1000-men strong army into Georgia on which the 
Russian Army would follow. Sarishvili claims to know the identity of the actors involved, but 
has so far refused to make it public. Additionally she accused Vladimir Putin, as he is the one 
that gives orders to the General HQ. Due to the claims by Sarishvili, The Georgian Messenger 
calls for stronger actions by the government, to handle pro-Russian actors in Georgia and 
clear up its relations with Moscow. However, Tbilisi needs Moscow’s help in handling 
refugees from Abkhazia and if it is shown that the there is no ground for these accusations, it 
can be concluded that Sarishvili only tried to score some additional points before the general 
election.395  
 
‘Commitment by Default’ 
This leads to the idea that American interests, vital or not, are not directly connected to 
survival, but relate to US foreign policy in general, as Zbgniew Brzezinski discusses.396 He 
poses a set of broad questions concerning the American endeavours in Eurasia which include 
the following three:  
 
What kind of Russia is in America’s interest, and what and how much can America do about it? 
What are the prospects for the emergence in Central Eurasia of a new ‘Balkans,’ and what 
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should America do to minimize the resulting risks? What new Eurasian coalitions are possible, 
which might be most dangerous to U.S. interests, and what needs to be done to preclude them? 
397
 
 
As indicated, this bears importance and the first case has partly been discussed already. A 
hostile, or at least non-cooperative Russia is of no gain neither for the US, nor for Georgia. 
However, the Georgian-American cooperation, especially on security, does nothing to reduce 
the likeliness of such a development. Concerning the second question, the cooperation is 
fruitful. A strong, stable and democratic authority in Tbilisi would decrease any problems 
with ‘balkanisation’ and given a stronger economic situation, Georgia would be able to handle 
the Russian presence without suffering from the yoke of dependence. Finally, Georgia is not a 
part of any coalition that threatens the US. Emergence of such structures is yet not plausible. 
However, there are other risks worth penetrating. 
 
François Heisbourg defines three main risks of the US foreign policy. First, the US can be 
seen as overemphasising the use of force. Maybe this is not the case in Georgia, but a military 
presence will certainly have a similar effect on Russia. Second, even if that is the case, the 
‘trigger-happy sheriff’ maybe reluctant to come, when called upon. Finally, the US can be 
seen as a paper tiger, unwillfull to make sacrifices other than for its own vital interests.398 
Nevertheless, the US can be a ‘trigger-happy sheriff’ and a paper tiger at the same time. 
Extending this idea further, one risk is that the US reluctantly will end up in a military conflict 
by its very presence. Even if the US commitment to military affairs, or as guarantor of peace 
and stability, is neither explicit in rhetoric, nor as a hidden agenda - deepened presence will 
enhance the risks. This could happen in two ways: first, as a situation where the regional 
states invite the US to take on an active military role; second as a ‘commitment by default’. 
The first case is rather unlikely as America has refused such proposals, but the second idea is 
worth exploring.  
 
‘Commitment by default’ is thus a risk derived from the plain fact that the US has troops for 
educational purposes. Having troops on foreign ground provides a military target and they 
will likely be protected as such, even if their role in the region is of a passive and peaceful 
nature. Its very presence thereby poses a risk. RAND comes to a similar conclusion and 
highlights that if the US is engaged in a region with political tension, this does not only affect 
them, but the US affects the situation too. In addition, the US has responsibilities towards the 
local Government that must be considered when exit strategies are formed.399 As indicated, if 
Georgia fails to develop into a democratic state, the US will withdraw most of its 
commitments, David Smith argues.400 However, Menagharishvili states that this is of no 
concern when cooperating. The reason is that if Georgia so does, the problems are so 
overwhelming that US support takes only a marginal role.401 
 
Even if the US does not end up in a conflict, as discussed above, the opposite scenario is risky 
too. The US is trying to win the hearts and minds of the Georgians by showing a huge interest 
in the region and provides aid and expertise in many ways. This creates a situation of trust and 
cooperation with shared goals and joint ventures for promoting security with common allies 
and against common enemies. By applying a cognitive aspect, the ‘realist’ setting of 
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conflictual dynamics may create a situation where the expectation of a presumed ally rises 
more than what the US is willing to handle. This involves two risks. The first is that Georgia 
cannot count on US support when it needs it, which will affect future relations. The second is 
that if one regional state presumes that Georgia has military support from the US, the existing 
security dilemma gets stronger. Cognitions become consolidated. This will infringe Georgia’s 
possibilities to interact with other states in the region. 
 
Exit Strategies of Cooperation 
As mentioned previously, there is no point in ending Georgian-US cooperation for the sake of 
it. However, the forms of cooperation will undoubtedly change over time. Alan Dobson raises 
the question of such a withdrawal in general. He argues that exit strategies must be related to 
a consolidation of archived goals.402 Three options come at hand for the US. First, 
withdrawing all aid, support and commitment from the region. Second, handing over all 
security ‘responsibility’ they have been engaged in to a third party, either a regional state or 
an organisation like the OSCE or the UN. The final option is to consolidate the own presence 
in a long-term perspective. This bears importance as shifts in the alliances and quasi-alliances 
are based on perceptions. If the setting changes – it will also affect the US’ plan of priorities. 
In either case, the US might single-handedly withdraw from cooperation, if its prioritisation 
changes. RAND concludes: 
 
And whatever choices the United States makes in coming years, as long as it remains involved in 
the region at all, its local unrest, conflict, and economic and political problems, themselves 
possibly exacerbated by the evolving situation in Afghanistan, will complicate U.S. military and 
other efforts in Central Asia, South Caucasus, and beyond.403 
 
Michael Emerson, states that as the US is much more involved in the Near East than the EU 
is, it has greater prospects from having an impact. Furthermore, he states that that from now 
on, the US has, basically, two options, as far as conflict resolution is concerned. The first 
option is to support Georgia in peace mediation over Abkhazia and promotes its NATO 
aspirations, which naturally have the disadvantage of agonizing Russia. The second option is 
to take on the role as one of three actors along with Russia and the EU. As Russian interests in 
solving the frozen conflicts are few, Emerson believes that this scenario is less plausible.404 
Likewise, Kathleen O’Halloran argues that “[t]he U.S. should adopt a strategy that assures it 
will retain the flexibility to choose when and where to use its power and influence, at what 
time.”405 In sum, this is a core of the asymmetric cooperation between Georgia and the United 
States.  
 
4.5 Conclusions  
By pinpointing the findings of this study, it can be said that an unfavourable perception of the 
US by a regional actor is not by definition a threat to security or a strategic problem. Still, the 
effects of these ‘soft’ perceptions are indeed related to security as they underlie political 
action. Accordingly, these ‘soft’ risks can move into the ‘hard’, physical realm. Subsequently, 
it might cause other problems and thus deserves attention from policy-makers. These 
problems can be related to Georgia, the US or both. In any case, it would affect future 
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cooperation. There is nothing in this study that shows any of such a danger that cooperation 
should be reduced.  
 
It must be remembered that a threat is something negative that might happen in the future. 
Although ‘might happen’ is not the same as existing intentions to realise it, it can be argued 
that everything or anything might happen. When an actor’s intention exists along with 
capacity to realise a threat, it becomes an issue of priority. This poses a risk that is a function 
of the consequences of what might happen and the probability for it to happen. If the 
consequences or probability is fatal and/or high, there is a high level risk.406 These risks are 
not only related to the threats themselves but also to how they are perceived. Even if 
intentions are rarely known, risks need to be assessed, as the consequences may be serious. 
However, even if the probability of several independent parameters or consequences is high, 
it does not make the total outcome probable.407 More important, there is a risk of error due to 
mistake or misinformation, but also, a risk of being ignorant or having informative vacuity.408  
 
In order to facilitate understanding of the strategic problems related to Georgian-American 
security cooperation, this chapter divides the issues discussed hitherto into the ‘soft’ 
perceptive problems and the ‘hard’ realist ones. By this, this chapter seeks to answer the 
question posed in chapter one: what long-term issues and risks are connected with the US-
Georgian security cooperation? Nonetheless, a few general comments can be made. First of 
all, the two objective of US policy in Georgia have been at a focus of this study and it has 
attempted to highlight the implications related to this. Potential positive outcome of the 
Georgian-US cooperation has thus been deliberately neglected and must be the object for 
further study. Moreover it can be concluded that the cooperation has a great impact both in 
military and civil aspects. Concerning ‘soft’ security issues, three main things can be said. 
 
Firstly, the US-Georgian security cooperation may create expectations related to future 
commitment. The very presence of the US can create expectations that the capabilities and 
intentions of Washington cannot or do not want to handle. It has been shown that Tbilisi 
would preferably see an enhanced level of commitment possible by military means. In 
addition to this, the US runs the risk of being seen as either a ‘trigger happy sheriff’ or a 
‘paper tiger’. Indeed, this is no new situation for American foreign policy, but it would also 
affect Georgia if regional actors have a negative impression of the cooperation - especially if 
it is unjustified. High stake commitment by the US is unlikely, even if Georgia so wishes. 
This emphasises an asymmetrical aspect of the cooperation. 
 
Secondly, the US can, once again, be seen as a supporter of authoritarian and corrupt 
regimes. However, it has been discussed above that dogmatic adherence to democracy might 
be counter-productive. Nevertheless, as long as the Georgian-American cooperation covers 
substantially more than support for the regime, such criticism is out of context. Besides, 
Georgia’s elements of authoritarianism are low and attention is given to decrease the level of 
corruptions. Therefore there are reasons to believe that this point is of minor importance. 
 
Finally, there can be a discrepancy in the understanding of Georgian security by Washington 
and Tbilisi. Georgian and American conceptions of security must harmonise if the 
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cooperation is to be successful in the long run. This is one of the most fundamental aspects 
that all forms of cooperation must take into consideration. From what has been said it is clear 
that in most cases, this harmony is limping severely. In addition, efforts must be made to 
convince the public of the general advantage of cooperation, otherwise it endanger the 
positive outcome of cooperation.  
 
If the ‘hard’ issues are under the magnifying glass, four things emerge. Firstly, the advent of a 
new security context may change the venue of cooperation. In the quasi-alliance system, the 
US interferes at the regional level, which will create a new security context as both an 
internal, and external, transformation occurs. By and large, the US is a part of the Israel-
Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis. The other axis consists of Russia-Armenia-Iran. Judging 
from the US objectives in the region, it can be said that this is what Washington prefers. A 
serious implication may arise if this worsens Georgia’s position towards any of the regional 
states. As it seems, Georgia is willing to take that risk. 
 
Secondly, the US could be ending up in a conflict by its very presence. It has been argued that 
the US strategic engagement in Georgia brings about risks that may have not existed 
otherwise, although the US’ troops are of a modest size so far. The deeper and wider the 
military presence is, the higher the risk is. There is yet nothing that highlights this risk as far 
as military actions are concerned, but if the commitments a deepened and widened, it must be 
taking into the equation.  
 
Thirdly, handling of what is thought of to be a zero-sum game. When the US as a strong and 
in the region unthreatened, state cooperates with Georgia on regional security matters it 
provides stability. Only if it is carried out in a way that does not bring about higher risks than 
before, the progress is given. It is clear that several actors, especially Russia, consider the 
undertakings in the Caucasus as a highly prioritised zero-sum game. This needs to be handled 
in order to prevent a renewed, and costly, regional power struggle but the US and Georgia do 
little in this aspect.  
 
Finally, commitment is a double-edged sword. No commitment is safe for the US as it can end 
up being in the middle of a conflict. At the same time, its presence can stabilise the situation. 
The intentions or capabilities to realise threats are not accounted for in this study and the 
actual level of the risks mentioned cannot be assessed, as the methodological tools are 
insufficient for such a quantitative undertaking. 
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FINAL REMARKS 
It can be said that drawing any specific conclusions from the three case studies in this paper 
would serve no purpose, as they are all different in style and content. However, a general 
impression is that although Georgia has been trying to organise its security for over a decade, 
it is too early to judge and evaluate the reform and actions undertaken. Assessments above 
largely indicate that there are several steps in a reform. First an awareness of the needs of 
reform must emerge. Secondly, problems must be identified and thirdly an agenda or action 
plan must be formulated. Fourthly, implementation should be made and finally an evaluation 
is possible. This study has looked at all of these five points and in relation to that, two things 
can be said. Firstly, the first step has been fulfilled, while the second and third is emerging in 
a vague and unclear way. The fourth and fifth step has with a few exceptions not really been 
launched. The prospects for the future greatly depend on the forthcoming laws, regulations, 
concepts and doctrines and most of all on their implementation. Apart from this, and what has 
been stated above, further speculations will not be made.  
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix 1 - Acronyms 
AFP Agence France Presse 
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier 
APF Azerbaijan Popular Front 
BBC British Broadcasting System 
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
CAST Centre for Anti-terrorism and Security Training 
CDI Center for Defense Information 
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
EBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and Development  
FOA Försvarets Forskningsanstalt, since 2001 FOI 
FOI Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GTEP Georgian Train-and-Equip Programme 
GUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova 
GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova 
ICCS International Crime Control Strategy 
ISAB International Security Advisory Board 
IHT International Herald Tribune 
IGO International Governmental Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INOGATE Interstate oil and gas transport to Europe 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MOI Ministry of Interior 
MOJ Ministry of Justice 
MSS Ministry of State Security 
MVD See MOI 
NATO Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBR National Bureau of Asian Research 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NSS National Security Strategy  
NUPI Norsk Utenrikspolitik Institutt 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PfP Partnership for Peace 
PPP Purchase Power Parity  
RFL/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia 
UN United Nations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
WB The World Bank 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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Appendix 2 – Intra-Caucasian Relations 
 
Table 2: Intra -Caucasian Relations  
 
 USA Russia Azer. Arm. Georgia Iran Turkey 
USA  P/N P P P N P 
Russia P/N  N P N P N 
Azer. P N  N P N P 
Arm. P P N  P P N 
Georgia P N P P  P P 
Iran N P N P P  P 
Turkey P N P N P P  
P = positive relation, N = negative relation, P/N = altering positive/negative  
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Appendix 3 – Paramilitary Groups etc. 
Existing Paramilitary Groups and Militias 
Chechens: Allegedly, Chechen fighters cross the Georgian border in numerous places, but mainly to the Pankisi 
Gorge. Georgian authorities have since 2001 launched several unsuccessful campaigns to regain control over the 
gorge. Arab fighters on the Chechen side have also taken a refugee from Russian military in the Gorge. This is a 
major source of instability and a prioritised need for the government to handle. 
 
Private Security Companies: Although the rules and laws concerning private security companies are unclear, 
several exist. Occasionally they have enjoyed police status by bribing officials in order to get around the 
regulations on the right to carry arms.409 
 
‘Aslan Abashidze’s Force’: Currently, the ruler of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, has his own MSS and MOI in 
addition to his loyal personal guards. The Georgian 25th Motorised Rifle Brigade located in Adjara has also been 
suspected of having loyalty to Abashidze rather than to Tbilisi, as it mainly consists of Adjarians. An indication 
of the autonomy of the local forces is that they occasionally carry out military exercises without notifying Tbilisi 
in advance. 
 
Forest Brothers: This is a Georgian guerrilla in Abkhazia and Mingrelia, led by David Shengelia. Claims are 
heard that they are cooperating with the Abkhazian ‘enemy’ in order to make money on smuggling in Gali and 
Zugdidi. 
 
White Legion: Mixture of bandits and freedom fighters armed with grenades, machine guns and mines. Located 
in Abkhazia.410 
 
Hunter Militia Battalion: This is a small group found in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, which formerly served 
the MOI and the MOD. 
 
Mingrelian and Svanetian Groups: Small groups of guerrillas and armed bandits that usually do not leave the 
forests of Mingrelia and Svaneti. 
 
Association of Georgian Patriots: This group created by Zarandia is comprised of old supporters of 
Gamsakhurdia. Currently the stand on Shevardnadze’s side and is lightly armed and can be hired for various 
tasks, rumours claim 
 
Parentsi: Located in Javakheti, it consists of Armenians that oppose the Georgian military presence in the region 
and support the Russians.411 
 
Feydan: The existence of this group has not been confirmed other than by the Alia Newspaper. It is said to be 
located in Javakheti and trained and equipped at the Russian base in Akhalkhalaki.412 
 
‘Kakheti Group’: As a response to the tension in Pankisi, local residents set up a paramilitary force that now is 
dissolved. However, the former members still are in the possession of weapons and occasionally helps the local 
authorities in Telavi.413 
 
Former Paramilitary Groups and Militias414 
National Groups 
Mkhedrioni: Group created by Djaba Ioseliani who currently, after having been released from prison, was 
appointed by Shevardnadze as security chief of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. Consisted of some 2500 
servicemen and later merged with official Georgian structures. 
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Imedi – Hope: 200 men strong group that had the role of an armed branch of the political party ‘Popular Front’. 
Now it is a part of the National Guards. 
Tetri Georgi – White George: Faction of the Mkhedrionis that later joined the political organisation of 
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the early 1990s.  
Falcon Legion: Some 50 men that in the late 1980s refused to join the Soviet Army. 
Tetri Artsivi – White Eagles: Militia during the South Ossetian conflict in 1990-91. It comprised of some 120 
men that later merged with the National Guards.  
Orbi: Old paramilitary group that joined the National Guards. 
Zviadist Forces of a National Guard Faction: Group of 2200 men.  
Sachkhere Squadron: A 200-500 men strong group from Western Georgia that in the 1990s was incorporated 
in the National Guard. 
 
In South Ossetia 
South Ossetian OMON: 700-800 men that made the foundation of a special purpose military unit under the 
responsibility of the South Ossetian authorities. 
South Ossetia Secessionist National Guard: 2200 men strong in early 1990s. 
South Ossetian Republican Guards: Group of less than 100 men. 
Adamon Nykhas: Armed wing of the political opposition in South Ossetia. 
 
In Abkhazia 
Abkhaz Secssionist National Guard Regiment: Some 4500 soldiers. 
Aidgylara Militia: A 100 men strong armed wing of the political opposition to the government in Abkhazia 
Abkhaz Ministry of the Interior Battalion: Internal troops of the unrecognised government of Abkhazia. 
Consisted of several hundred soldiers. 
Abkhaz Volunteers (Russian/Cossack mercenaries): Group of up to 4500 men in 1991-1993. 
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Appendix 4 – Georgian Military in Abkhazia 
Georgian Military Forces in Abkhazia in 2001.415 
 
Guard Company 
Strength: 60 
Equipment: 4 APCs (BTR-70), 1 self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system 3CU-23-4 ‘Shilka’  
 
Communications Company 
Strength: 50 
Equipment: 4 military vehicles P-142, 1 P-145 
  
Army Ground Troops  
Located: East, West and Central 
Strength: five motorised rifle battalions, one rapid reaction unit, two reconnaissance battalions, two armoured 
battalions and three artillery units. 
Equipment: 35-40 MBTs (T-54, T-55, T-66), 80 APC/AIFVs (BTR-70, BMP-1, BMP-2, BRDM-2), 100 
Artillery units (D-30, D-44, C-60, KC-19, T-12, BM-21 "Grad" MRLS)  
 
Air Force  
Strength: 250 
Equipment: Planes: 1 MIG-21, 1 Su-25, 2 L-39, 1 Yak-52; Helicopters: 2 Mi-8 
 
Navy  
Located:  1st div: HQ in Sukhumi  
2nd div: HQ in Bitchvinta 
Strength:  1st div: 70  
2nd div: 25 
Equipment:  1st div: 2 Patrol boats (Grif), 9 Fishing vessels (Volga), 1 Motorboat  
2nd div: 8 Civil boats, 2 Howitzers (85mm D-44), 1 APC/AIFV (BRDM-2)  
 
Air Defence  
Located:  1st div: HQ in Ochamchire  
2nd div: HQ in Agudzera  
3rd div: HQ in Bitchvinta 
Strength:  1st div: 90 on paper (50 in reality)  
2nd div: 160 on paper (60 in reality)  
3rd div: 70 
Equipment: 1st div: 9 Anti-aircraft artillery (ZU-23-2), 1 100mm anti-aircraft gun, ~10 Shoulder-launched 
surface-to-air missiles (Strela, Igla)  
2nd div: 4 Self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery (ZSU-23-4 Shilka), 2 100mm anti-aircraft guns, 
~12 Shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (Strela, Igla)  
3rd div: 3 Anti-aircraft artillery (ZU-23-2), 3 57mm anti-aircraft guns (S-60), ~8 Shoulder-
launched surface-to-air missiles (Strela, Igla).  
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Appendix 5 – National Security Council 
The law of Georgia on the National Security Council 416 
 
Article 1. National Security Council  
In Accordance with Article 99 of the Constitution of Georgia the National Security Council is established to 
build up military forces and to organize defence of the country and it is headed by the President of Georgia.  
 
Article 2. Status of the National Security Council  
The National Security Council is the consultative body of the President of Georgia for taking decisions on the 
strategic issues of building up military forces, organizing defence, domestic and foreign policy relating to state 
security, stability and law and order providing. The Constitution of Georgia determines the composition, 
authority and procedure of activity of the National Security Council by this law and other legislative acts.  
 
Article 3. Authority of the President of Georgia. 
The National Security Council:  
a) Provides the elaboration of national security conception  
b) Considers the main issues of domestic and foreign policy relating to providing of state defence and security  
c) Considers the programs of building up and strengthening military forces and provides the organization of its 
implementation  
d) Studies and analyses the situation and perspectives in regions of international conflicts  
e) Elaborates the proposals on cooperation of Georgia with collective security systems  
f) In accordance with international agreements and treaties concluded with and by Georgia considers the issues 
of participation of Georgia in measures of security providing out of the bounders of the country 
g) Considers the issues of permitting the entry, use and movement of military forces of other state on the 
territory of Georgia for the purpose of state defence in special cases and cases envisaged by law;  
h) Elaborates drafts of law and other normative acts on defence and national security issues; 
i) Annually submits the strength of military forces to the Parliament of Georgia;  
j) Considers the issues of readiness of military forces for action and mobilization  
k) Prepares the directive documents of the President of Georgia - Supreme Commander in Chief of military 
forces in order to implement the planned tasks 
l) Coordinates military scientific-research activity 
m) Considers the perspectives of functioning and development of military industry  
n) Considers the issues of training and distribution of military personnel, performance and mobilization of 
military duties; 
o) Coordinates the activity of defence, state security and law enforcement institutions in strategic issues on 
providing security, law and order and stability  
p) Controls the activity of ministries, state departments, corporations and other state bodies, state governments of 
Autonomous Republics and institutions of local government in the field of security and defence  
q) On the base of labour contracts invites scientists and specialists from organizations, scientific-research 
institutions, economical, legal, sociological and political centers  
r) Elaborates and submits to the President of Georgia the complex of measures on exposure, prediction, 
prevention and naturalization of domestic and foreign threats against vital interests of the country;  
s) During a state of emergency elaborates proposals for prevention or elimination of hard political, social, 
economical, ecological and other consequences  
t) Organizes and controls the elaboration and implementation of necessary measures for reliable defence of 
objects of vital importance and their safe functioning;  
u) Considers the issues relating to the declaration of a state of war or a state of emergency by the President of 
Georgia  
v) Considers the issues relating to the appointing of the representative of the President in  
the region of emergency situation  
w) Implements other authorities envisaged by Georgian legislation  
 
Article 4. Composition of the National Security Council  
The members of the National Security Council are: the President of Georgia (the Head of the Council), State 
Minister of Georgia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of State Security, Minister of 
Internal Affairs and the Secretary of the National Security Council.  
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The President of Georgia appoints these and other members of National Security Council.  
The Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, the Chairman of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and 
Adjaria directly participate in the activity of the National Security Council.  
The Secretary of the National Security Council is the Assistant to the President on National Security Issues by 
his\her position.  
 
Article 5. The authority of the Secretary of the National Security Council  
The Secretary of National Security Council:  
a) Provides the organization of the activity of the National Security Council  
b) Heads the Apparatus of the National Security Council  
c) Submits the structure and regular staff of the Apparatus of the National Security Council to the President of 
Georgia  
d) Prepares sittings of the National Security Council  
e) Controls the implementation of orders and decrees of the President of Georgia and his other acts on national 
security issues  
f) Coordinates the activity of permanent and temporary joint commissions established  
by the National Security Council 
g) Sings labour contracts and orders of the National Security Council on expert analytical works  
h) Signs official documents in the framework of his\her competence  
 
Article 6. The Rule of Consideration of Issue in the National Security Council  
The President of Georgia gathers the sittings of the National Security Council.  
The member of the National Security Council elaborate recommendations on issues considered for the purpose 
of taking decisions by the President of Georgia.  
 
Article 7. Joint Commissions of the National Security Council  
The National Security Council established permanent or temporary joint commissions on functional or regional 
ground in conformity with the main tasks of its activity.  
The permanent or temporary commission by proposal of the National Security Council is headed by the member 
of the national security council or a person authorized so by the President of Georgia.  
 
The authority, procedure of establishment and activity of the commissions of the National Security Council is 
determined by regulations, approved by the President of Georgia.  
 
Article 8. The Apparatus of the National Security Council  
The Apparatus of the National Security Council provides organizational- technical and informative-analytical 
activity of the National Security Council. The Secretary of the National Security Council heads the Apparatus. 
The President of Georgia approves the structure of regular staff and regulations of the Apparatus of the National 
Security Council.  
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Appendix 6 - Budget Figures of the MOD 
 
Table 3: Budget of the Ministry of Defence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State Budget of Georgia.  
67.9 0.87 7 800.0 2003 
38.5 0.52 7 300.0 2002 
34.60 0.5 6 800.0 2001 
43.75 0.69 6 300.0 2000 
55.00 0.98 5 600.0 1999 
Million. 
GEL 
% of 
GDP 
Expected 
GDP, 
Million. 
 
Year 
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Appendix 7 – MOD Spending 2001417 
 
Figure 1: Budget Spending of the MOD 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State Budget of Georgia 
 
Explanation of diagram:  
 
1. Procurement of materiel 
2. Payroll of the Defence Forces 
3. Upkeep of conscripts (excluding salaries) 
4. Rents  
5. Other operational expenses of the Defence Forces 
6. Peace-keeping 
7. Costs of value added tax  
8. Other expenditure of the administrative branch 
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 This diagram was prepared by Tamara Pataraia on the basis on the state budget. 
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Appendix 8 – MOD Spending 2002418

Figure 2: Budget Spending of the MOD 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State Budget of Georgia 
 
Explanation of diagram 
 
1. Payroll of the Defence Forces 
2. Upkeep of conscripts (excluding salaries) 
3. Rents 
4. Other operational expenses of the Defence Forces 
5. Peacekeeping costs 
6. Costs of VAT 
7. Other expenses of the administrative branch 
8. Procurement of materiel 
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Appendix 9 - Defense Forces, April 2003419 
 
GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES 
Tanks 
31 T -72 main battle tanks 
59  T-55  
 
Armored Combat Vehicles 
68 BMP -1 
13 BMP-2 
18 BRM-1K BRDM-1/BRDM-2 BTR-50 
1 BTR-60 
18 BTR-70 
3 BTR-80 
144 MT-LB 
5 BRB-3 
 
ARTILLERY 
Guns/Howitzers/SP  
60 122-mm D-30 towed howitzer 
1 100-mm KS-19 towed anti-tank gun 
# 85-mm D-44 towed field gun 
3 152-mm 2A36 
10 152-mm 2A65 
1 152-mm 2S3 SP 
1 203-mm 2S7 SP 
 
Multiple Rocket Launchers 
16 122-mm BM-21 Grad Mortar 
17 M-120 120-mm 
 
MISSILES 
Anti-tank 
# AT-3 Sagger /AT-4 Spigot 
# Russian 9K11 Malyutka/9K111 Fagot 
 
AIRCRAFT 
Fighter/Attack 
7 Su-25 Frogfoot 
5 Su-17 Fitter (non-operational) 
9 L-29 
 
Helicopters 
10 UH-1H Iroquois, transport 
4 Mi-8 Hip transport 
3 Mi-24 Hind attack 
2 Mi-2 Hoplite training 
 
Training 
10 L-39C Albatros Transport 
1 Tu-134 VIP 
6 An-2 transport 
2 Yak-40 transport 
 
Surface-to-Air 
(75 launchers including:) 
                                                 
419
 Information mainly from: - The Military Balance 2002-2003, London: The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 
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# SA-2 Guidline (Russian S-57 Dvina) 
# SA-3 Goa (Russian S-125 Neva) 
# SA-5 Gammon (Russian S-200 Angara) 
 
Radio Direction Finding Systems 
4 P-18 
1 19J6 
2 P-15 
2 P-12 
2 PRV-16 
 
	

2 L-125 
 
VESSELS 
Patrol Craft 
1(+2) LINDAU (Type 331) class (Germany) 
2 DILIOS class 
 
Coastal Patrol Craft 
2     Mk. 5 
1 Commander ship 
3 Artillery ship 
1 Artillery-Rocket launcher ship 
2 Artillery boat 
1 Paratrooper ship 
1 Paratrooper boat 
1 Large patrol boat 
1 Diving boat 
1 Cruiser boat 
1 River boat 
1 Hydrographic boat 
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Appendix 10 – MOD Structure 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of Georgian Ministry of Defence 2002 
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